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Summary 
This thesis maps out business networks among listed companies in China and 
investigates their consequences on firms’ access to financial resources, profitability and 
stock return volatility. Using data from China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
database and Datastream database from 1997 to 2011, this study identifies business 
networks among listed companies and model their effects using micro econometric 
modeling approach. The statistics show that the number of firms in business networks is 
expanding considerably over the years. However, networks do not develop evenly 
across sectors, and state-owned enterprises play a prominent role. The empirical 
analysis suggests that firms in business networks have superior access to long-term 
debts, short-term debts, trade credit and have more efficient working capital 
management and sufficient cash for investment. The effects of business networks on 
firms’ access to financial resources are mediated by ownership of listed companies and 
nature of business networks. Furthermore, we find business networks affect firm 
performance negatively. Evidence suggests firms in business networks experience 
higher management cost. Ownership networks and collaboration networks, among three 
types of business networks, show to have significant influence over firms’ management 
cost and performance. Interestingly, concentrated ownership acts as a mediator for 
network effects. Finally, this study also presents evidence that firms in business networks 
experience more volatile stock returns. In particular, network structures have significant 
influence over firm stock return volatility. To conclude, our study shows that business 
networks may induce both positive and negative effects, which provide insights to firm 
strategy-making in terms of engaging with business networks to achieve organizational 
goals. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations 
There is an article posted on the Forbes website that discusses the extent of global 
corporate control. In his post, the author suggests there are 147 companies that control 
everything (Upbin, 2011). Based on a model of who owns what, the 147 companies control 
40% of wealth in a network of 37 million companies and investors worldwide. Coffey (2011) 
examined the data and further points out that there are four companies that control the 147 
companies that own everything. Similar statistics abound. For example, ten multinationals 
control almost all the world’s food brands (Bradford, 2012). It can easily be seen therefore 
that firm interconnectedness is a common occurrence.  As Granovetter (1985) suggests, 
firms are embedded in concrete, on-going systems of social relations rather than existing 
as single atoms outside of social contexts.  
These impressive figures suggest that firms are enmeshed and linked by complex 
relationships or networks.  Researchers have identified and investigated many such types 
of business network. For example, North American conglomerates (Davis et al., 1994), 
Japan’s keiretsus (Gerlach, 1992), South Korea’s chaebols (Chang, 2003), supplier 
networks (Jarillo, 1988), and alliance networks (Gulati, 1998). These types of business 
networks constitute our global economy.  
Networks are particularly important for firms in emerging economies, such as China, 
where the institutional environment is relatively weak and the market is imperfect (Achrol & 
Kotler, 1999; Jia & Wang, 2013). In these environments, transaction costs such as finding 
cost, negotiation cost, and contracting cost are very high, and business networks can 
provide a mechanism to reduce transaction costs and their associated uncertainty (Achrol 
& Kotler, 1999). In networks, members are familiar with each other and exchange favors for 
the promotion of the organizational purpose (Gu et al., 2008). Through repeated interactions, 
norms and trust would be established, which govern networked firms’ sharing and 
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exchanging of expertise, information, knowledge, and resources. Disputes are resolved 
using network norms instead of formal laws, which are inefficient in many emerging 
economies (Jia & Wang 2013). Aside from gaining market-orientated benefits, networks are 
associated with superior information processing and flexible monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 
1999). Research literature on business groups (e.g. Lamin, 2013; Mahmood et al., 2011) 
also documents that business units affiliate in groups to pass each other resources and 
information, especially in emerging economies. 
These inter-firm relationships are evident worldwide but are particularly popular in the 
emerging economies where the need for business networks is greater due to the prevalence 
of market failure and information problems (Manos et al., 2007). Business networks have 
been seen to be capable of filling institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu; 1997, 2000). For 
example, Japanese and Korean business groups are characterized by their superior 
capability of absorbing new technology, delivering stable financial performance, and 
achieving international competitiveness (Ma & Lu, 2005). In China, which is an emerging as 
well as a transition economy, firms extensively form business networks to exchange 
organizational purpose. China’s deeply rooted culture system has fostered a boom in 
various types of relations that promote the development of business networks (Li, 2013). 
Evidence suggests that business groups in China have contributed to over 60% of its 
industrial economic output (Yiu et al., 2005), and Sha & Zeng (2014) indicate that over 50% 
of listed companies in China are involved in cross share-holding networks. 
The prominence of various business networks is an important feature of the global 
economy (Lechner & Leyronas, 2009), and understanding business networks is key to 
understanding the global economy. The increasing number of network studies over time 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011) and the application of network linkages (Guler & Guillen, 2010) 
have outlined the importance of business networks. Firms construct linkages to effectively 
develop value-adding partnerships (Phusavat et al., 2010). Firms view connections with 
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whom they are networked as being ranked among their own resources. By adopting and 
managing appropriate network strategies, firms can achieve or sustain competitive 
advantages (Pablos, 2005). For example, Lenovo has achieved significant success by 
managing its relationship with its partners and competitors (Shen & Wu, 2004). It has 
managed to establish marketing channels, gain managerial expertise, access new 
technological advancements, and obtain advantages in taxes and finance through 
establishing relationships with partners, universities, and governments respectively. 
Literature on networks (e.g. Park & Luo, 2001; Lee, Pae & Wong, 2001) has argued that 
network affiliations are positively related to sales growth, market expansion performance, 
firm efficiency, and operating performance. 
It is important for firms to adopt the appropriate network strategy as network 
connections are crucial and can even determine the survival and growth of the firm. Goplan 
et al. (2007) investigate the role of business groups and indicate that the main function of a 
business group is to support firms in crisis. He et al. (2013) also suggest that firms in 
business groups in China are less at risk of going bankrupt. Colli et al. (2015) point out that 
affiliating into business networks is an important force for growth. It is therefore argued that 
firms with the appropriate network strategy can achieve growth and are less likely to go 
bankrupt. 
Given the importance of business networks for business units, the relationship between 
business network affiliation and firm performance is widely researched in emerging 
economies (Lee et al., 2008; Ramaswamy et al., 2012). However, ambiguity exists about 
the net advantages of business networks since business networks have both bright and 
dark sides. The existing literature reports mixed findings with regard to performance 
implications. On the one hand, numerous studies (e.g. Jensen & Schott, 2014; Markoczy et 
al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Guest & Sutherland, 2010) have reported the benefits of joining 
various business networks. They argue that business networks such as business groups 
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may fill institutional voids that are common in emerging markets, particularly in the transition 
economies (Guest & Sutherland, 2010). Business networks can enhance firm performance 
as affiliation allows firms to internalize market transactions to reduce transaction cost, 
provides superior access to scarce resources, and introduces firms to value-creating 
relationships (Carney et al., 2009). With more internalized transactions in business groups, 
the affiliates may be more likely to access raw materials and intermediate goods (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001). By affiliating to business networks, superior access to scarce resources 
provides for higher combinative potential and increases the ability of firms to respond flexibly 
and efficiently to market demand (Ahuja et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, business networks also involve affiliates in costs that may negatively 
affect their business performance. Isobe et al. (2006) argue that affiliates may suffer from 
the liabilities of business groups. For example, a business group’s bad reputation is a liability 
for an affiliate that would otherwise be unaffected, and its performance will therefore be 
impaired rather than improved. Moreover, even though internal lending among member 
firms may mitigate the exigencies of the affiliates’ cash flow pressures, it is also a primary 
source of endless “triangle debts” and will overall have an adverse impact on the 
performance of affiliates (Peng & Luo, 2000). Furthermore, the complexity of the business 
group’s ownership structure poses significant governance challenges, and thus increases 
management costs for business groups (Gaur & Kumar, 2009). 
The extent of the mixed findings on the consequences of business network affiliation 
presents a valuable opportunity for future research. Given the popularity and importance of 
business networks, the ambiguity of the consequences of affiliation poses challenges for 
firms, who must adopt appropriate network strategies. Given the embeddedness of firms in 
complex network relations (Granovetter, 1985), understanding the impact of business 
networks is vital for firms. However, the mixed results seen in the research constrain our 
understanding of the role of business networks and may lead to firms’ misusing network 
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strategies, which may negatively impact on firm performance. Therefore, it is of significant 
importance for academics and firms to have a more reliable and accurate knowledge of the 
role of business networks. With a more complete understanding of business networks, firms 
can guide their adoption of network strategies to achieve their organizational goals and gain 
competitive advantage. 
We therefore set out to generate a more reliable and comprehensive understanding of 
the nature of business networks by clarifying their role and how they work for firms.  
First of all, we argue that since business networks are contextually sensitive (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002), the way in which we define business networks is crucial to determining 
network effects. The first step in examining networks is for the researcher to define the 
network by choosing a set of actors and relations. Different definitions of business networks 
could produce different results and creating a good definition of business networks is key. 
However, due to data limitation, previous studies have investigated only individual types of 
firm relationships (Chen & Xie, 2011; Duysters & Lemmens, 2003; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
Such incomplete definitions of business networks cannot capture a representative network. 
An increasing number of network studies have explored various inter-firm networks. For 
example, business groups (e.g. Garney et al., 2009), corporate networks via interlocks (e.g. 
Ren et al., 2009), cross-shareholding networks (e.g. Li et al., 2014), and alliance networks 
(e.g. Wu et al., 2010) are all popular networks to study. These definitions either include 
unnecessary actors or exclude important relations, which constrains our understanding of 
business networks among firms. We therefore set out to establish a good definition that 
includes important and popular cross-dimensional relations between firms. To have a more 
complete definition of business networks, this research uses ‘related relations’ to capture all 
the important connections between firms, including relations from ownership, relations from 
collaboration, and relations from key individuals. 
Secondly, prior studies were hampered by a lack of sufficient quality data and were thus 
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unable to disclose an overall picture of business networks (Ren et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014). 
Data limitations meant that previous studies either used a small sample or one specific to a 
single industry (Wu, 2015; Carney et al., 2009). Most studies investigate networks on the 
basis of a single year, neglecting the dynamic nature of these networks (e.g. Li et al., 2014; 
Wang, 2008). In order to capture the configuration of business networks underlying the 
national economy, a quantitative presentation of business networks and their evolution is 
needed (Li et al., 2014). Our research constructs business networks via related relations 
from a database that includes all the listed companies in China over a 15 year period.  We 
outline the features and dynamics of the firms to gain a direct impression of business 
networks. In this way, a more reliable and accurate understanding of business networks can 
be generated. 
Thirdly, the empirical results of research into the impacts of business networks are 
mixed and a consensus has not yet been reached about the net effects of business network 
affiliation (He et al., 2013).  It cannot however be assumed by researchers or firms that 
business networks have only an upside to affiliation (Byun et al., 2013). The negative effects 
of business networks are increasingly being reported (Gaur & Kumar, 2009; Singh & Gaur, 
2011; Byun et al., 2013) leading to the raising of a fundamental question: why and how do 
business networks survive and continue to grow (Masulis et al., 2011)? Adopting a network 
strategy imposes significant challenges for firms and it is important to investigate the 
benefits and expenses of business networks given the changing environment. The current 
literature has extensively examined the financing advantages of business networks in 
investigating the role of business networks on firms’ debt financing (Byun et al., 2013; 
Mulyani et al., 2016; Manos et al., 2007; Chakraorty, 2013) and internal capital markets (He 
et al., 2013; Gopalan et al., 2007; Buchuk et al., 2014). Researchers expected to find that 
business networks help firms to finance but the empirical results are mixed (Byun et al., 
2013; He et al., 2013). Moreover, debt and the internal capital markets are not the only 
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aspects of firm finance. There are other important channels of firm financing such as trade 
credit and working capital management. It is essential to have a more detailed and accurate 
knowledge of the role of business networks on firm finance since having sufficient capital is 
crucial for firms and can even determine their survival (Bridges & Guariglia, 2008; Clarke et 
al., 2012). With more accurate knowledge of the role of business networks on firm finance, 
firms can confidently adopt network strategies to help them to obtain finance and achieve 
their organizational goals. This study expects to generate a more complete and accurate 
understanding of the role of business networks on firm finance by investigating many 
aspects of firm finance, constructing more inclusive networks, and using a more reliable 
sample.  In this way we hope to partially answer the question raised above.  
Fourthly, since business networks are contextually sensitive (Adler & Kwon, 2002), it is 
important to consider how institutional factors and the nature of business networks affect 
the role of business networks. Many studies have investigated the role of state ownership 
on network effects (e.g. He et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016), however there remains ambiguity. 
For example, He et al. (2013) suggest that the internal capital markets are more pronounced 
among State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) while Liu et al. (2016) claim that the effects of 
business networks are more pronounced among private firms. The role of ownership in 
business networks remains an open question, which is a significant lacuna given the 
importance of state capitalism in China (Lee & Kang, 2012).  Thus, it is essential to study 
the role of ownership on the effects of business networks. When we look at business 
networks in China, we cannot neglect the role of SOEs since SOEs are often the main 
players in the market (Lee & Kang, 2012). Indeed, the existence and prominence of SOEs 
in the market is an important feature of the Chinese economy (Liu et al., 2016). Without 
considering the role of state ownership on network effects, our understanding may be 
incomplete and immature. Knowledge about the role of state ownership on network effects 
helps us to achieve a more reliable and meaningful understanding. We also need to 
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establish whether or not the consequences of business networks are felt more strongly by 
SOEs. In this study we investigate how network composition and the financing advantages 
of business networks are mediated by firms’ state ownership.  In this way we hope to 
achieve a more complete and reliable understanding of business networks. 
Apart from institutional factors that may influence network effects, it is important to 
investigate the role of how different networks work differently for firms. The nature of 
business networks matters because different types of business networks can produce 
different results. For example, Kuo & Wang (2015) indicate that alliance network linkages 
positively affect financial leverage. However, family firms have been found to be less likely 
to finance using leverage, which reduces their fixed cash flow commitments and default 
probabilities (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001). Accurate 
knowledge of how the nature of business networks shapes the role of business networks 
will help firms to adopt a more precise network strategy enabling them to achieve their 
organizational goals. Without such knowledge, firms can easily misuse network strategies 
and therefore be less effective at achieving their goals. Despite the importance of having 
this knowledge, the literature is relatively blank and, to the best of our understanding, there 
is no study investigating the role of the nature of business networks. This study constructs 
ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks in order to examine 
the impact of the nature of business networks. 
Fifthly, as we mentioned above, business network affiliation can be a blessing or a curse 
for a firm.  Even though many studies have investigated the net effects of business networks, 
the literature’s findings, both theoretically and empirically, are mixed concerning the 
relationship between business networks and financial performance. Indeed, the benefits of 
business networks can often go unrealized due to various offsetting costs (Claessens et al., 
2006; Lee et al., 2008; Carney et al., 2011). It is essential to understand the ultimate effects 
of business networks, taking the benefits and costs fully into account.  This will guide firms 
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when they are adopting network strategies. The current state of ambiguity may lead to 
confusion for firms and it is necessary to find a new perspective to clarify the effects of 
business networks.  Previous studies heavily focused on institutional aspects with little 
academic attention being given to the management costs for firms in business networks. 
This study provides an explanation of how firm performance is influenced by network 
affiliation using the effects of business networks on firms’ management cost. We believe this 
new approach to be superior as it considers the costs of business networks, thereby 
providing a more complete and accurate understanding of business networks. 
Sixthly, given the importance of business networks on firm performance, it is necessary 
to understand how firm strategy may also play a part in maximising returns from network 
affiliation. Many studies have investigated the performance implications of business 
networks, but there is little research examining the strategies of network affiliates (Carney 
et al., 2011). Thus, it is unclear whether a firm’s strategies can affect the relationship 
between affiliation and financial performance. We have examined this in the context of firm 
governance by way of its ownership concentration, with particular regard to how ownership 
concentration mediating the relationship between network affiliation and firm performance 
could improve our knowledge about the relationship. With an understanding of how firm 
strategy can affect network effects, practitioners and academics can figure out ways to 
adjust the network effects in order to achieve organizational goals.  
Seventhly, prior studies have investigated the drivers of stock return volatility in terms 
of fundamental factors and trading-volume based factors (Zhang et al., 2010). There are no 
prior attempts to investigate the role of informal contracts, such as business networks, on 
stock return volatility. Given the importance of the understanding of stock return volatility in 
emerging economies (Mahender et al., 2014) and the popularity of various business 
networks in emerging markets (He et al., 2013), it is essential to examine whether there is 
a link between business network affiliation and stock return volatility. The two most recent 
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financial crises (the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the more recent global financial crisis 
in 2008) with their concomitant shockwaves for investors and a higher degree of stock return 
volatility have prompted research seeking to identify the factors that determine firms’ return 
volatility. By directly linking business network affiliation and firm stock return volatility, this 
study identifies the role of informal contracts between firms on firm stock return volatility. 
This knowledge has important implications for firms and policy-makers as both firms and 
policy-makers are sensitive to stock return volatilities.  
Finally, previous studies have extensively investigated the role of business network 
structure on firm performance (Chen & Xie, 2011; Sha & Zeng, 2014). There has however 
been little academic focus on the effects of business network structure on stock return 
volatility. Since different network structures empower firms with different network effects, an 
understanding of the role of business network structure on firm return volatility is essential 
in guiding firms' network strategies. Moreover, previous studies have focused on the effects 
of network position (Chen & Xie, 2011) whereas we need studies that investigate a relatively 
wide set of network structures to advance our understanding of network structure. This study 
investigates how firm stock return volatility is affected by network structures using a 
relatively wide set of network structure measures including network size, network diversity, 
network position, and network dominator. With this knowledge, we are able to have a more 
complete understanding of the effects of network structure. 
 
1.2 Research questions and objectives 
Given the limitations and gaps mentioned above, this research aims to outline business 
networks among firms and investigate the consequences of these business networks. As 
firms are embedded in complex relations which constitute their networks, it is important to 
have a comprehensive understanding of these business networks. Moreover, it is essential 
to know the impacts of these business networks for firms. As business networks are 
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particularly prominent in the emerging economies, it is critical to find an explanation for firms’ 
motivations to affiliate into business networks. This study aims to explain firms’ network 
choice by examining the benefits of business networks for firms. After reviewing the benefits, 
this study further investigates (i) the cost of business networks and (ii) the market response 
for firms in networks, to generate a complete understanding of the effects of business 
networks. 
This research formulates several research questions to generate a thorough knowledge 
of business networks and their consequences. (1) What are the features of business 
networks in China and how they are evolving over time? (2) Do networks help firms to obtain 
finance? (3) What is the relationship between business network affiliation and firm 
performance, and how does concentrated ownership affect this relationship? (4) What are 
the effects of business network affiliation and network structure on firm stock return volatility? 
Through these research questions, this research expects to shed light on business 
networks and their consequences. More specifically, this research attempts to achieve the 
following objectives. 
(1) Identify and disclose important connections among firms to capture the way in which 
business networks underlie the national economy.  
This study sets out to construct business networks that capture only the important 
relations among firms.  We use related relations to define business networks, i.e. relations 
that either control or significantly influence firms’ policy and decision-making (Michele, 2013). 
We believe that this approach is superior compared with the definitions used in prior studies, 
such as alliance networks (Gulati, 1998) and business groups (He et al., 2013). Our 
definition excludes connections that have less significant influence over network members 
and includes many relations that are widespread in the market. The completeness of this 
definition provides excellent coverage of ownership relations, collaboration relations, and 
relations derived from key individuals. The definition is superior at capturing business 
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networks generally in the market. 
(2) Outlining and presenting the features of business networks and their dynamics 
This study constructs business networks using related relations from 1997 to 2011 to 
achieve a complete understanding of business networks in the market. We adopt a 
quantitative method to describe the features of business networks and their dynamics with 
regard to industry sector and ownership, which is not something that has been previously 
seen in the literature (Li et al., 2014). Through a systematic descriptive analysis of business 
networks in China, this research discloses the features of business networks, business 
network composition, and some individual network features of business networks in China. 
This study also visualizes business networks and their dynamics to have a more direct 
understanding by using network analysis software.  
(3) Explaining why firms choose to be involved in business networks 
This study partially contributes to the question about the prominence of business 
networks by investigating the effects of business networks on firms’ access to financial 
resources, particularly in an environment of improved institutions and increasingly reported 
adverse effects (Singh & Gaur, 2009; Byun et al., 2013). Based on the network definitions 
we constructed, this research investigates the role of business networks in firms’ debt 
financing, access to trade credit, working capital management, and cash sufficiency to 
provide evidence that firms in business networks gain advantages in financing. It helps to 
explain the benefits of business networks in the changing environment and helps firms to 
choose an appropriate network strategy.  
(4) Explaining how the financing advantage for firms in business networks is affected 
by institutional factors and the nature of business networks. 
This study further investigates the role of institutional factors and the nature of business 
networks in the relationship between network affiliation and firms’ access to financial 
resources.  This enables us to have a comprehensive understanding of the financing 
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advantages of business networks for affiliated firms. The importance of state capitalism in 
China and the mixed results of the role of business networks for SOEs motivated a further 
study that looks at how state ownership affects the role of business networks in firms’ access 
to financial resources. As network effects are contextually sensitive (Adler & Kwon, 2002), 
the nature of the business network is relevant since different networks may have different 
network effects. By examining how SOEs and the nature of the business network shape the 
effects of business networks on firms’ access to financial resources, this research generates 
an improved picture of business networks’ financing advantage for firms. 
(5) Examining the net effects of business networks on firm performance and explaining 
how business networks affect firm performance. 
To obtain the net effects of business networks, this study investigates the relationship 
between business networks and firm performance with regard to profitability. Given the 
mixed results in the literature about the performance implications of network affiliation, the 
effects of business networks on profitability deserve additional investigation. However, this 
research goes further by investigating the effects of business network on firm performance 
with reference to firms’ management costs. We are therefore able to explain in more detail 
how business networks affect firm performance.  
(6) Identifying the effects of ownership concentration on the relationship between 
business networks and firms’ management cost as well as firm performance. 
This study continues to research the relationship between business networks and firm 
profitability, and the relationship between business networks and firms’ management cost, 
by examining how concentrated ownership can mediate the effects of business network 
affiliation on management cost and firm performance. Understanding how ownership 
concentration helps firms to manage the cost of affiliating to business networks 
complements our understanding of business networks. It also has strong managerial 
implications for guiding firms in managing business networks. 
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(7) Investigating the market response for firms in business networks 
To investigate the market response for firms in networks, this study examines the 
relationship between network affiliation and firms’ stock return volatility. As firms are 
increasingly involved in business networks, they become exposed to other network 
members and this may affect firms’ stock return volatility.  Previous research findings in this 
area have been ambiguous. Given the importance of firm stock return volatility and the 
prominence of business networks in the emerging economies, research investigating the 
role of business networks on firm stock return volatility is essential. Moreover, by 
investigating how network structures affect firm stock return volatility, we can achieve an 
improved understanding of business networks as well as of stock return volatility. Our 
research has important implications for firms seeking to attract investors since firms can use 
our findings to steer their strategy towards their investors’ tolerance of risks. An 
understanding of the relationship between business networks and firm stock return volatility 
also has strong implications for policy setting.  
 
1.3 Data and methodology 
We employ CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research) database and 
Datastream database. In this study we use the data to identify business networks, key 
financial indicators, and stock prices of listed companies in China. The data spans from 
1997-2011. In total, five datasets are used, namely: listed company related party information 
data; listed company related party transaction data; listed company financial indicator data; 
listed company governance data; and listed company stock price data. The first two datasets 
are used to construct business networks using related relations. We use the data to 
generate network information for listed companies, we then merge this data with the 
remaining three datasets respectively to build the data used in each chapter. Using these 
data, we have outlined the characteristics and dynamics of business networks in China, and 
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further investigate the consequences of these networks on firms’ financing, performance 
and return volatility. 
We use listed company related party information data, listed company related party 
transaction data and listed company financial indicator data to identify the business 
networks among listed companies and to outline the networks’ characteristics and dynamics. 
Using several measures developed by previous network studies, we outline characteristics 
at both network level and firm level. We look at network size, network density, average 
degree, centrality, and structural holes, and use network analysis software to analyse the 
networks. We use summary statistics of network variables by industry and ownership type 
during the period to generate an improved understanding of business networks and their 
dynamics, which provide the background to the remaining chapters. 
Taking this knowledge of business networks and their dynamics in China, we further 
investigate the impacts of business networks on firms’ access to financial resources. By 
employing listed company related party information data, listed company related party 
transaction data, and listed company financial indicator data, we can model the effects of 
business networks on firms’ access to debts, trade credit, working capital management, and 
cash sufficiency using a micro-econometrics modelling approach. The models are estimated 
using fixed effects, which are widely employed in the literature. To control for potential 
endogeneity, we control for endogenous treatment effects. For robustness checks, several 
alternative measures of the dependent variable as well as explanatory variables are used 
to provide extra comfort for the findings. We also control for cross-sectional dependence to 
provide confidence that our results are reliable. 
After nuancing the benefits of business networks, we further examine the relationship 
between business networks and firm performance, and investigate how ownership 
concentration affects this relationship. Using listed company related party information data, 
listed company related party transaction data, listed company financial indicator data, and 
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listed company governance data, the study models the impacts of business network 
affiliation on firm performance and firms’ management cost. Moreover, by investigating the 
interaction effects of business networks and concentrated ownership, this work investigates 
the mediating effects of concentrated ownership on the relationship between business 
networks and firm performance as well as on firms’ management cost. The literature and 
data structure suggest fixed effects to estimate these models. We also provide extra comfort 
for the results by using alternative measures of firm performance and ownership 
concentration and controling for cross-sectional dependence. 
Finally, this study investigates the relationship between business networks and firm 
stock return volatility. Adopting listed company related party information data, listed 
company related party transaction data, listed company financial indicator data, and listed 
company stock price data, we model the effects of business networks on firm stock return 
volatility and estimate them using fixed effects. Three measures of firm stock return volatility 
are constructed in order to provide confidence in the results. To control for the potential 
endogeneity problem, dynamic GMM is used to provide additional comfort for the results. 
We also control for cross-sectional correlations to provide additional confidence for the 
results.  
 
1.4 Preview of findings 
First of all, we constructed business networks via related relations among listed 
companies in China.  We examined the characteristics and dynamics of these business 
networks. We found that the number of firms in business networks has expanded 
considerably during the study period. Notably, the development of business networks in 
China is uneven and is shaped by the development of its economy. Firms in major industries 
and SOEs are actively involved in the process. Moreover, we provide new insights into the 
debate of “the state advances and private retreats.” Regarding network perspective, we note 
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that SOEs are expanding their influences through network size and network centrality while 
private firms are relatively stalled or even shrinking. 
Based on the network constructed, this research investigated the role of business 
networks in firms’ debt financing, access to trade credit, working capital management, and 
cash sufficiency. The empirical results suggest that firms in business networks have superior 
access to long-term debts, short-term debts, and trade credit; they also have more efficient 
working capital management and sufficient cash for investment. Moreover, we find that the 
effects of business networks are mediated by institutional factors, the nature of business 
networks, and network structure. Evidence shows that SOEs in business networks have 
better access to debts and trade credit while non-SOEs in networks have more efficient 
working capital management and sufficient cash. Among ownership networks, collaboration 
networks, and individual networks, individual networks have the largest marginal effects 
while collaboration networks are less significant in influencing firms’ access to financial 
resources. A central network position and tight network structure are both positively related 
to firms’ access to financial resources. 
By investigating the relationship between business networks and firms’ management 
cost as well as firm performance, we find that business networks affiliation is negatively 
related to firm performance. The empirical analysis suggests that firms in business networks 
experience higher management cost. Across the three types of business network, 
ownership networks and collaboration networks are found to have significant influence over 
firm performance in terms of profitability and firms’ management cost. Concentrated 
ownership is found to significantly affect the relationships between business networks and 
firms’ performance and management cost. Central network position is negatively related to 
firms’ performance and the presence of structural holes is positively related to firms’ 
performance. 
Finally, this study inspects the effects of network affiliation and network structure on 
26 
 
firm stock return volatility. We find that firms in business networks are more volatile than are 
free-standing firms. Additionally, the results show that network size and network diversity 
exhibit an inverted U shape relationship with firm stock return volatility. The central position 
is positively related to firm stock return volatility while the intermediate position is negatively 
related to firm stock return volatility. Moreover, we also find that firms in SOE dominated 
networks are more volatile than those not. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis reports the characteristics and impacts of business networks using China as 
the empirical setting. The whole thesis consists of six chapters with the first chapter 
introducing the motivations for research, the research questions, the methodology and main 
findings. In the next chapter, we provide an overview of business networks in China to 
outline the dynamics and features of business networks. This chapter is descriptive in nature 
to give a background for the empirical studies that follow. The third chapter investigates the 
role of business network affiliation on firms’ access to financial resources. This chapter 
outlines the potential motivations that prompt firms to participate in networks. The fourth 
chapter examines profitability, the management costs incurred by firms in business networks, 
and how concentrated ownership can mediate network effects. The fifth chapter inspects 
the impacts of business network affiliation and network structure on firm stock return volatility, 
and the sixth chapter concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Business networks in China 
2.1 Introduction 
China has achieved rapid economic growth and since 2011 has been ranked second only 
to the U.S. (Ling & Li, 2012). After it introduced economic reform, its economy started to take 
off, and according to World Bank figures, its GDP increased to $11.199 trillion in 2016. It is in 
a special position because it is an emerging as well as a part transition economy (Peng et al., 
2008). In 1992 China started its economic reforms at the firm-level and introduced several 
significant changes, such as transferring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into private 
ownership. The aim was to privatize SOEs to maximize profitability, improve efficiency, and 
increase managers’ decision-making autonomy (Chen et al., 2008). However, SOEs 
maintained ultimate control of the economy. This situation constitutes what the authorities call 
a socialist-market economy (Lin & Zhu, 2000). The uniqueness of China’s economy has 
attracted ongoing interest into the underlying factors behind its rapid growth.  
During China’s institutional transition, Chinese business became widely known for its 
extensive use of guanxi (a Chinese word for connections) and network strategies (Ren et al., 
2009). Formally, guanxi refers to the dynamics of personal exchanges inside and outside a 
social network (Parnell, 2005). It comprises relational connections and links between 
individuals and groups (Lau & Young, 2013). In this study, we define business networks as 
inter-firm networks. Business networks in this study is a set of firms connected by a certain 
types of guanxi. The importance of guanxi for business in the Chinese economy are broadly 
acknowledged (Li et al., 2008; Li & Zhang, 2007; Lau & Young, 2013). Firms are heavily reliant 
on guanxi to gain a competitive advantage (Li & Zhang, 2007). The concept is deeply 
embedded in China’s culture and helps firms to mobilize complementary resources by bridging 
different networks and even potentially negotiating between competing networks (Peng & Luo, 
2001). While the current literature heavily focuses on the importance of guanxi, there has been 
limited academic focus on the mechanics of the underlying configuration of China’s network 
economy (Ren et al., 2009).  
As China continues its economic reform, guanxi utilization is increasingly extensive at the 
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firm level, which reflect networks among organizations (Peng & Luo, 2001). The literature 
mainly discusses guanxi at a personal level (Lau & Young, 2013; Peng & Luo, 2001), 
disregarding the firm-level guanxi that is crucial to promoting the development of business 
networks. In this study, business networks are firms with guanxi relationship as guanxi is a 
broader concept.  It consists of various types of relations and links (Lau & Young, 2013). 
However, firms with guanxi relationship do not necessarily constitute business networks 
mentioned in this study as we do not take all guanxi relationships to construct business 
networks in this study. The business network in this study is a narrower concept as it only 
involves firms and some related relations. We only account for those reliable and stable 
relations such as parent, subsidiary relations to construct a representative business network. 
There are studies that define business networks using informal guanxi among firms, such as 
the CEO’s friendship network (EI-Khatib et al., 2015). We argue that these informal 
relationships among firms are less reliable and vulnerable to changes. For example, both a 
firm’s CEO and his/her friends may change at any time. In our study we capture firm-level 
relationships that are more transparent and contractual (official and verbal), which will be 
discussed later in the next section. We believe that these relationships are more helpful in 
constructing business networks and generate reliable understanding of business networks.  
As was outlined in the first chapter, the importance of guanxi in China was such that the 
Chinese economy has been referred to as a relationship economy. China’s inter-organization 
networks are important components that make up the relationship economy. Without a 
thorough understanding of the configuration of business networks, our understanding of 
China’s economy is incomplete.  
Business networks are particularly important for firms in emerging economies such as 
China’s where the institutional environment is relatively weak and the market is imperfect 
(Achrol & Kotler, 1999; Jia & Wang, 2013). In an underdeveloped market, business networks 
are associated with superior information processing and flexible monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 
1999), both of which appeal to business units. Business networks help affiliates to reduce 
transaction costs and peer uncertainty (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). Moreover, as suggested by the 
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resource-dependence theory (Hillman et al., 2009), networked firms tend to release constraints 
and obtain access to key resources such as expertise, finance, and advice. Establishing 
relationships with other organizations enables the focal firm to access external resources. 
Business networking strategies are extensively used by business units to overcome market 
failure (Leff, 1978). Literature has documented the positive role of business networks in helping 
firms to gain scarce resources, foster firm growth, and achieve competitive advantage (Li et 
al., 2008). Many empirical works have demonstrated that network connections increase firm 
performance in China and other emerging economies (Peng & Luo, 2000; Li et al., 2008). 
Consequently, it is important for academics and practitioners to have an accurate 
understanding of business networks within the market, particularly in emerging economies. 
It isn’t just the business units that have embraced business networks.  Since 1987, the 
state has signaled its favor for various business networks such as business groups (Carney et 
al., 2009). In 1991, the national trail group was established to share resources and protect 
them from competition (Nolan, 2001). Business networks have assisted in the development of 
the national economy and have significantly contributed to it. Sha & Zeng (2014) suggests that 
over 50% of China’s listed companies are involved in cross-shareholding networks. Yiu et al. 
(2005) find that business groups have contributed over 60% of the nation’s industrial output. 
Many studies have indicated the prominence and significance of business networks (Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Peng & Luo, 2000; Park & Luo, 2001). Understanding China’s business networks 
aids knowledge of the country’s economy and its capitalism (Ren et al., 2009; Aguilera, 1998). 
Thereby, it is necessary to study business networks to have a better understanding of the 
country’s economic achievement.  
Given the importance and popularity of business networks in the practice of business in 
China and other emerging economies, a thorough understanding of them is crucial. Even 
though there are many studies investigating business networks in China, there are knowledge 
gaps and limitations which may impede our understanding of business networks. First, 
previous studies have used relatively vague definitions of business networks, which limits our 
understanding of the configuration of such networks in the economy. Business groups (e.g. 
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Carney et al., 2009), collaboration networks (Wu et al., 2010), interlock directorship networks 
(e.g. Ren et al., 2009), trading networks (Cohen-Cole et al. 2014) are popular networks studied 
in the literature. However, the definitions of each of these business networks have limitations. 
The studies are either concerned with very narrow types of relationships, or they investigate 
weak connections. The limited definitions fail to generate a representative sample of business 
networks in the market. Further, the results generated may be less than reliable as network 
effects are contextual sensitive (Adler & Kwon, 2002). A broad definition that incorporates 
critical and popular connections between firms is necessary for a reliable understanding of the 
configuration of business networks. We expect to contribute to the literature by proposing a 
new approach to constructing business networks, which is to define business networks using 
related relations. A related party is an agent that controls or significantly influences the listed 
company’s policy and decision-making (Michele, 2013). Our definition of business networks 
provides us with a more representative sample and consequently helps to generate a complete 
and reliable understanding of business networks. 
Additionally, due to data limitation, it is arguable whether the findings about business 
networks are reliable. The emerging literature about China’s business networks largely relied 
on the examination of individual network structures in a cross-sectional setting (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2011; Sha et al., 2014) while failing to comment on the dynamics of business networks. 
Thus, a study that explores the whole network structure over a period of years is necessary to 
enhance the understanding of the network economy and its evolution. Burt (2002) suggests 
that 90% of the relationships between counterparties disappear in a year. As business 
networks evolve all the time, trying to understand them statically leads to incomplete or even 
biased findings. Therefore, it is important to study them dynamically by using panel data to 
investigate them. In this study, we construct business networks from 1997 to 2011, and analyze 
the dynamics of business networks; this gives us a thorough understanding of business 
networks in China. Our grasp of the features and dynamics of business networks in China also 
potentially contributes to the relatively under-studied area of business networks generally, 
including the causes of and motivations for joining in this type of networking activity (Lockett 
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et al., 2012). 
Moreover, prior studies (e.g. Wu & Lou, 2010; Schilling & Phelps, 2007) primarily rely on 
samples that are either relatively small or are limited to specific industries.  Thus, the 
knowledge generated may be less representative. Consequently, a complete understanding of 
inter-organizational networks among Chinese firms at the national level is needed (Ren et al., 
2009). Firms do not all network in the same way; some may remain largely isolated, others 
may cluster in separate alliances or the network may have a core-periphery structure. 
Understanding the structure of the firms’ networks is of particular importance for policymaking 
(Vitali et al., 2011). Narrow data limits the general applicability of our understanding since 
business networks are contextually sensitive (Adler & Kwon, 2002). In this study, we use 15 
years of panel data for companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to 
investigate business networks in China.  
Lastly, even though the prominent role of SOEs in China has been highlighted extensively 
(He et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2006), there is no prior study that analyzes state capitalism in China 
from a network perspective. Given the prominence and importance of business networks in 
China (He et al., 2013; Singh & Gaur, 2009; Carney et al., 2009) and state capitalism (Lee & 
Kang, 2012), it is crucial to look at the role and dynamics of SOEs in business networks. By 
comparing the roles of SOEs with those of private firms in business networks, we can gain an 
improved understanding of state capitalism in China. Since state capitalism is an important 
feature of China’s economy, this study helps to generate an improved understanding of China’s 
economic achievement. 
In this chapter, we are going to construct listed company networks using related relations 
in China, and investigate the features and dynamics of these networks. Using data from 1997 
to 2011, we expect to reveal the configuration of business networks in China and shed light on 
its state capitalism. By describing business networks at the individual and network levels, we 
are able to generate a thorough understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of business 
networks. This knowledge gives us a degree of background information, and contributes to an 
understanding of the impact of business networks on the economy and elsewhere, which will 
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be examined in the following chapters. 
In order to systematically understand business networks in China, we first provide a critical 
review on the measurement of business networks, and outline the possible limitations of prior 
studies. This is followed by the presentation of the methodology used in this study. Next, we 
present our findings and discussion. Finally, the conclusion and research limitation are 
presented to shed light on avenues for future research on business networks in China. 
 
2.2 A critical review on measuring business networks  
To know what a business network is, we need to first know what a network is. A network 
consists of a set of actors, and the relationships that link them (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). 
Depending on the definition of relationships, researchers can investigate different types of 
networks. For example, social networks refer to networks connected through social relations 
that include social obligations, kinship obligations, or a past relationship with social entities 
(Granovetter, 1985). The researcher must therefore start by defining the network to be studied 
by choosing a set of actors and relations (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). In this study, we describe 
business networks as inter-firm networks.  
In general, there are two categories of relations: state relationships and event 
relationships (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). State relationships have continuity over time and an 
open-ended persistence (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Kinship relations and role-based relations 
are examples of state relationships. In contrast, event relationships have a discrete and 
transitory nature and we can enumerate them over periods of time (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). 
Examples of event relationships are transactions and e-mail exchanges. Event relationships 
are widely researched since the data are easy to collect. As technology advances, the study 
of state relations has increased.  
Since firms in the market operate in complex business relationships, there are many types 
of business networks among firms, which vary depending on the definition of relations. An 
increasing number of networks studies have explored various inter-firm networks, such as 
business groups (e.g. Garney et al., 2009), corporate networks via interlocks (e.g. Ren et al., 
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2009), cross-shareholding networks (e.g. Li et al., 2014), and alliance networks (e.g. Wu et al., 
2010). In this section, we are going to briefly discuss some of the most studied networks and 
outline the strengths and weaknesses of their definitions.  
Business groups refer to “a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound 
together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking 
coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Business groups are widely investigated, 
particularly in emerging economies where they have a prominent role in filling institutional voids 
(Khanna and Palepu; 1997, 2000). However, this definition may vary in different contexts. 
Business group studies in China usually take the definition issued by the National Statistics 
Bureau of China: namely, a set of legally independent firms that are partly or wholly owned by 
a parent firm or registered as affiliates of that parent firm (Lee et al., 2012). Using different 
definitions of business groups causes problems when comparing results across countries. 
Clearly firms in business groups as defined in China connect through ownership. Resource 
and information sharing are effective and efficient in these networks since ownership ensures 
if not direct control then at least significant influence. However, this business group definition 
naturally excludes many relations that also have significant influence, for example, partnership 
relations. The definition is limited to a sole type of relationship, which is ownership, and means 
that the research findings may not be transferable to other more generalized types of business 
networks.   
Listed company cross-shareholding networks are networks of listed companies connected 
by holding shares in each other’s companies (Sha & Zeng, 2014; Li et al., 2014). In this 
definition, listed companies create stock-holding links to other listed companies. However, the 
definition is weak because it also includes listed companies that are linked through owning 
only a tiny number of shares of the other listed companies. Without significant ownership, the 
listed company cannot have significant influence over the connected listed company. The 
definition therefore may include many superfluous actors and relations with highly inefficient 
information or resource sharing, or mobilization. Study of these actors and relations is 
meaningless since they have little influence over each other. Moreover, as the definition is 
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associated with ownership, it naturally excludes more meaningful connections that fall short of 
ownership. By and large, this definition of business networks may include some weak 
connections and exclude more relevant and widespread connections, which will bias our 
understanding of business networks in general. 
Listed company interlock directorship networks are defined as those listed companies that 
share at least one board-level director (Chen & Xie, 2011, Li, 2012). It is a commonly seen 
network, defined via key individuals. In listed companies issuing A shares in China in 2007, 
over 84% of them had interlocking directors constituting corporate networks (Lu et al., 2009). 
Another form of business networks is the CEO network.  These are networks of firms with 
connected CEOs (EI-Khatib et al., 2015). This is a particularly weak form of connection since 
the key individual may leave the firm at any time and may in any case be less than influential 
within the organization. For example, the press and public criticize some independent directors 
of listed companies in China for not actively working in the company and merely taking up a 
seat on the board (Chen et al., 2011). They may not therefore effectively link firms together. 
The grouping is theoretically useful in that it captures many firms in networks; however it can 
have little practical impact if the many alleged connections do not actually have a significant 
influence on each other. Further, since only key individuals come under the CEO umbrella, the 
definition excludes many important relationships between firms and this may constrain our 
understanding of business networks in general. 
Trading networks are defined as companies linked by at least one shared transaction 
(Cohen-Cole et al., 2014). These transactional networks are a form of event relationship. 
Networks defined through trading can capture many actors, generating a whole picture of 
business networks. However, as transactions are discrete, these relationships are not stable. 
Consequently, it is less likely that all the firms in these networks have significant influence over 
each other.  
Production facilitators such as suppliers, distributors, and other institutions form 
production networks (Wu et al., 2015). A typical example of a production network is a supply 
network formed via integrated supply and production systems (Bezuidenhout et al., 2012). 
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These networks capture relations in the production process and assist our understanding of 
production. However, it excludes relations outside of production, and includes many 
insignificant relations. For example, a firm that is party to a joint venture may be excluded from 
its collaborator’s network because it does not participate in the firm’s production system. Such 
networks are beneficial to the understanding of production but are less effective at capturing 
business networks in general. An understanding generated from production networks may be 
less reliable or even biased when applied to general business networks because of the 
contextual nature of network effects (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Alliance networks are established through strategic alliances, which is a commonplace 
type of connection among firms in practice (Wu et al., 2010). As firms form and maintain 
partnerships with each other, they weave a network of relationships (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). 
This is one of the most studied forms of network, and captures widely seen relationships 
between firms. However, even this is an imperfect definition since it may include many weak 
relations as alliances, including many informal connections (Wu et al., 2010). The 
understanding of business networks generated from alliance networks is not sufficient.  
The definition of business networks varies significantly. Previous definitions either include 
unnecessary actors or exclude important relations; both constrain our understanding of 
business networks in general. Such weak or incomplete definitions of relations hamper 
research.   We need a new definition of business networks; one that will ensure effective and 
efficient resource mobilization and information sharing and will capture business networks in 
general. It needs to capture all important relations as well as relations across different 
dimensions. 
An additional issue for previous studies is the constraint in measuring business networks 
due to data limitation. Many studies use surveys and interviews (e.g. Lee & Jin, 2009; Wu, 
2015) to identify the origins of business networks and the implications of these networks. The 
sample size tends to be small, around 300 firms, and the use of seven-point Likert scales 
carries a high degree of dependence on interviewees’ personal feelings. These shortcomings 
would constrain the ability of such network studies to reveal the underlying picture of China’s 
37 
 
business networks (Ren et al., 2009). Additionally, prior studies normally investigate business 
networks in China in specific sectors, such as the manufacturing industry (e.g. Wu, 2015; 
Carney et al., 2009). As network effects are heavily reliant on the contextual environment (Adler 
& Kwon, 2002), it is debatable whether these studies can be representative. 
Apart from the data used, previous studies researching business networks use either 
surveys or reported data to assess the firms’ network affiliation status. For example, business 
group affiliation information provided by He et al. (2013) and Singh & Gaur (2009) come directly 
from the China Securities Regulatory Commission and PROWESS databases respectively.  
Since each database has its own definition of network affiliation status, this is reflected in the 
two studies. While He et al. (2013) use the same definitions as Lee et al. (2012), Singh & Gaur 
(2009) adopt the definition described by Khanna & Rivkin (2001). The use of different 
definitions challenges the comparability of the results.  
Furthermore, most studies investigate networks over a period of one year so they fail to 
comment on the dynamics of these networks (e.g. Li et al., 2014; Wang, 2008). As we 
mentioned above, business networks are evolving all the time. Attempting to understand 
business networks without taking into account their dynamics may not provide a sufficient and 
reliable understanding. It is therefore essential to have panel data to study the dynamics of 
these networks. Some studies (e.g. Li et al., 2014; He et al., 2013) used panel data to explore 
the characteristics of China’s business networks but, due to the availability of the data, they 
only can observe networks over a period of around six years and most of the studies’ data 
have an endpoint of 2007, which makes the studies relatively old.  
In summary, business networks studied in the literature have certain limitations that call 
for an improved definition and network construction. In order to capture the configuration of 
business networks, a quantitative presentation of business networks is necessary (Li et al., 
2014). It is important to have a dynamic understanding of business networks that takes their 
evolution into account.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
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2.3.1 Definition of business networks 
As we discussed above, the definitions of business networks used in prior studies are 
insufficiently strong or complete for us to have a thorough understanding of business networks 
in the market. It is essential to have a more generalized definition that covers all important and 
popular connections and enables us to capture firms and relations. A good definition of 
business networks should, first of all, include all important relations and exclude those 
connections that can have little influence on their counterparts. Strengthening the definition 
enables us to establish business networks that consist of network members who have 
significant influence over each other, ensuring that information and resources flow efficiently 
and effectively.  Additionally, the definition should incorporate relations from different 
dimensions. The definition should include various types of relations that are seen in practice 
in the market. An understanding of the topic that has been generated in this way will have 
general applicability. 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, this study proposes a new approach to defining 
business networks, which is to construct business networks using related relations. As defined 
by Michele (2013), a related party is an agent that controls or significantly influences the listed 
company’s policy and decision-making. We argue that the firms who participate in the business 
networks that have been formed by related parties experience more effective and efficient 
resource mobilization and information-sharing when compared with the firms in other networks 
and those firms that do not participate in any networks.  This is because the definition of a 
related party is associated with either control or significant influence. Related parties and 
related relations are defined as important actors and relations for listed companies. Our 
definition by its nature excludes actors and relations that carry little influence, such as 
companies with very few shares in listed companies. Moreover, related relations includes 
relations of varying types, the only criteria being that they are associated with control or 
significant influence. Unlike previous studies that only captured some relationships such as 
alliances, this definition includes many relationships that are widely seen in the market such 
as ownership relations, collaboration relations, etc. We argue that defining business networks 
39 
 
via related relations captures various important connections in the market that are a good 
miniature of business networks at national level. Investigating business networks via related 
relations gives a more complete and accurate understanding of the national economy. 
Moreover, when we examine the literature on business networks we see a focus on 
various relations. With regard to the state relationships investigated by scholars, there are 
three broad types of business networks. These are ownership networks, collaboration 
networks and individual networks. Ownership networks are firms connected by sharing the 
same ownership, and include business group and listed company cross-shareholding networks. 
These networks are widely studied in the literature (Lee et al., 2012; Garney et al., 2009; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Sha & Zeng, 2014; Li et al., 2014). Collaboration networks are firms 
linked by collaborations, for instance, alliance networks. These networks widely exist in the 
market and are very common forms of business network. Individual networks are firms 
networked through key individuals, for example, interlock directorship networks. These three 
broad networks are widely seen in the market. However, prior studies mainly examine only one 
type of business network without comparing it to the others, and nowhere in the literature are 
the differences between these networks explored.  In this study we examine these three types 
of business network in order to have a better idea about business networks in China, and most 
particularly about how the networks are different from each other. In this research, we also 
define ownership networks, collaboration networks and individual networks to capture the 
effects of the nature of business networks. 
As our definition includes many relations that have already been investigated, it leads to 
greater comparability. Relations can be categorized into one of 3 broad types enabling us to 
compare the results generated across different types of networks. For example, we can 
compare the results of our collaboration networks to those obtained for the alliances studied 
in previous research. Using a complete range of relations heightens the potential comparability 
of our results.  
Related parties of listed companies are often seen in research on listed company related 
party transactions (e.g. Cheung et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009). These transactions are widely 
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observed and studied. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior study 
investigating business networks formed through related parties.  By examining related parties 
through the lens of a network perspective, an improved understanding of the connections 
between listed companies can be generated. We argue that defining business networks via 
related relations contributes to a more in-depth understanding of business networks in general.  
 
2.3.2 Data 
The study focuses on networks among listed companies in China for three main reasons. 
First, listed companies are big enterprises that have a considerable amount of capital. They 
are important and large players in the market. As at 2013, there were 2490 listed companies 
in the market, with a capitalized market value of around 23 trillion RMB (SHSE and SZSE, 
2013). As China places strict requirements on corporations who want to be listed (CSRS, 1999), 
all listed companies in the market are large enterprises with superior profitability. According to 
the Forbes ranking of the top 2000 companies in the world, China’s top 10 firms are all listed 
companies (Forbes, 2014). Thus, understanding the networks among listed companies helps 
significantly to generate an understanding of networks in the whole economy. Second, 
previous studies have focused mostly on interlock directorship networks and cross-
shareholding networks of listed companies (Chen & Xie, 2011; Sha & Zeng, 2014).  There are 
many hidden connections among listed companies that have not previously been studied. 
Research that discloses these connections and generates a complete picture of business 
networks among listed companies would be invaluable. Finally, listed companies are required 
to publish their financial performances and regularly disclose related parties to the public. Data 
are reliable and easy to access through open channels, for example from the official website 
of two stock exchanges in China. In this section, we present the source and structure of our 
data. 
In this study, three main datasets are employed to identify network connections among 
listed companies and their basic information over the period spanning from 1997-2011 in China. 
The datasets are listed company related party information data, listed company related party 
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transaction data, and listed company financial performance data. The first two datasets are 
mainly used to identify network connections among listed companies, and the third one 
provides more information on listed companies, including firm ownership. The three datasets 
employed in this study are all extracted from the CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research) database issued by GTA (Guo Tai An) Technology LTD. It is a reliable and widely 
used database for research on China listed companies (e.g. Chen et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 
2009; Li et al., 2014; He et al., 2013). These datasets provide superior coverage for listed 
companies in the market, which varies from 90% to 100%. Table 2.1 provides a summary of 
the coverage of these datasets in each year. The population of listed companies is well 
captured in these datasets. In total, there are 2482 listed companies caught in the data. The 
data shows that the number of listed companies in China increased considerably from 618 in 
1997 to 2346 in 2011. 
 
<Table 2.1 inserted here> 
 
The unique feature of these data is the availability of relations between the listed company 
and its related parties. The dataset of listed company related party information provides 
relationships between listed companies and their related parties. A related party is an agent 
that controls or significantly influences the listed company’s policy and decision-making 
(Michele, 2013).  Overall, there are 11 types of relations between the listed company and 
related parties classified as related relations. As suggested by the definition of a related party, 
these 11 types of relations all associate with control or significantly influence over each other. 
They include parent relationship, subsidiary relationship, sister-company relationship, investor 
imposing joint control, investor imposing significant influence, associate company, joint venture 
company, key individual related to the investor, key individual related to the manager, 
enterprise significantly influenced by the key individual and other related relation. These 11 
types of relations can be divided into relations with control and relations associate with 
significant influence. Clearly, top 4 relations connect companies via control as major ownership 
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empower control over each other. The rest relations associate with significant influence either 
through minor but significant portion of ownership or influences firms’ decision making from 
various aspects. Either control or significant influence enable companies connected effectively 
and efficiently sharing resources and information, which contribute to a network-affiliated 
advantage. 
This classification method of relations is consistent with China Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises Rule 36 - “related party disclosure.” As long as a listed company has a 
relationship with another entity that belongs to one of the relationships outlined below, the listed 
company should report it in their annual reports. It is a legal requirement for listed companies 
to report their related parties, which provides a valuable opportunity to study relations among 
listed companies. Table 2.2 below presents the explanation of the 11 relationships between 
listed companies and their related parties.  
 
<Table 2.2 inserted here> 
 
As the table suggests, the 11 kinds of relationships are associated with a level of 
ownership that can directly impose control over listed companies or they have significant 
influence to the extent that it indirectly affects listed companies’ operating and decision-making. 
Where the parties in such a relationship maintain associations that are strong enough to allow 
them to influence each other, this contributes to the establishment of network connections. As 
the related parties of listed companies can influence or even determine listed companies’ 
decision making, the relations classified as ‘related’ are all important relations. The definition 
de facto excludes those relations that have little impact on each other. By broadening the 
definition in this way, we take into account many previously disregarded important actors. 
Moreover, by incorporating the many various definitions of business networks, our construction 
of business networks is more likely to be able to be generalized and the findings are closer to 
the truth. The relations we examine are all commonly seen relations among firms; this makes 
our definition more complete and closer to reality. The inclusion of relations from different 
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dimensions also helps us to have a more generalized understanding.  
The 11 types of relations can be further divided into three groups. As we mentioned above, 
state ties can be broadly grouped into ownership ties, collaboration ties, and individual ties. As 
these relations have continuity over time, we call them state ties. In order to test the effects of 
these ties on different networks, they are classified as ownership networks, collaboration 
networks and individual networks. Clearly, relations 1 to 5 are essentially the same, being 
derived from ownership. These relations can link companies together as they share a degree 
of ownership that ensures they have control or significant influence over each other. These 
relations can be further divided into ownership with control, and ownership with significant 
influence. Clearly, the top 4 relations are ownership with control, while relation 5 is ownership 
with significant influence. Relation 6 and relation 7 are relations derived from collaborations, 
and connect firms through their significant influence over each other. Relation 8 to relation 10 
are relations from key individuals. These key individuals link firms and exercise significant 
influence over them. The definition of our business networks naturally includes many 
connections from different dimensions, which is superior to those used in the previous studies 
mentioned above.   
The dataset of listed company related party information offers rich information about 
connections among listed companies and related parties. However, it does not provide 
complete relations. We therefore employ a listed company related party transaction dataset to 
supplement our first data set.  This enables us to obtain comprehensive connections among 
these companies. This second dataset records all related party transactions between listed 
companies and their related parties since 1997. While these two datasets provide valuable 
information for network construction, they do not contain information on listed company 
ownership. Therefore, we further adopted listed company financial indicator data, which 
contains firms’ basic information as well as their financial information. Firms’ ownership 
information is based on the ultimate controller type and is classified into SOEs, private firms, 
foreign firms, collectivist firms, and others. Utilizing this dataset contributes to an improved 
understanding about listed company related party networks, and the role of state capitalism in 
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an examination of network development.  
Utilizing these data, we can construct connections among listed companies via their 
related parties. In the next section, we introduce the procedures of constructing business 
networks and outline the network measures used in this study. 
 
2.3.3 Methodology of network measurement 
Once we obtained relatively complete data about the relationships between listed 
companies and their related parties, the next step was to construct the listed company related 
party networks, and compute relevant network measures to identify features of such networks. 
First, all relationship data about listed companies and their related parties (which defines the 
counterparties of a relationship and the relationship between said counterparties) are 
transferred into network data in order to be read in network analysis software. Network data 
defines nodes and lines in a network. In network data, the names of listed companies and 
related parties are coded using numbers. After the data are prepared, Pajek software is used 
to construct the networks. Pajek is network analysis software that is widely used in constructing 
and computing network coefficients. Once network data is input, the software automatically 
recognizes connections and establishes networks. Networks data are input yearly to generate 
the whole network of listed companies and their related parties in each year. In this way, we 
generate 15 years’ whole networks about listed companies and their related parties. 
In order to have a more direct understanding of listed companies, the next step is to 
simplify the network generated above into networks that show connections solely among listed 
companies. The rationale for this is as follows. First, the focus of this study is listed companies, 
being enterprises with a significant amount of capital in the market. All listed companies have 
capitalized 2.654 trillion yuan (SHSE & SZSE). Listed companies provide a good miniature of 
China’s national economy, to which they are important contributors. In 2010, the value of listed 
companies accounts more than 6% of GDP in China. Secondly, listed companies come from 
different sectors and provide a better picture of firms in China than can be seen in earlier 
studies that focused mostly on the manufacturing sector (Wu, 2015). Furthermore, listed 
45 
 
companies include firms with different control structures, including SOEs, private firms, 
collectively owned firms, foreign firms, and so on. From an examination of data on the structure 
of control, we see that SOEs are major players, while the other firms are important contributors. 
This is consistent with China’s economic system. Moreover, listed companies have firms of 
different sizes. In 2004, the Second Board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange was opened up for 
SMEs (small and medium enterprises). So listed companies are divided into large firms in the 
main board and SMEs in the Second Board. SMEs have contributed over 40% of capital in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).  
Additionally, listed companies are required to publish their information regularly to the 
public. In our study we need accurate and reliable data (including corporate governance and 
financial data) and listed companies therefore make good candidates. Since non-listed 
companies are not required to publish their financial information, data are not available for 
these firms.  
Finally, we have a precedent for simplifying business networks since this was also done 
in Chen & Xie (2011), Li et al. (2014). 
By excluding non-listed related parties, we obtain a more direct and clear picture about 
networks among listed companies. In this step, all indirect connections between listed 
companies via related parties that are non-listed are replaced by direct connections. For 
example, A and B are listed companies while C is a non-listed related party. If we find that A 
connects to C and B connects to C, we can remove C from the picture and replace the link 
with “A directly links to B”. By doing so, our networks contain only listed companies in China. 
Moreover, in order to generate accurate connections among listed companies, we use the 
number of lines between a specific pair of listed companies to get a sense of the number of 
channels through which these two listed companies are connected. For example, if listed 
companies E and F both have common third parties G and H as their non-listed related parties, 
there would be two lines between these two listed companies to reflect that there are two 
potential channels that can connect them. This consideration of the number of lines that exist 
between each pair of listed companies contributes to a more accurate computation of network 
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parameters.  
The identification of ownership networks, collaboration networks and individual networks 
follows the same procedures as for the general networks. Previous studies used reported 
affiliation or survey affiliation (Singh & Gaur, 2009; Manos et al., 2007; He et al., 2013). We, 
on the other hand, adopt network perspectives to construct business networks among listed 
companies and we identify their network affiliation status through the network established. We 
believe that this method is more objective and leads to findings that can be generalized, making 
it superior to the methods used previously.  
Once we have constructed the business networks, the next step is to compute key network 
measures to capture the network’s features. Our first measure, network size, refers to the 
number of members of a network (Nooy et al., 2005). Firms in big networks encounter more 
resources, which can enhance corporate performance (Soh, 2010; Liao & Welsch, 2005). We 
compute two levels of network size. The first is the number of whole networks per year, and 
the second is the number of components per whole network. A component is a sub-network in 
which all members can reach each other through certain paths. As each whole network is 
composed of many sub-networks, it is essential to identify the size of each sub-network for a 
comprehensive understanding of the composition of the whole network and the features of 
individual networks. Since individual networks are the main theme of our study we next 
compute companies’ network positions based on the individual networks that listed companies 
engage in.  
Centrality is a measure of the virtual position of an individual network member in their 
networks. There are several measures of network position and centrality is one of the most 
used ones to capture how central a firm is in its networks. Degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality are widely used in prior studies (Chen & Xie, 2011). We calculate these centralities 
using the following equations:  
(1) Degree centrality 
𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 
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where 𝑙𝑖𝑗 means a connection from firm i to firm j. 
(2) Betweenness centrality 
𝐵𝐶𝑖 = ∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗 , 
where 𝑔𝑗𝑘  means the number of shortest paths from firm j to firm k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the 
number of shortest paths from firm j to firm k through firm i. 
Degree centrality is defined as the number of direct contacts that a firm has in the network 
(Wang et al., 2014). Uzzi (1997) suggests that the number of connections that a node has 
made determines the information and resources that are available to use, filter, or recombine, 
which in turn increase the potential for extracting value from the network. 
Betweenness centrality, another much used centrality measure, refers to the overall 
control that a firm has over the paths of other firms (Nooy et al., 2005). Freeman (1979) 
suggests that companies can influence the network by controlling or distorting the information 
flow and that this is another form of central positioning. Maintaining a central network position 
brings a listed company greater access to resources and information (Ahuja, 2000). Evidence 
suggests that listed companies that occupy central network positions achieve better firm 
performance (Chen & Xie, 2011). Both of the two measures are calculated using Pajek 
software.  
Furthermore, we employ structural holes to measure the tightness of such networks. 
According to Burt’s (1992) structural holes theory of social capital, actors’ ego networks with 
more structural holes can receive more non-redundant information, which in turn provides the 
focal actor with superior capability for performing better. A structural hole is a feature of ego 
networks and an ego network is the cloud of nodes surrounding a given node, along with all 
the ties among them. Structural holes measure the freedom of association within networks 
using aggregated constraints of individual nodes in a network. It is argued that the higher the 
number of aggregated constraints, the less opportunity there is to broker (Nooy et al., 2005).  
(3) Aggregate constraint  
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𝐴𝐶𝑖 = ∑(𝑃𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑃𝑞𝑖
𝑞
)2
𝑗
, 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 means the proportional strength of the tie from firm i to firm j.  
The aggregated constraint is used to measure an individual’s structural holes in a network, 
the higher the aggregate constraint, the less freedom for the individual to withdraw from 
existing ties and explore structural holes (Nooy et al., 2005).  
Regarding cohesion of networks, density, average degree, and component analysis are 
useful tools for understanding the features of the whole network. Macro patterns of a network 
play a significant role in understanding network effects (Jackson, 2014).  
(4) Network density 
ND =
2𝐿
𝑔(𝑔−1)
 , 
where L refers to the number of lines in a network; g means the number of actors in a 
network. 
(5) Average degree  
AD =
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
𝑔⁄ , 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a connection from firm i to firm j; g is the number of actors in a network. 
Network density is critical in determining the diffusion of network effects. The density of a 
network is the number of lines expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of 
lines (Nooy et al., 2005). However, as density is inversely related to network size, it is not 
feasible to compare density measures across networks of different sizes. To do this, we use 
average degree whereby we measure network cohesion as compared between networks of 
different sizes (Nooy et al., 2005). Denser networks in terms of average contacts per node can 
produce more extensive diffusion. Moreover, component analysis could provide an 
understanding of the distribution of individual sub-networks in the whole network, which can 
enhance knowledge about the entire network. 
 
2.4 Results and discussion 
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In this section, results are reported in 4 sections and followed by a discussion section. 
Firstly, a whole network analysis is presented to provide an overview of business networks. It 
is followed by network composition analysis, showing what kinds of firms are more likely to be 
networked. After that, an individual network analysis is presented, which outlines firm-level 
network characteristics. The next section discusses the role of state ownership to provide an 
in-depth analysis of China’s state capitalism. Finally, a discussion section is presented. 
 
2.4.1 Whole network analysis 
We have two layers of whole networks. One layer contains networks consisting of all listed 
companies and non-listed related parties, and the other one is limited to networks of listed 
companies only. The first layer of the whole network provides some insights about network 
evolution. The second layer of the whole network gives a more direct understanding of network 
connections among listed companies. However, as we do not have data for non-listed 
counterparts, the main focus of this study is the second layer of networks. In this section, both 
layers of the whole network are presented and analyzed through a consideration of certain 
network features. 
Table 2.3 below shows the characteristics of the whole network consisting of listed 
companies and their related parties. Clearly, network size increased significantly during the 
research period: from 4,922 in 1997 to 45,747 in 2011. In terms of density, which represents 
the proportion of actual links in a network to the number of possible connections in the network, 
it was 0.00035 in 1997 and 0.000043 in 2011. However, it is meaningless to compare these 
figures as network size increased significantly during the period. Another density measure, 
average degree, suggests that the average connections per node stably increased from 1.75 
in 1997 to 1.99 in 2011. Members of a denser network are likely to have more contacts than 
those in a low-density network. Thus, information and resources are expected to flow more 
freely among members in denser networks (Scott, 1992). The component distribution of the 
whole network suggests that listed companies and their related parties became increasingly 
involved in multiple sub-networks. The number of components and the size of the largest 
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component increased significantly during the period. Generally, the whole network of listed 
companies and related parties starts out sparse and grows increasingly denser during the 
period. 
 
<Table 2.3 inserted here> 
 
Table 2.4 presents network features of the whole network of only listed companies. In table 
2.4 we report network characteristics based on ownership connections as well as general 
connections. Panel A gives the whole network features based on all related relations and Panel 
B illustrates network features based on ownership relations. The whole network of listed 
companies shows similar characteristics to the whole network that included non-listed 
companies. Network size, density, and the number of sub-networks increased significantly over 
the years. The whole networks of listed companies are less complicated than the whole 
network of listed companies and unlisted related parties since the former is a sub-network of 
the latter.  
 
<Table 2.4 inserted here> 
 
Tables suggest that the majority of listed companies start out isolated in the network as 
the density and average degree are very small. During the study period, links between listed 
companies are increasing as more and more listed companies participate in networks. On 
average each listed company had about 0.04 connections in 1997, and the average degree 
rose to 0.71 in 2011. The density was 0.00006 in 1997 and 0.0003 in 2011. This suggests that 
the network is relatively sparse and that only 0.03% of possible links were active among listed 
companies. In terms of networks connected by ownership, the trend is similar to the general 
network development. However, it exhibits some uniqueness. It suggests that ownership 
networks have a smaller size and more components during their development. Sometimes, it 
even shows adverse development when compared with the development of general networks. 
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For example, the average degree of networks experienced a drop within ownership networks 
while there was an increase in the general networks’ cohesion. 
It is interesting that even though China is famous for its guanxi economy, network 
connections among listed companies are relatively sparse. Even though China is believed to 
be a guanxi-oriented society, this does not necessarily imply a densely connected business 
network.  In our study, we find only one large component (namely, densely-linked guanxi 
interfirm networks). This finding is consistent with Ren et al. (2009) who investigate listed 
companies’ interlock relationships in China. As firms are related either through control or 
significant influence, expanding networks among listed companies may weaken market 
competition. A single developing giant component in the network further suggests that control 
through networks is increasingly concentrated. Moreover, the definition of networks matters, 
since different definitions may exhibit different networks features. 
 
2.4.2 Networks composition 
After gaining insights about networks among listed companies in China, we look further at 
the composition of these networks. In this section, we only investigate firms with connections 
to other listed companies since isolated listed companies are less attractive in the network 
perspective. In this section, we analyze the coverage of listed companies by their connections 
with others, and the distribution of these firms in terms of industry and ownership. We report 
both general networks and ownership networks. 
First of all, it is worth noting that the listed company related party network expands and 
grows increasingly complicated during the period observed. Figure 2.1 presents the evolution 
of business networks and ownership networks during the period. In 1997, 22 out of 618 listed 
companies were involved in related party networks. We treat listed companies as being in a 
network if it connects to at least one another listed company rather than standing isolated in 
the whole network. These 22 listed companies form 10 individual networks, with the largest 
component consisting of 4 listed firms.  During the period, more listed companies became 
involved in such networks. In 2005, there were 425 listed companies forming 148 individual 
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networks. In 2011, there were 884 listed companies in networks, which accounts for about 38% 
of listed companies in the market. In total there were 189 individual networks in 2011. Notably, 
listed companies are increasingly related, and the largest sub-network in 2010 consists of 312 
listed companies that account for 13% of population listed companies.  
Regarding ownership networks, it suggests that connections among listed companies are 
increasing. The connections of ownership are less frequent than those in the general network 
as we dropped many connections that are not derived from ownership. Looking at the 
components of ownership networks, it is clear that the individual component size tends to be 
small and that the number of components is greater than those in the general network. 
 
<Figure 2.1 inserted here> 
 
Moreover, looking at firms in networks across sectors, we find that listed companies in 
Manufacturing, Real Estate, and the Wholesale & Retailing sectors are more likely to 
participate in related party networks. Figure 2.21 outlines the distribution of listed companies 
in related party networks across different industries, and the intensity of listed companies in 
networks in key industries. Both general networks and ownership networks exhibit the same 
characteristics. As the coverage of listed company related party network is expanding, listed 
companies in various industries are increasingly involved in networks. When the intensity2 of 
listed companies in different industries is considered, the statistics show that listed companies 
in the Energy, Financial and Utility sectors are mostly involved in related party networks. Many 
industries are more intensively involved in these networks.  In 2011 for example, over 50% of 
listed companies in the following sectors were involved in related party networks: the Electricity, 
heat, gas and water production and supply industry; Accommodation and catering services; 
and the Financial sectors. These findings are similar to those seen in studies that investigate 
listed company interlocking directorates networks (Ren et al., 2009). 
                                                             
1 The data for figure 2 are given in Appendix 1 in case of information needed. 
2 For interest, the table is in appendix 2 
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<Figure 2.2 inserted here> 
 
Furthermore, considering the ultimate controller types of listed companies, it is suggested 
that state capitalism dominates these networks since SOEs are main players in these networks. 
Table 2.5 shows the distribution of listed companies in related party networks across different 
ownership. Panel A reports the results for general networks and panel B shows the results for 
ownership networks. Clearly, SOEs are the majority player in these networks. Over 60% of 
listed companies in related party networks are SOEs, followed by private firms which account 
for around 20%. Among all listed companies, foreign-owned listed companies are least likely 
to participate in these networks. They account for only around 1% of all listed companies in 
general networks. In terms of ownership networks, we find similar characteristics. 
 
<Table 2.5 inserted here> 
 
By investigating listed companies’ industry and ownership structure, we have generated 
an improved picture of listed company related party networks. Even though China is famous 
for its guanxi economy, formalized network connections among listed companies are relatively 
sparse (Ren et al., 2009). The development of inter-organizational networks among listed 
companies is unequal and varies according to the industry and ownership of the listed company. 
Generally, listed companies in certain industries are more likely to participate in networks. 
Given China is a socialist country, it is not surprising that SOEs are major players in these 
networks. The findings of network composition provide evidence for the argument that the 
government is responsible for the formation of business networks in most cases (Lee, 2006). 
In emerging economies where the institutional environment is imperfect, governments often 
intervene in the market. A consideration of the role of the state is crucial. According to Lee 
(2006), business networks are organizational devices for economic catch-up. Our findings on 
the composition of business networks in China have supported this view. In order to further 
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exploit the features of these networks, individual networks are studied to understand listed 
companies’ position in networks and other network structures. 
 
2.4.3 Individual network features 
Hundreds of sub-networks of different sizes constitute the whole network of listed 
companies. Listed companies are positioned in these networks differently. Some listed 
companies occupy central positions and some of them are on the periphery. Some listed 
companies are associated with a more closed ego-network structure while some others are 
not. In this section, we investigate individual listed company related party networks and 
examine network size, position and degree of closedness. 
Table 2.6 gives the statistics of network variables. The statistics show that on average 
there are 30% of listed companies affiliated into business networks via related relations. The 
coverage found is less than was found by prior studies (e.g. Sha & Zeng, 2014). We argue that 
this is due to the nature of our business networks. The definition of our networks has excluded 
connections that only have little influence and this is the rational result. Moreover, we compute 
the coverage of ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks. Our 
research indicates that the main component of related relations is ownership relations. We also 
tabulate key network measures of ownership networks. The mean value of network size is 11 
– meaning that there are 11 firms on average in each network. However, there is a lot of 
variation, suggesting that the development of business networks in China is uneven. 
Regarding network size for firms in ownership networks, the mean value is 2.6 with a standard 
deviation of 7.1, which suggests that ownership networks are on average smaller than general 
networks. It also hints that different networks may precipitate different network effects. 
 
<Table 2.6 inserted here> 
 
Network size here is the number of listed companies in an individual component. Evidence 
shows that resource availability is increased as network size grows (Greve & Salaff, 2003). 
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Participating in large networks may hence enhance firms’ performance. Network size of listed 
companies varies significantly in terms of industry and ownership. Table 2.7 summarizes 
network size for listed companies across industries. Panel A shows the results for general 
networks and panel B illustrates the results for ownership networks. Regarding the industry 
sector of the listed company, we see relative large network sizes in the Electricity, heat, gas 
and water production and supply industry, the Financial industry, and in Transportation, storage 
and postal services. It appears that listed companies in the infrastructure sectors are more 
likely to engage in large networks. As regards firms in ownership networks, we find that 
networks for firms in ownership networks are much smaller on average. Overall, firms in key 
industries have relatively big networks even though there are some differences in specific 
sectors. For example, firms from the education industry tend to have small networks in general 
networks but medium networks in ownership networks.  
 
<Table 2.7 inserted here> 
 
In terms of ownership structure, table 2.8 shows the results. Panel A has the results for 
general networks and panel B reports results for ownership networks. The results suggest that 
listed companies where the ultimate controller is classified as unknown, SOEs and ‘other’ have 
more members in a network. In comparison, listed companies that are private firms, foreign-
owned enterprises or collectively owned are involved in relatively small networks. It is 
interesting that collectively owned businesses are associated with the smallest network size, 
which is lower than that for foreign-owned firms. Regarding ownership networks, we find similar 
results to the general network. The only difference in terms of network size is that in ownership 
networks, it is foreign firms that have the smallest network size. 
 
<Table 2.8 inserted here> 
 
In terms of listed companies’ network position, centrality measures provide a valuable 
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opportunity to understand the network members’ virtual position in their networks. A central 
network position brings a listed company greater access to resources and information (e.g. 
Ahuja, 2000). Evidence shows that listed companies occupying a central network position 
demonstrate better firm performance (Wang et al., 2014). Figure 2.33 presents the centrality 
measures of listed companies across industries. In terms of industries, the statistics show that 
listed companies that operate in the following sectors are more centrally positioned in terms of 
betweenness centrality: Financial; Mining industry; Electricity, heat, gas and water production 
and supply industry; Environment and water conservancy; and Environment and public 
facilities management. Of these, listed companies in the Financial sectors, Mining industry, 
Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, are significantly more central.  
Regarding ownership networks, we find features that are consistent with the general 
network findings.  As measured by betweenness centrality, firms in the Electricity, heat, gas 
and water production and supply industry are the most centrally positioned, followed by firms 
in the Water conservancy, environment and public facilities management sector. Firms in the 
Financial sectors rank third. Even though this feature is overall consistent with the general 
network, it varies by specific industry. 
 
<Figure 2.3 inserted here> 
 
The literature is consistent about banks’ centrality in big inter-firm networks (e.g. Zhu et 
al., 2013; Levine, 1972). Banks are more likely to be positioned in the center of networks and 
they are more able to control the resource flow in these networks. Banks hold financial 
resources that are essential for other firms and this resource availability determines their 
crucial position in networks. Firms seek to obtain funds from banks, and banks seek to monitor 
debtors (Elouaer-Mrizak & Chastand, 2013). Banks are thereby a central actor in these 
networks.  
                                                             
3 The data for figure 3 are attached in appendix 3. 
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According to the ownership of listed companies reported in table 2.9, we find that those 
listed companies whose ownership structure is classified as ‘unknown’ and ‘other’ have more 
central positions in networks. Further, SOEs are more central than private firms, collectively 
owned businesses, and FOEs. This is consistent with the structure of the Chinese economy. 
The government owns SOEs, therefore SOEs have access to more resources and policy 
privileges. They are in a position of control in the national economy. Private companies have 
more difficulty accessing resources, especially financial resources, than have SOEs (Sha et 
al., 2014; Du et al., 2013). This is reflected in their weak position in these networks. Foreign-
owned enterprises are the most peripheral in these networks. As suggested by Booth et al. 
(2014), foreign-owned firms encounter linguistic and cultural differences, which make them 
less informed about information and policies. As a result, foreign listed companies are less 
involved in networks and are positioned more peripherally. These findings are generally 
consistent with those found in ownership networks reported in panel B of table 2.9, although 
there are some differences as measured by betweenness centrality. 
 
<Table 2.9 inserted here> 
 
In terms of the ego network structure, the aggregate constraint is used to measure the 
structural holes of a network. Evidence shows that firms with more structural holes are more 
likely to have non-redundant information and novel ideas, which will enhance firms’ innovation 
(Semrau & Werner, 2013). Structural holes are negatively related to aggregate constraint, 
which means that higher constraints are associated with fewer structural holes (Nooy et al., 
2005). The aggregate constraint varies according to ownership and industries. Figure 2.44 and 
table 2.10 display the aggregate constraints of listed companies by industry and ownership. 
Listed companies operating in the financial industry, electricity, heat, gas and water production 
and supply industry, and mining industry are more likely to have structural holes, which are 
                                                             
4 Data for the figure is provided in appendix 4. 
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believed to spark more novel information. Regarding ownership structures in table 2.10, 
unknown owned business, SOEs and other enterprises have more structural holes in their ego 
networks while foreign-owned firms, collectively owned businesses, and private firms are more 
likely to be constrained. Even though there are differences in specific industries, the findings 
for ownership networks are generally consistent with the general network. 
 
<Figure 2.4 inserted here> 
 
<Table 2.10 inserted here> 
 
2.4.4 The role of state ownership 
China is a famous guanxi economy that is widely acknowledged to use guanxi and the 
network strategy extensively (Ren et al., 2009). It is also characterized by a high level of state 
capitalism (Lee & Kang, 2012). The dominance of state ownership is widely acknowledged 
through the preponderance of SOEs in China. Since its liberalization policy in 1978, China has 
implemented a series of continuous economic reforms. One of the most important reforms was 
the gradual privatization of SOEs to solve the governance problem caused by the low 
incentives and scant public responsibility that were associated with SOEs (Driffield & Du, 2007). 
Private ownership is growing fast and contributes significantly to the national economy.  
Despite this, private firms have of late grown increasingly concerned about their survival 
prospects. This is because it is argued nowadays that there is an anti-privatization trend in the 
national economy in that SOEs are taking private firms back to public ownership. Prompted by 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government implemented a 4000-billion-yuan investment 
policy to save the market. There are many examples of SOEs taking over private companies, 
causing universal concern. For example, the state-owned company Shan Dong Steel merged 
with the loss-making Ri Zhao Steel in 2009. COFCO, which is a state-owned firm in the food 
sector, acquired 20% equity in MENGNIU and became the first majority shareholder. 
Numerous privately owned shares in highway companies in many provinces were purchased 
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by local governments. Similar cases abound, creating debate as to whether private firms are 
retreating. These phenomena are called “Guo Jin Min Tui” in China, which means “the state 
sector advances and the private sector retreats” (Du et al., 2014) 
Scholars argue that the trend of “state advances and private retreats” is reversing the 
economic reform, that it will undermine private firms, and thus the national economy would be 
affected (Guo, 2010; Du et al., 2014) while others suggest that it is normal market competition 
that makes these companies fail (Hu, 2012). Scholars (e.g. Ji, 2010; Hu, 2012) are committed 
to investigating the existence of such trend since there is no unanimous agreement that it even 
exists. On the one hand Ji (2010) suggests that SOEs are advancing as the competition 
environment increasingly discriminates against private firms and Guo (2011), using many 
criteria, confirms that it exists in some sectors. Qiao (2011) indicates the existence of this trend, 
showing that 72% of people interviewed think the trend is true. Many similar studies have 
indicated the trend is true relying on evidence from specific sectors or examining the survival 
environment. However, these studies provide little empirical evidence for such a trend, leaving 
it open to debate.  
Many other scholars suggest that it is not true to say state advances and private retreats. 
Xiang (2011) argues that statistics, in the form of an examination of the number of private firms 
and the proportion of private capital, belie the existence of such a trend.  Hu (2012) provides 
evidence using the number of firms, production, employment, profit and contribution to tax. Li 
(2010) proves that its non-existence using both qualitative and quantitative methods.  These 
scholars employ statistical data to show that the empirical evidence does not support the trend.  
Scholars finding in favor of the trend point to the increasing number of mergers and 
acquisitions operated by state ownership, and to state ownership’s increasing influence over 
the market. Scholars who refute the trend’s existence use statistical data, such as the number 
of firms, production, and profit, which are on the decrease for state ownership firms. A lack of 
rigor in the arguments of the trend-finders (most particularly concerning the indicators they use) 
suggests that there is insufficient and inconsistent evidence for the presence of “Guo Jin Min 
Tui” (Du et al., 2014). Further research using more reliable methods is required to justify the 
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trend’s existence. 
In this study, we use the network perspective to provide some empirical evidence to add 
to the debate, which provides a new element of ways that SOEs are advancing. By looking at 
the evolution of networks among Chinese state-owned and privately owned listed companies, 
we can have a better understanding of the role of state capitalism, thereby contributing to the 
debate about state advances and private retreats in China. In this section, we only report 
results for the general networks since our examination of both networks produced consistent 
results. 
First, the statistics show that the percentage of privately owned business involved in 
networks has been stable since 2003 at about 22% while the number of listed SOEs in 
networks as a proportion of all listed SOEs in the market increased significantly and stably to 
60%. Table 2.11 shows the percentage of listed companies in SOEs and private firms involved 
in related party networks. The results show that SOEs are actively expanding their influence 
through these networks, while private firms, whose influence had increased from 1997, 
remained stable after 2003. From 2003 to 2011, the percentage of private firms in networks 
even showed decreases in 2005, 2009 and 2011. One possible reason for that is the private 
firms’ retreat in the face of the advances of SOEs. 
 
<Table 2.11 inserted here> 
 
Additionally, the size of networks for SOEs and private firms also generates some insights. 
Table 2.12 presents the average size of networks for SOEs and private firms during the period. 
We find that the size of networks for both types of business increases significantly during the 
period. However, private firms experienced decreases in network size in 2004 and 2011 while 
SOEs increased their network size. Evidence shows that while SOEs are stably expanding 
their influence via the increases in their network size, private firms showed more fluctuation in 
terms of network size. The results show that private firms are less stable compared with SOEs 
in China. 
61 
 
 
<Table 2.12 inserted here> 
 
Moreover, by investigating listed company centrality in the network for SOEs and private 
firms during the period, we have yet more valuable findings. Evidence shows that central firms 
in networks have more access to information and resources as well as greater control over the 
network, which enable them to perform more strongly compared to peripheral firms (Chen & 
Xie, 2011; Tsai, 2001). Central players can control for other network members by distorting 
information and resource flow. Central firms are therefore associated with superior influence 
and control over peripheral firms in networks. Figure 2.55 demonstrates degree centrality and 
betweenness centrality for SOEs and private firms during the period. It is noteworthy that 
degree centrality for SOEs stably increased from 0.049 to 1.478 during the sample period. This 
means that SOEs generally have an increasing number of directly connected partners and are 
able to expand their influence over their networks. However, degree centrality for private firms 
fluctuated during the period and experienced several decreases, particularly after 2004. In 
2011, degree centrality for private firms decreased to 0.284 even though there was an increase 
in 2010. We find similar trends reflected in the betweenness centrality measures for SOEs and 
private firms in the period. Generally, both types of firms became more central (as the centrality 
measure increased during the period). However, there are fluctuations among both types of 
business. Even though both SOEs and private firms experienced decreases in centrality in the 
period, private firms experienced greater decreases while SOEs increased their centrality in 
their networks. In other words, compared with SOEs, private firms were growing increasingly 
weak in their networks.  
 
<Figure 2.5 inserted here> 
 
                                                             
5 Data for the Figure is given in appendix 5 
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In summary, we find that SOEs make advances and private firms retreat from the 
perspective of networks influences. The state makes advances in the percentage of listed 
companies involved in networks, network size, and centrality measures. As networks provide 
firms with channels to influence and exert control over other firms, private firms are growing 
increasingly weak in terms of the influence and control they have over the networks. In other 
words, private firms are indeed retreating compared with SOEs’ advancing. By looking at 
network features, this study provides interesting insights into the debate of “state advances 
and private retreats” in China. However, there is a pre-assumption, which is that networking 
brings about power and influence in China. In this sense, it is another facet of the increasingly 
unfair market environment for private firms that includes entry barriers, financing problems, 
and discrimination by local government (Jiang, 2010). Private firms may find themselves being 
crowded out due to the increasing scale and power of SOEs (Liu, 2012). In the marketplace, 
SOEs benefit from financial and political help, which will weaken market competition and create 
or enhance SOEs’ monopoly position in the national economy (Cao, 2011). The national 
economy may be further affected due to the tortuous methods of resource allocation and the 
high incentives for rent-seeking.  
 
2.4.5 Discussion 
By investigating the networks of listed companies in China, we have configured a definition 
of business networks in China. Through an analysis of network level and firm level 
characteristics, we generate interesting findings. Firstly, the statistics show that network 
connections are increasingly popular among listed companies. Both network size and network 
cohesion significantly improved during the research period. The increasing level of network 
connections has raised a fundamental question, namely why do firms choose to affiliate into 
business networks? Given the popularity and prominence of various business networks, 
scholars have become curious about why and how business networks survive and grow 
(Masulis et al., 2011). This has motivated our next chapter, which investigates the role of 
business network affiliation in firms’ access to financial resources. In that chapter, we expect 
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to contribute a partial answer to the ‘why and how?’ question by providing evidence that firms 
in business networks gain financing advantages. 
Additionally, the expanding connections among listed companies also motivates studies 
investigating the consequences of business networks. As ever increasing numbers of firms 
become involved in various business networks, it is clear firms recognize that they benefit from 
networks. However, there may also be associated costs for firms, and the net effect of business 
networks on a firm, taking into account both the costs and the benefits, needs to be 
investigated. At present the net effect of business networks is ambiguous even though many 
studies have attempted to contribute to research on the consequences of business networks 
(Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016; Keister, 2000; Singh & Gaur, 2009). In order to contribute to the 
debate about the effects of business networks, this study examines the impacts of business 
networks on firm performance. We will also contribute to the literature with a discussion about 
the consequences of business networks on stock return volatility. Given the importance of 
stock return volatility and the popularity of business networks, a study directly linking business 
network affiliation and stock return volatility is needed.  
We find in this study that the features of networks suggest that ownership of listed 
companies matter. SOEs are more likely to involved in business networks, their networks are 
likely to be larger, and they are more likely to occupy a central network position in them. Given 
the importance of state capitalism in China (Lee & Kang, 2012), it is essential to investigate 
the role of ownership on the effects of business networks. Whether the consequences of 
business networks are amplified for SOEs or not deserves inspection. To address this question, 
in the next chapter of this study we further investigate how ownerships shape network effects. 
Even though many studies are examining the role of SOEs in business networks, ambiguity 
still persists, as mentioned in the first chapter. It remains an open question to investigate the 
role of ownership in business networks.  
Furthermore, as firms become increasingly related to other firms, challenges emerge for 
firm governance. Firms in business networks are more exposed to other firms than are isolated 
firms and are therefore less independent, which will affect firms’ strategy and decision-making 
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(Gadde et al., 2003). It is important to find a mechanism for firms in networks to manage 
network cost in order to maximize the benefits of business networks. Firms need to have good 
governance in order to minimize the cost of business networks. Consequently, it is crucial to 
understand how firm governance affects business networks. In order to shed light on this issue, 
we conduct interaction analysis to investigate how firm governance in terms of ownership 
concentration influences the relationship between network affiliation and firm performance. 
Lastly, as the results suggest, network features vary according to the different natures of 
business networks. Even though the overall results are consistent, several differences are 
found between general networks and ownership networks. Firms in ownership networks tend 
to form several small networks. Thereby, we expect that the network effects differ with the 
definition of business networks. Our definition of related relation incorporates various 
relationships, which provides a valuable opportunity for looking at the nature of business 
networks. In the following chapters, we also attempt to add to the literature by investigating 
how the nature of business networks shapes their role. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
This study investigates networks among Chinese publicly-traded companies. Utilizing (i) 
listed companies related party information data, (ii) listed companies related party transaction 
data, and (iii) listed companies’ financial indicator data, we constructed related party networks 
in which the listed companies were involved for the years 1997 through to 2011. Through the 
analysis of these networks we generate some valuable findings, which suggest novel patterns 
of connections in the Chinese context. 
First, we find that Chinese listed companies are becoming more interrelated. The 
coverage of networks increased significantly during the research period, from 3% to around 
40%. During the period, listed companies grew increasingly densely related and more likely to 
collaborate with each other. It is notable that key industries and SOEs played an important role 
in the development of such business networks. Our results further suggest that networks in 
China are still evolving since firms from this emerging economy are not as well connected as 
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their counterparts in the developed economies. Second, this study provides new insights into 
the debate of “the state advances and private retreats.” In terms of network perspective, SOEs 
are expanding their influence through network size and network centrality at a time when 
private firms are stalled or even shrinking. Governed by the policy of “strong-strong alliance,” 
the majority of SOEs in the market affiliate into networks while private firms remain fairly 
isolated. Generally, listed company networks via related relations are developing, and SOEs 
dominate the development of such networks. The increasing power of SOEs through their 
influence over networks may broaden the gap between SOEs and private firms, and even 
weaken market competition.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to investigate listed company 
related party networks among listed companies in China. More specifically, the study 
contributes to our understanding in the following ways. We provide the first attempt to construct 
listed companies’ inter-organization networks using related party information as disclosed in 
their annual reports. The construction of such networks reveals important connections among 
listed companies. In these networks, listed companies can exert control or exercise significant 
influence over another company. In such networks, information-sharing and resource 
mobilization are more efficient. These networks are representative of the national economy 
and capture valuable insights into it. An investigation of business networks as we have defined 
them is, we believe, more reliable in contributing to the understanding of the national economy 
and its capitalism.  
Additionally, we contributed to the understanding that China’s guanxi-oriented society (Li, 
2013) does not necessarily imply a network of dense connections among firms. We were 
unable to identify densely connected networks in our sample capturing formalized relationships 
between listed companies. As this study mainly focused on related party networks among listed 
companies, we included many important relationships but omitted any informal connections 
that may exist. The sample has important implications for the understanding of the network 
economy since we constructed representative business networks connected by important 
relations. The results have suggested that even though guanxi are widely distributed in China’s 
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society, inter-organizational ties are still evolving. The research has important implications for 
the multidimensionality of guanxi. We have showed evidence that inter-organizational guanxi 
is different to personal guanxi. Thus, the concept of guanxi in China is more complex than the 
prior studies showed.  
Furthermore, through our investigation of the features and dynamics of business network 
composition, we expect to contribute to factors that influence the formation of business 
networks in China. Our findings provide evidence that the government is responsible for the 
formation and development of business networks in China. Economic features heavily shape 
the development of business networks in China. Moreover, we provide new insights into the 
debate of “the state advances and private retreats” in China using network perspectives, which 
enhance our understanding of China’s state capitalism. We contribute to the understanding of 
the existence of such trends using SOEs’ expanding influences over networks through network 
size and centrality.  
However, this study also suffers from certain limitations. Firstly, even though we show that 
guanxi and networks are not necessarily the same, we fail to provide evidence for how they 
are different from each other. Our dataset does not allow us to differentiate between the two. 
Additionally, we are unable to comment on how the factors identified in this study affect firms’ 
decision to enter networks. As this chapter is descriptive, further regression analyses are 
required to further advance the understanding of drivers of network formation, and the 
implications for these networks. Finally, we acknowledge that our findings would gain more 
reliability if we were to investigate the whole network including the non-listed companies. It 
was purely the lack of data for these firms that meant that we had to omit them and deal only 
with listed companies.  
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Tables in Chapter 2 
 
Table 2.1: Percentage of listed companies sampled in each year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows the coverage of the sample in the market. It is suggested that the sample 
captures well the populations in the market, which include around 90% of listed companies in the 
market. As this chapter presents an overview of business networks in China, the number of listed 
companies captured here may be different to those in other chapters. The later chapters use data 
that corresponds with business network data in order to acquire network information. The no. of 
listed companies captured in the data are computed from our database. The no. of listed companies 
in the market are from the website of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
year 
No. of listed firms in 
the sample 
No. of listed companies in 
the market 
Percentage 
captured 
1997 618 764 80.89 
1998 809 853 94.84 
1999 953 953 100 
2000 1067 1067 100 
2001 1154 1160 99.48 
2002 1269 1269 100 
2003 1311 1311 100 
2004 1360 1360 100 
2005 1359 1359 100 
2006 1450 1450 100 
2007 1571 1571 100 
2008 1624 1624 100 
2009 1769 1769 100 
2010 2122 2122 100 
2011 2346 2346 100 
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Table 2.2: Relationships accounted as a related party for listed companies 
Relations Note Networks 
Parent company of listed 
company 
 Ownership 
network 
Subsidiary of listed company  Ownership 
network 
Other enterprise under the 
control of the same parent 
company as the listed company 
Sister company of listed company Ownership 
network 
Investor exercising joint control 
over the listed company 
Shareholder that jointly control the 
listed company’s operating. 
Ownership 
network 
Investor imposing significant 
influence on the listed company 
Shareholder can influence or 
participate in listed company’s decision- 
making but cannot control the decision 
making. Normally investor controls less 
than 30% shares. 
Ownership 
network 
Joint venture of listed company Enterprise and listed company jointly 
control another company 
Collaboration 
network 
Associate of listed company Enterprise has significant influence 
over another company in which listed 
company has equity 
Collaboration 
network 
Main individual investor of the 
listed company and his closely-
related family 
Individual investors in the listed 
company and their closely-related 
family members. 
Individual 
network 
Key manager of the listed 
company or its parent company 
and his closely-related family 
Important managers of listed company 
and their closely-related family. 
Individual 
network 
Enterprise which is controlled, 
jointly controlled, or significantly 
influenced by individual investor, 
key manager and closely-related 
family of the listed company 
Enterprise that shares the same 
important investor, manager, and 
closely-related family with the listed 
company. 
Individual 
network 
Others Other relationship whereby the entity 
can significantly influence the listed 
company’s decision-making.  
Individual 
network 
Note: The table is converted from the definition of variables in CSMAR database. The group of 
relations are based on the nature of relations. Onet stands for relations from ownership relations; Cnet 
refers to relations from collaborations; Inet includes relations from key individuals 
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Table 2.3: Whole network features-listed company and related parties 
Year Size Density Average degree Component Size largest 
1997 4922 0.00036  1.7558  606 75 
1998 7138 0.00025  1.7935  774 107 
1999 9426 0.00019  1.8218  891 137 
2000 10492 0.00017  1.8210  991 135 
2001 13708 0.00014  1.8666  1006 138 
2002 17402 0.00011  1.9027  1069 366 
2003 18106 0.00011  1.9074  1065 240 
2004 18954 0.00010  1.9267  1077 308 
2005 19971 0.00010  1.9344  1082 545 
2006 21995 0.00009  1.9426  1108 566 
2007 24856 0.00008  1.9515  1195 564 
2008 28859 0.00007  1.9831  1165 680 
2009 31019 0.00006  1.9759  1236 1301 
2010 40144 0.00005  1.9913  1438 9726 
2011 45747 0.00004  1.9927  1651 9753 
Note: This table presents the whole network features that include all non-listed related parties. Size 
refers to the number of members in a network. Density is measured as a proportion of existing links to 
a theoretical maximum number of the link. Average degree is a measurement of cohesion of the network, 
which takes the mean value of degrees of each node. The component is a connected sub-network. The 
increasing network size suggests that whole network is expanding significantly. During the period, listed 
companies and their related parties are increasingly densely becoming related to each other. The 
networks are getting more complicated as the number of sub-networks, and the size of individual 
networks and the whole network increased significantly. 
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Table 2.4: whole network features-listed company only 
Panel A: Networks with all related relations 
year size density average_degree component（>=2） size_largest 
1997 618 0.00006  0.03883  10 4 
1998 809 0.00011  0.08900  30 4 
1999 953 0.00014  0.13431  46 5 
2000 1067 0.00014  0.14620  53 7 
2001 1154 0.00022  0.25823  89 8 
2002 1269 0.00026  0.32624  112 22 
2003 1311 0.00030  0.39512  126 16 
2004 1360 0.00033  0.45147  150 14 
2005 1359 0.00033  0.44592  148 15 
2006 1450 0.00035  0.51172  159 18 
2007 1571 0.00033  0.52069  187 15 
2008 1624 0.00040  0.64655  187 23 
2009 1769 0.00040  0.69983  184 56 
2010 2122 0.00036  0.76532  179 312 
2011 2346 0.00030  0.71270  189 305 
 
Panel B: Networks with ownership relations 
year size density average_degree component（>=2） size_largest 
1997 618 0.00005  0.02913  7 4 
1998 809 0.00008  0.06675  23 4 
1999 953 0.00010  0.09234  34 4 
2000 1067 0.00009  0.09560  41 4 
2001 1154 0.00014  0.16118  66 8 
2002 1269 0.00018  0.22222  89 12 
2003 1311 0.00019  0.25019  100 10 
2004 1360 0.00029  0.39118  147 14 
2005 1359 0.00029  0.38852  145 15 
2006 1450 0.00030  0.43862  155 18 
2007 1571 0.00030  0.46722  182 11 
2008 1624 0.00035  0.56773  189 19 
2009 1769 0.00034  0.60938  177 53 
2010 2122 0.00027  0.58153  194 70 
2011 2346 0.00024  0.55413  204 56 
Note: This table shows the whole networks that only includes listed companies. These are sub-networks 
of the whole network mentioned above. Size refers to the number of members in a network. Density is 
measured as a proportion of existing links to a theoretical maximum number of the link. Average degree 
is a measurement of cohesion of the network, which takes the mean value of degrees of each node. 
The component is a connected sub-network.  
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Table 2.5: Listed companies in networks across different controller types 
Panel A: General networks 
Control 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Collectively   1 2 3 1 3 5 4 2 4 8 4 4 4 4 
Foreign     1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 17 
Other 2 3 2 3 3 3 8 16 8 9 11 9 15 5 23 
Private 5 13 4 8 23 45 73 91 83 104 121 133 154 283 218 
SOE 15 43 95 111 202 249 275 313 327 376 412 491 521 545 577 
Unknown   4 3 2 6 7 8 6 3 6 10 7 22 24 42 
Total 22 64 107 128 236 309 372 432 424 500 562 644 716 862 881 
 
Panel B: Ownership networks 
Control 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Collectively 0 1 1 2 1 2 4 4 2 4 8 4 3 2 4 
Foreign 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 
Other 1 3 2 2 3 3 6 14 7 8 11 9 11 5 21 
Private 4 9 3 4 10 31 45 82 71 88 99 114 122 214 163 
SOE 10 32 68 80 137 182 192 287 299 344 390 459 487 481 522 
Unknown 0 4 1 1 5 5 7 6 3 6 10 7 18 22 35 
Total 15 49 76 90 157 225 256 395 383 451 518 593 641 724 755 
 
Note: This table illustrates the distribution of listed companies in networks by different types of ultimate controller. The classification of these types of ownership 
is given by the database of CSMAR.  
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Table 2.6: Summary of key network variables 
Variables Definition Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Net 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is 
network affiliated 
20782 0.3020  0.4591  
Onet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is 
affiliated to ownership networks 
20782 0.2570  0.4370  
Cnet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is 
affiliated to collaboration networks 
20782 0.0595  0.2366  
Inet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is 
affiliated to individual networks 
20782 0.0361  0.1867  
Net_size The Number of Firms in a Network 20782 11.4150  52.1812  
Degree 
The Number of Contacts a Firm 
has in its Network 
20782 0.5477  1.1292  
Betweenness 
The possibility that a focal firm 
falls into the paths of other 
network members 
20782 0.0372  0.1628  
Aggregate 
constraint 
Total Constraint the Network has 
to the Firm 
20782 0.9680  0.1300  
Onet size 
The Number of Firms in the 
Ownership Network 
20782 2.6298  7.1121  
Onet degree 
The Number of Contacts a Firm 
has in the Ownership Network 
20782 0.3860  0.8328  
Onet 
betweenness 
The possibility that a focal firm 
falls into the paths of other 
network members in the 
ownership network. 
20782 0.000001  0.00002  
Onet aggregate 
constraint 
Total Constraint the Network has 
to the Firm in the Ownership 
network 
20782 0.9687  0.1296  
 
Note: : (1) Degree centrality 𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 means a connection from firm i to firm j.  
(2) Betweenness centrality 𝐵𝐶𝑖 = ∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗 , where 𝑔𝑗𝑘  means the number of shortest paths 
from firm j to firm k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the number of shortest paths from firm j to firm k through 
firm i.  (3) Aggregate constraint 𝐴𝐶𝑖 = ∑ (𝑃𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑃𝑞𝑖𝑞 )
2
𝑗  where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 means the proportional 
strength of the tie from firm i to firm j. 
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Table 2.7: Network size for listed companies across industries 
Panel A: General networks 
Industry 
Network Size 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Electricity, heat, gas and water 
production and supply industry 
28.9247  85.3281  1 312 
Financial Industry 26.5064  79.5098  1 312 
Transportation, storage and postal 
services 
19.3090  69.6165  1 312 
Mining industry 16.4425  62.3867  1 312 
Water Conservancy, Environment and 
Public Facilities Management 
13.0366  57.8043  1 312 
Manufacturing 9.7857  47.1278  1 312 
Real Estate 9.5288  47.2891  1 312 
Wholesale and retailing 9.1512  45.6251  1 312 
Information transmission, software, and 
IT services 
8.4129  44.8048  1 312 
Building industry 8.8982  42.9901  1 312 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 7.3137  42.8208  1 312 
Complex 7.1379  39.8434  1 312 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery 
5.8880  36.9009  1 312 
Accommodation and Catering Services 4.7886  27.7019  1 305 
Leasing and Business Services 4.4512  27.8602  1 312 
Health and social work 4.0909  7.9681  1 27 
Scientific and technical services 1.4130  1.5431  1 11 
Resident services, repairs, and other 
services 
1.2907  0.7007  1 5 
Education industry 1 . 1 1 
Notes: Network size is the number of listed company in a network 
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Panel B: Ownership networks 
Industry 
Network Size 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Electricity, heat, gas and water 
production and supply industry 
4.6751  12.3458  
1 70 
Financial Industry 3.3709  6.2578  1 70 
Transportation, storage and postal 
services 
3.2585  9.1848  
1 70 
Mining industry 3.1459  7.5496  1 70 
Information transmission, software and 
IT services 
2.6861  8.1838  
1 70 
Manufacturing 2.6389  7.0822  1 70 
Building industry 2.5232  6.4040  1 70 
Wholesale and retailing 2.2793  5.6595  1 70 
Education industry 2.2000  2.7826  1 9 
Health and social work 2.1250  3.1596  1 12 
Leasing and Business Services 2.0051  3.3678  1 27 
Water Conservancy, Environment and 
Public Facilities Management 
1.9375  5.8087  
1 70 
Real Estate 1.9337  4.4541  1 70 
Complex 1.9291  5.5010  1 60 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery 
1.8264  5.3166  
1 70 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 1.6442  4.9489  1 70 
Accommodation and Catering Services 1.5745  1.2941  1 9 
Scientific and technical services 1.0488  0.3123  1 3 
Notes: Network size is the number of listed company in a network 
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Table 2.8: Network size for listed companies across controller types 
Panel A: General networks 
Control 
Network Size 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Unknown 18.5198  67.8201  1 312 
SOE 13.0331  55.2291  1 312 
Other 12.4267  54.1903  1 312 
Private 6.4595  38.3042  1 312 
Foreign 4.8414  31.0181  1 305 
Collectively 4.7637  32.2841  1 312 
 
Panel B: Ownership networks 
Control 
Network Size 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Unknown 3.1569  7.6383  1 70 
SOE 3.1223  8.1487  1 70 
Other 2.5699  5.7809  1 56 
Private 1.6973  4.5063  1 70 
Collectively 1.5836  4.4536  1 70 
Foreign 1.4848  3.9164  1 56 
 
Notes: Network size is the number of listed company in a network. The classification of controller 
types is given by the CSMAR database. 
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Table 2.9: Centrality of listed companies across controller types 
Panel A: General networks 
Control 
Degree Between 
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Unknown 0.7526  1.3735  0 10 0.0732  0.2243  0 1 
Other 0.6906  1.0220  0 6 0.0580  0.2083  0 1 
SOE 0.6794  1.2812  0 18 0.0464  0.1783  0 1 
Private 0.3063  0.7421  0 11 0.0186  0.1220  0 1 
Collectively 0.1813  0.5035  0 3 0.0158  0.1148  0 1 
Foreign 0.1759  0.5262  0 4 0.0086  0.0806  0 1 
 
Panel B: Ownership networks 
Control 
Degree Between 
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Unknown 0.5246  1.0169  0 6 0.0000019  0.0000146  0 0.000276 
Other 0.5018  0.7090  0 3 0.0000003  0.0000024  0 3.86E-05 
SOE 0.4797  0.9436  0 14 0.0000017  0.0000178  0 0.000773 
Private 0.2050  0.5231  0 6 0.0000003  0.0000079  0 0.000433 
Collectively 0.1530  0.4577  0 3 0.0000004  0.0000053  0 0.000089 
Foreign 0.0996  0.3408  0 3 0.0000002  0.0000025  0 3.75E-05 
 
Notes: (1) Degree centrality 𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 means a connection from i to j. Degree 
refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. (2) Betweenness centrality 𝐵𝐶𝑖 =
∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗 , where 𝑔𝑗𝑘  means the number of shortest paths from j to k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the 
number of shortest paths from j to k through i. Betweenness centrality means the number of paths 
through the firm to all paths in the network. 
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Table 2.10: Structural hole of listed companies across controller types 
Panel A: General networks 
Control 
Aggregate Constraint 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Foreign 0.9950  0.0580  0.5000  1.4791  
Collectively 0.9902  0.0719  0.3333  1.2893  
Private 0.9873  0.0887  0.1623  1.9445  
Other 0.9711  0.1280  0.2678  1.4868  
SOE 0.9587  0.1452  0.1210  1.9238  
Unknown 0.9316  0.1777  0.2485  1.2936  
 
Panel B: Ownership networks 
Control 
Aggregate Constraint 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Foreign 0.9971  0.0439  0.3333  1.0000  
Private 0.9888  0.0792  0.2500  1.1250  
Collectively 0.9884  0.0821  0.3333  1.1250  
Other 0.9787  0.1156  0.5000  1.1250  
SOE 0.9587  0.1470  0.1000  1.1250  
Unknown 0.9314  0.1912  0.2000  1.0000  
 
Notes: Constraint measures the structural holes a firm has in its network. It captures total constraint the 
network has to the firm.  
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Table 2.11: The percentage of listed companies in networks to listed companies in the market 
for private firms and SOEs in each year 
Control Private SOE 
1997 2.79  3.94  
1998 6.13  8.25  
1999 4.60  12.35  
2000 7.69  12.86  
2001 18.25  21.65  
2002 21.95  25.75  
2003 25.44  28.95  
2004 25.93  33.40  
2005 22.19  34.94  
2006 22.76  40.13  
2007 22.45  43.37  
2008 22.70  50.31  
2009 21.69  53.49  
2010 26.20  57.79  
2011 18.78  59.18  
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Table 2.12: network size for SOE and private firms in each year 
Year 
Network size for SOE Network size for private 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1997 1.0499  0.2812  1 4 1.0503  0.3398  1 4 
1998 1.1017  0.3711  1 4 1.0896  0.3972  1 4 
1999 1.1964  0.6031  1 5 1.0460  0.2106  1 2 
2000 1.2549  0.8670  1 7 1.0769  0.2678  1 2 
2001 1.4920  1.2129  1 8 1.3095  0.8145  1 5 
2002 2.0072  3.2515  1 22 1.5902  2.2876  1 22 
2003 2.0347  2.6066  1 16 1.6202  1.8413  1 16 
2004 2.1025  2.4508  1 14 1.5783  1.4178  1 9 
2005 2.0684  2.3299  1 15 1.5160  1.5144  1 15 
2006 2.6916  3.3307  1 18 1.5405  1.4551  1 11 
2007 2.5505  2.8383  1 15 1.4972  1.3625  1 15 
2008 3.8033  4.8612  1 23 1.9795  3.4527  1 23 
2009 7.9569  14.2070  1 56 2.5718  6.3581  1 56 
2010 76.1633  131.0700  1 312 24.1720  80.4110  1 312 
2011 77.1836  129.9500  1 305 10.7820  51.9760  1 305 
Note: Network size is the number of firms in a business network. 
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Figures in Chapter 1 
Figure 2.1a: The evolution of business networks 
Networks in 1997 
 
 
Networks in 2005 
 
 
Networks in 2011 
 
Note: There were 22, 425 and 884 listed companies in networks respectively in 1997, 2005 
and 2011. In 1997 there were 10 individual networks, which increased to 148 networks in 2005. 
Till 2011, the number of individual networks increased to 189. 
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Figure 2.1b: The evolution of ownership business networks 
Networks in 1997 
 
Networks in 2005 
 
Networks in 2011 
 
Note: There are 16, 384 and 758 listed companies connected by ownership relations. The 
number of networks increased from 7 to 145 in 2005 and further increased to 204 in 2011. 
82 
 
Figure 2.2a: Listed companies in networks across key industries 
 
Note: The size of the bubble is the number of listed companies in networks. The vertical line represents percentage of firms in networks.  
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Figure 2.2b: Listed companies in ownership networks across industries 
 
Note: The size of the bubble is the number of listed companies in networks. The vertical line represents percentage of firms in networks.  
 
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Manufacturing Wholesale and retailing
Real Estate Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry
Mining industry Financial Industry
Transportation, storage and postal services Information transmission, software and IT services
Building industry
84 
 
Figure 2.3: Centrality for firms in different industries 
Panel A: Degree centrality and betweenness centrality for firms in general networks 
 
 
 
Note: Degree refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness centrality 
means the number of paths through the firm to all paths in the network. (1) Degree centrality 
𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 means a connection from i to j.  (2) Betweenness centrality 𝐵𝐶𝑖 =
∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗  , where 𝑔𝑗𝑘  means the number of shortest paths from j to k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the 
number of shortest paths from j to k through i. The figure is based on the data in appendix 2, 
which shows centrality measures for firms in different industries. 
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Panel B: Degree centrality and betweenness centrality for firms in ownership networks 
 
 
 
Note: Degree refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness centrality 
means the number of paths through the firm to all paths in the network. (1) Degree centrality 
𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 means a connection from i to j.  (2) Betweenness centrality 𝐵𝐶𝑖 =
∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗  , where 𝑔𝑗𝑘  means the number of shortest paths from j to k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the 
number of shortest paths from j to k through i. The figure is based on the data in appendix 3, 
which shows centrality measures for firms in different industries. 
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate constraint for firms in different industries. 
Panel A: Aggregate constraint for firms in general networks across industries 
 
 
Panel B: Aggregate constraint for firms in ownership networks across industries 
 
Note: Aggregate constraint is a measure of structural holes. The more constraint a firm has, 
the less likely for the firm to be a broker. Aggregate constraint 𝐴𝐶𝑖 = ∑ (𝑃𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑃𝑞𝑖𝑞 )
2
𝑗  
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 means the proportional strength of the tie from firm i to firm j. The data for the 
figure is provided in appendix 4. 
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Figure 2.5: Centralities for SOEs and private firms 
 
 
 
Note: Degree refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness 
centrality means the number of paths through the firm to all paths in the network. (1) 
Degree centrality 𝐷𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  , where 𝑋𝑖𝑗  means a connection from i to j.  (2) 
Betweenness centrality 𝐵𝐶𝑖 = ∑ ∑
𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑔𝑗𝑘
𝑘𝑗  , where 𝑔𝑗𝑘   means the number of shortest 
paths from j to k; 𝑔𝑗𝑘(𝑖) refers to the number of shortest paths from j to k through i. The 
figure is based on the data in appendix 2, which shows centrality measures for firms in 
different industries. The data for these figures are given in appendix 5. 
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Chapter 3 Do business networks help firms to finance? 
3.1 Introduction 
The prominent role played by various business networks in the emerging economies 
is witnessed and researched worldwide (He et al., 2013; Byun et al., 2013; Morck et al., 
2005; La Porta et al., 1999). Researchers studying a network choose a set of actors tied 
by certain relations (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). As resource-dependency theory (Hillman 
et al., 2009) suggests, firms try to release constraints, and obtain access to key 
resources such as expertise, finance, and advice. Establishing and managing 
relationships with other organizations enables the focal firm to access external resources 
that, in emerging markets, can be expensive and scarce or even unavailable (He et al., 
2013). There is evidence to suggest that the absence of appropriate institutional 
safeguards makes it more difficult for firms to raise external financing (Gopalan et al., 
2007). Firms form business networks due to the under-developed nature of the markets 
and business networks help to fill institutional voids (Leff, 1978; Goto, 1982; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997, 2000).  
However, as institutions are continuously improving in the emerging markets, a 
substantial body of literature has documented some negative impacts of business 
networks (Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Sing & Gaur, 
2009; Morck et al., 2005). For example, the complex ownership structure of a 
conglomerate or business group may impose significant governance challenges, and 
thus increase costs (Ma et al., 2006; Carney et al., 2009). Affiliates of business groups 
may suffer from agency problems that arise from the conflict of interests between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Such conflict may result in the 
misallocation of resources within the business group. Given the significant adverse 
effects of business networks, the prevalence and thriving of business networks in many 
countries (The Economist, 2011) has raised a fundamental question: why and how do 
business networks survive and continue to grow (Masulis et al., 2011)? The empirical 
results of research into business networks are mixed and a consensus has not yet been 
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reached about the net effects of business network affiliation (He et al., 2013). This study 
contributes to the debate by examining the financing advantage that may be gained by 
membership of business networks. 
Previous studies investigating the role of business networks in firms’ financing are 
constrained. They heavily focused on internal capital markets (He et al., 2013; Gopalan 
et al., 2007; Buchuk et al., 2014) and debts (Byun et al., 2013; Mulyani et al., 2016; 
Manos et al., 2007; Chakraorty, 2013). Studies investigating the relationship between 
business networks and firms’ financial constraints focus on an examination of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (e.g. He et al., 2013). There is limited research on 
whether and how firms in business networks may be less financially constrained than 
their counterparts outside the business network. A thorough understanding of how firms 
in business networks are less financially constrained is not only academically imperative, 
it has practical benefits since a better knowledge about the role of business networks 
can govern network strategies for firms. Moreover, examining the role of business 
networks purely from the point of view of firms’ debt financing may limit our 
understanding about firms’ access to financial resources since debt is only one element 
of financial resources. Our study contributes to the literature by examining how firms in 
business networks are less financially constrained with regard to a relatively wide range 
of financial resources, such as firms’ debt financing, access to trade credit, working 
capital management and cash flow adequacy ratio.  Thus we obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of business networks.  
China is an excellent case for a study on the effects of business networks on firms’ 
access to financial resources. First, there are various types of business networks in 
China, which play significant roles in its national economy. For example, as mentioned 
in chapter 1, business groups in China contribute close to 60% of the nation’s industrial 
output (China Development Research Center of the State Council, 2000). Business 
networks are widespread and play prominent roles in the practice of business.  This 
makes China a good and relevant context for business networks studies.  
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Second, as China is both an emerging and transition economy (Peng et al., 2008), 
its institutional infrastructure cannot provide consistent and sufficient protection for 
business activities (Jia & Wang, 2013; Allen et al., 2005). For example, investor 
protection in China is among the worst in the world (Allen et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 
1998) and external capital can be expensive and scarce, or even unavailable (He et al., 
2013). In this context, business networks can have significant effects on firms’ access to 
resources.  
Third, China has maintained a state-dominated financial system; government at 
different levels controls the allocation of financial resources in both the banking sector 
and the securities market (He et al., 2013). Institutional biases and discriminatory 
economic policy lead to an unfair competitive environment. In such a context, business 
networks are likely to serve as a resources pool for firms needing to access external 
finance, particularly for non-SOEs.  
Finally, China offers valuable opportunities to study the nature of networks grounded 
in the importance of the relationships between firms. Its value system entrenched in a 
deeply rooted culture has promoted the prominence of various guanxi, which provide 
valuable opportunities for investigating many different types of business networks. As 
seen in Chapter 2, due to data limitation, previous studies have examined just one type 
of relationship among firms (Chen & Xie, 2011; Duysters & Lemmens, 2003; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). This study uses listed company related party data to examine business 
networks that defined via different types of relationship, through which we can make a 
contribution to research on the effects of the nature of business network. 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role of business 
networks and to contribute to the mixed empirical results in studies about them we 
address the following issues in this study: (1) whether firms in business networks have 
superior access to debts than free-standing firms have; (2) whether firms in business 
networks have superior access to trade credit than free-standing ones; (3) whether firms 
in business networks have more efficient working capital management than isolated 
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firms; (4) whether affiliated firms have more cash flow for investment than those that are 
non-affiliated; (5) how ownership and type of networks shape the role of business 
networks in China; and (6) how the structure of the networks affects the role of business 
networks in China.  
Unlike previous studies that are reliant on an examination of internal capital markets 
and debts, we can offer a relatively wide range of knowledge about how affiliates of 
business networks are less financially constrained. Moreover, we investigate how these 
relations are affected by the ownership type and nature of business networks, which 
provides a more detailed and complete understanding of the role of business networks. 
Furthermore, by examining the network effects of network structures, we have an 
improved understanding of the role of business networks on firm finance. 
Using data from the CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research) 
database, a widely used database for the study of Chinese listed companies, this study 
constructs business networks over a 15-year period from 1997 to 2011. By examining 
the role of business network affiliation, we find that affiliates in business networks 
typically have superior access to financial resources. Our evidence shows that firms in 
business networks are less financially constrained because they have a higher degree 
of leverage, better access to informal finance in terms of trade credit, more efficient 
working capital management, and greater access to cash for investment. Moreover, the 
effects of business networks on firms’ access to financial resources are swayed by the 
nature of the business network and the controller type of the firm. Our results suggest, 
for example, that the role of business networks in firms’ cash sufficiency for investment 
and working capital management is more pronounced for non-SOEs, who are 
discriminated against by the formal financial systems. Among the different types of 
business networks, collaboration networks show relatively weak determining effects 
compared to ownership networks or individual networks. Affiliation to ownership 
networks has better-determining effects for long-term debts, while individual networks 
affiliation has more impact on short-term leverage, trade credit, working capital 
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management, and cash sufficiency. Furthermore, we also find that networks effects are 
mediated by network structures and that the centrality of the firm’s position in the network 
and the degree of network tightness are positively related to firm’s finance. 
We also perform a battery of robustness checks. Using multiple measures of trade 
credit, we investigate the role of the business network on firms’ granting of trade credit 
and the net trade credit received. Moreover, we examine alternative measures of 
ownership by using domestic private firm dummies as a robustness check for the use of 
non-SOEs. We also control for endogenous network formation and cross-sectional 
dependence to check the reliability of our results. Our robustness checks provide 
estimation results that are consistent with the main regression. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss 
context in Chinese networks and institutions. In section 3, we present the theory and 
hypotheses development. In Section 4, data is introduced. Section 5 illustrates the 
empirical strategy. Section 6 gives findings and discussions. In section 7, further analysis, 
including robustness checks, is presented. We conclude the work in Section 8. 
 
3.2 Business networks and the institutional environment in China 
3.2.1 Business networks in China 
China has been searching for appropriate methods to govern firms since its market-
oriented reforms in 1978 (Nee, 1992). Reformers in China believed that since China fails 
to provide adequate formal institutions to facilitate the functioning of the market (Ma et 
al., 2006), business networks, such as business groups, might help firms deliver stable 
financial performance and achieve international competitiveness (Ma & Lu, 2005). In 
1987, the state ministries first issued a formal policy document to signal approval for 
transforming SOEs into recognized business groups (Carney et al., 2009; Keister, 2000).  
This formalized earlier experiments on establishing business groups. As a result, 
business groups, being a typical example of business network, have grown dramatically 
(Hahn & Lee, 2006). By the early 1990s, the number of business groups in China 
94 
 
amounted to 7000 (Wu, 1990; He et al., 2013). 
Indeed, to achieve policy goals, it is suggested that significant consolidation was 
required (Carney et al., 2009). China therefore encouraged firms to form different types 
of network in order to achieve competitive advantage.  These are now widespread in 
China and include National Trail Groups established in 1991 and 1997 (Nolan, 2001), 
industry association networks (Liu et al., 2016), interlock directorship networks (Chen & 
Xie, 2011), and cross-shareholding networks (Sha & Zeng, 2014). Evidence shows that 
over 50% of listed companies are involved in listed company cross-shareholding 
networks (Sha & Zeng, 2014).  
A relation-based governance regime is very evident in China and is a product of its 
rich heritage and entrenched value system.  It persists despite the country’s efforts to 
transfer to a rule-based governance system as adopted by western countries (Lau & 
Young, 2013; Li, 2013). For the Chinese, relationships are viewed as essential elements 
of society (Ambler & Witzel, 2000) and guanxi is at the heart of Chinese rationalism. As 
mentioned above, guanxi is widely used as a business strategy to gain a competitive 
advantage (Li et al., 2008; Li & Zhang, 2007). It is important to appreciate that guanxi is 
deeply rooted in Chinese culture, having been formed and reinforced over centuries (Lau 
& Young, 2013). It is appropriate to say that the Chinese economy is composed of 
various guanxi, which constitutes different types of business networks.  
In such a context, the blossoming relationships among firms provide us with 
valuable opportunities for investigating the role of the different business networks. 
Ownership networks, such as business groups, are promoted by the government while 
individual networks are deeply rooted in its culture. We argue that the substantially 
different nature of the various types of network means that firms receive different benefits 
according to the type of network they are affiliated to.   
 
3.2.2 Institutional environment in China 
China is significant as it has an emerging economy as well as a partial transition 
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economy (Peng et al., 2008). As a socialist country, public ownership occupies a 
dominant position in the national economy, with other forms of ownership developing in 
its train (Chen & He, 2009). The state controls access to capital, exercises favoritism, 
and influences investment decisions. Thus, state bureaus and SOEs are crucial to the 
national economy and often dominate business activities in the market. This leads to one 
characteristic of China’s reform, which is the uneven development of the economic and 
legal systems. One of the most reported issues identified by researchers is the 
discriminatory financial system.  
The state dominates the financial system and controls the allocation of financial 
resources in both the banking sector and the securities market (He et al., 2013). The 
banking system in China is dominated by the four state-owned commercial banks, 
although there are scores of foreign and regional commercial banks. China’s imperfect 
legal system and market mechanism means that its legal system is less than flexible, 
and provides neither transparent nor consistent protection for business activities (Jia & 
Wang, 2013). Due to poor legal protection from opportunistic behaviors, banking 
systems favor firms with whom they are familiar, for example, large and established 
SOEs. 
In terms of the securities market in China, it is also shaped by the government since 
in order to be approved as listed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
companies must be selected by a provincial government or ministry (He et al., 2013). 
Government-guided financial resource allocation normally favors a few large-scale state-
owned enterprises that are critical to the economic development of the country or the 
specific region. Indeed, Chinese listed companies came about as a direct result of the 
government’s restructuring of SOEs (Wang, 2012). China’s aim in establishing two stock 
exchanges was to list SOEs and thereby solve its property rights problem, improve 
corporate governance, and develop more efficient business operations (Zhang, 2008). 
Even now, the states are important shareholders in these companies and in most cases, 
they are the majority shareholders. The state (or SOEs proxying for the state) can 
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therefore exert significant influence over listed companies. Compared with SOEs, 
private-owned enterprises are constrained by lack of access to available resources, and 
discriminatory policies (Li, 2013). Hence, smaller state-owned and most non-state 
enterprises experience difficulty in securing finance from the official financial system.  
Given that China’s financial systems discriminate between different types of 
business entities, we expect firms, particularly private firms, might seek to improve 
access to external financing by affiliating to business networks, thereby reducing the 
information asymmetry problem and transaction cost. We also surmise that the result of 
business networks affiliation on firms’ access to resources is different for SOEs and non-
SOEs. 
 
3.3 Literature and hypothesis development 
The number of network studies has been increasing exponentially over time 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). One of the dominant explanations of various business 
networks is the market-based view proposed by the works of Leff (1978) and Goto (1982).  
This was further developed by Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) into ‘institutional void.' 
This view argues that the existence of business networks, such as business groups, is 
due to the under-developed nature of markets in the developing markets. Business 
networks emerge to fill the institutional voids caused by the absence of supportive 
institutions for business activities in many parts of the world. As a result, business units 
form networks in order to avoid market imperfections by internalizing transactions within 
network members rather than the market (Leff, 1978; Bugador, 2015). Clearly, the 
institutional voids hypothesis (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) would suggest that the benefits 
of business network affiliation would decrease or even disappear as institutions improve, 
and there is evidence in support of this (see Gaur & Delios, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2005). 
Further, studies have increasingly reported on the cost of affiliating to business networks 
(Gaur & Kumar, 2009; Morck et al., 2005).  
We therefore see that both positive effects and negative effects of business network 
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affiliation have been empirically reported. We have outlined these benefits and costs in 
chapter 1. Given the persistence and prominence of business networks despite an 
improvement in the institutional environment (Carney, 2008; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012), 
it is important to examine the benefits of business networks to provide an explanation of 
firms’ persistent motivation to join. 
This study expects to partially investigate the benefits of business networks by 
looking at their role in relation to firms’ access to financial resources. We argue that firms 
in business networks gain a financing advantage through superior access to financial 
resources. Previous studies have investigated the role of business networks on firms’ 
financial constraints but these have heavily focused on debt and equity (e.g. Byun et al., 
2013; Manos et al., 2007; Almeida et al., 2015; Buchuk et al., 2014). Very few studies 
have examined informal finance mechanisms such as trade credit (Liu et al., 2016) and 
working capital management (Singh & Kumar, 2014). This study expects to bridge this 
gap by examining a relatively comprehensive range of financial resources. By doing so, 
we expect to contribute to the literature by showing how firms in business networks are 
less financially constrained, rather than simply stating that firms in business networks 
are less financially constrained (e.g. He et al., 2013). We argue that business network 
affiliation significantly impacts on firms’ access to debts, trade credit, working capital 
management, and cash flow sufficiency.  
 
3.3.1 Business networks and firms’ access to debts 
An investigation into the role of business networks in firms’ debt financing is an 
empirical question since business networks come with both positives and negatives 
(Byun et al., 2013). Empirical studies examining the relationship between business 
networks and debt financing present mixed findings. Manos et al. (2007) suggest that 
group affiliated firms are more highly levered compared with non-affiliated firms as they 
enjoy better access to external capital. Paligorova & Xu (2012) investigate the motivation 
of pyramidal firms for the use of debt financing and suggest that pyramidal firms have 
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significantly higher leverage against the risk of expropriation. Kuo & Wang (2015) 
indicate that network linkages positively affect financial leverage. Mulyani et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that family firms tend to maintain higher leverage to mitigate agency 
problems. On the other hand, business network affiliation is found to be negatively 
related to firms’ debt financing. Family firms are found to rely less on leverage for funding 
to reduce fixed commitment on their cash flows and reduce default probabilities (Jensen, 
1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001). Network linkages based on financial 
resources can increase firms’ overall financial flexibility and capacity for financing, and 
reduce firms’ debt level (Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Kuo, 2006). Managers of group-affiliated 
firms seem to prefer equity over debt since high leverage increases firms’ bankruptcy 
risk (Chakraborty, 2013). 
Given the importance of sufficient capital for firms’ performance and survival 
(Bridges & Guariglia, 2008; Clarke et al., 2012), the impact of business networks on firms’ 
debt financing deserves additional investigation. Even though researchers have found 
that network affiliation is a major factor affecting firms’ financing strategy, there is a lack 
of research on firms’ debt structure in relation to network affiliation, particularly in the 
context of the emerging economies (Malik & Afza, 2015). In this study we supplement 
the literature by investigating the role of business networks in firms’ long-term leverage 
and short-term leverage. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior study 
directly investigating the role of business networks on firms’ debt financing in the Chinese 
context; this study thus fills a gap. Furthermore, previous studies that investigated the 
role of business networks in firms’ debt financing have largely ignored endogenous 
treatment effects (e.g. Manos et al., 2007; Paligorova & Xu, 2012; Malik & Afza, 2015), 
which biases the results. 
In order to understand the role of business networks in firms’ debt financing, we 
need to bear in mind that the effects of business networks are felt differently in the debt 
market and in the equity market. From the perspective of debt holders, they are less 
concerned with the governance of firms so long as the owners maintain the firm’s value 
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above the threshold for default (Byun et al., 2013). The adverse effects of business 
networks exerting influence on the firm may therefore be less significant for debt holders 
than it would be for the shareholders.  
Business networks are composed of various relational ties, which have developed 
through frequent and repeated interactions and turned into the kind of relational social 
capital that facilitates firms’ access to external finance (Du et al., 2013). Affiliation to 
business networks can affect firms’ access to debts in several ways. First, members of 
business networks become familiar with each other through frequent interactions.  This 
helps member firms to reduce information asymmetries, as was found in the case of 
Japan by Dewenter & Warther (1998). In networks, members are familiar with each other 
and exchange favors for organizational purpose (Gu et al., 2008). Through interactions, 
norms and trust would be established, which encourage firms to share and exchange 
different expertise, information, knowledge, and network resources. Disputes are 
resolved using network norms instead of formal laws, which are inefficient in many 
emerging economies (Jia & Wang 2013). Aside from the market-related benefits, 
networks are associated with superior information processing and flexible monitoring 
(Achrol & Kotler, 1999) which would reduce agency cost (Gul, 1999). An affiliated firm 
can also share a network’s reputation capital, which can help affiliated firms to sustain 
superior access to capital by mitigating the agency cost of firms’ access to financial 
capital (Anderson et al., 2003). Interactions in business networks enable firms to transfer 
their credit to other business entities and potential financiers. Thus, the information 
asymmetry problem and agency cost can be reduced and financiers become more 
willing to extend credit. 
Additionally, by forming business networks, firms can facilitate their access to 
external resources. Firms bond together to enlarge their bargaining power and gain 
increased access to resources, such as government support (Majumdar & Sen, 2006; 
Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998), raw materials and intermediate goods (Khanna & Rivkin, 
2001), foreign capital and foreign technology (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and financial 
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capital (Anderson et al., 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000). By establishing a sharing platform, 
firms pool their resources for sharing and mobilization. For example, firms in business 
groups can create virtual (or internal) capital markets to mitigate the distortion in the 
capital, product, and labor markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1999; Khanna, 2000; Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001; Buchuk et al., 2014; Gopalan et al., 2007). By internalizing transactions in 
the market, firms in business networks can provide and receive loan guarantees from 
members (Manos et al., 2007; Malik & Afza, 2015), and the cost of debt financing is 
reduced (Byun et al., 2013). Evidence suggests that the absence of appropriate 
institutional safeguards makes it harder for firms to raise external finance (Gopalan et 
al., 2007). Firms in business networks can expand their access to debt from other 
network members since such networks provide mechanisms for resource sharing by 
pooling their financial resources. 
Moreover, it is suggested that firms in business networks have a lower probability 
of defaulting on debt repayments (He et al., 2013; Manos et al., 2007; Achrol & Kotler, 
1999). By connecting to various partners, firms can make a supplement to firm-level 
diversification which will reduce risks (Claessens et al., 1999; Manos et al., 2007). In 
order to avoid the negative spillover of firm default in business networks, most networks 
will have mechanisms for supporting firms in distress (Gopalan et al., 2007). Creditors 
will be more likely to grant credit to firms in such networks as there is perceived 
enhanced protection. 
Based on the analysis, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Firms’ business network affiliation will be positively related to long-term 
leverage. 
H1b: Firms’ business network affiliation will be positively related to short-term 
leverage. 
 
3.3.2 Business networks and firms’ access to trade credit 
Business networks, being a type of informal contract and institution, are increasingly 
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being seen by researchers as a mechanism to reduce credit market frictions and 
facilitate firms’ access to formal finance, such as bank loans and the equity market 
(Claessens et a., 2008; Liu et al., 2013; Haselmann et al., 2013). It is recognized that 
information asymmetry and moral hazard are the major problems that impede firms’ 
access to financial resources (Haselmann et al., 2013). Such problems are more severe 
for firms wishing to access informal finance such as trade credit because the providers 
of trade credit do not charge any interest or require any collateral (Wu et al., 2014). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been limited academic focus on how 
informal institutions affect firms’ access to informal finance such as trade credit.  
Trade credit, as an important financing channel for firms, is vitally important all over 
the world (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002; Guariglia & Mateut, 2006). It is even 
more important for firms in emerging economies where formal financial institutions are 
not sufficiently developed to support firms who need to gain access to adequate formal 
financing (Liu et al., 2016). Many firms use trade credit to finance their own purchases 
and even offer financing to customers. Current studies about the determinants of trade 
credit are heavily reliant on financial statement variables or firm/product characteristics 
(Cunat, 2007; Giannetti et al., 2011; Fabbri & Klapper, 2016). Our study takes the 
relatively novel approach of investigating how business network affiliation influences 
firms’ access to trade credit. 
We argue that firms’ access to trade credit can be affected by business network 
affiliation in the following ways. Firstly, business network affiliation helps firms to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency cost (Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Anderson et al., 
2003). Firms in business networks are more likely to extend and receive trade credit 
since they know each other better than the financial institutions do. Evidence shows that 
suppliers of trade credit have a lending advantage due to the availability of better 
information (Bias & Gollier, 1997). Additionally, business network affiliation helps firms to 
establish their social capital through interactions in which they build their reputation and 
trust (Peng & Luo, 2000; Park & Luo, 2001; Luk et al., 2008). Informal financing, such 
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as trade credit, is always reputation and relationship-based (Ayyagari et al., 2010). 
Having a good reputation and a well-established level of trust are vital for the supply of 
trade credit (Wu et al., 2014). Consequently, firms in business networks are more likely 
to access trade credit.  
Moreover, business network affiliation provides firms with protection from debtor 
bankruptcy (He et al., 2013; Manos et al., 2007; Achrol & Kotler, 1999; Gopalan et al., 
2007). Firms that use trade credit for finance are more likely to pay it back. Firms in 
business networks are less likely to behave opportunistically in order to avoid negative 
spillovers to other network members and this reduction in borrower opportunism means 
that firms in networks are more likely to use trade credit (Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004). 
Finally, firms form business networks to enlarge their bargaining power and increase 
their access to resources (Majumdar & Sen, 2006; Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). The 
literature has provided evidence that a supplier’s bargaining power significantly affects 
trade credit supply (Fabbri & Klapper, 2016). Thereby, we develop our hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2: Firms’ network affiliation will be positively related to firms’ access to trade 
credit. 
 
3.3.3 Business networks and working capital management 
The management of working capital is one of the most important issues in corporate 
finance (Ben-Nasr, 2016). It represents the source and use of short-term capital, and 
firms’ liquidity to meet their short-term obligations (Ding et al., 2013; Buchmann et al., 
2008). It is evidenced that working capital management plays a significant role in 
determining firms’ performance and value (Falope & Ajilore, 2009; Gill et al., 2010; Wang, 
2002). Working capital is the difference between the current assets and the current 
liabilities (Pass & Pike, 1984). Ensuring the efficient use of working capital is essential 
because the level of working capital to total assets is often high (Padachi, 2006). It can 
be used as an additional source of finance for firms with limited access to long-term 
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capital markets (Ding et al., 2013). However, compared with the development of long-
term finance, far less attention has been paid to the area of short-term finance, 
particularly working capital management (Singh & Kumar, 2014). Our study expects to 
add to the literature by looking at this much neglected subject.  
Current studies about working capital management have heavily focused on the 
effects of working capital management on the profitability of the firm (Deloof, 2003; 
Raheman & Nasr, 2007; Garcia-Teruel & Solano, 2007). Very few studies investigate the 
determinants of working capital management. Effective and efficient working capital 
management enables a faster availability of cash flow and higher revenues. It is 
important to investigate the factors that influence firms’ working capital management. 
With a better knowledge of the determinants of working capital management, firms can 
strategize properly and manage their working capital more efficiently. Our study expects 
to make a contribution to this by examining the role of business networks affiliation on 
firms’ working capital management. The main components of working capital are 
inventory, accounts receivable, and accounts payable. Through the administration of 
these elements, firms can achieve efficient working capital management. Business 
networks affiliation is associated with several characteristics that may affect firms’ 
working capital management. 
Firstly, business network affiliation helps firms in networks to alleviate asymmetric 
information and reduce agency cost (Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Anderson et al., 2003). 
Through frequent interaction among network members, trust would be established (Park 
& Luo, 2001) and firms are more likely to be able to access external financial resources 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000). Therefore, firms in business networks 
acquire a superior capability to adjust working capital to an optimal level, which is 
evidenced to positively affect firm performance (Aktas et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2013; 
Ben-Nasr, 2016). Additionally, firms in business networks enjoy superior access to trade 
credit (Liu et al., 2016), which is a major component of working capital. Internal 
transactions among network members provide channels for adjusting the working capital 
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level while lowering transaction costs in the market. Furthermore, empirical studies have 
suggested that leverage level is a factor that determines working capital management 
(Rimo & Panbunyuen, 2010; Haron & Nomran, 2016). A high level of debt introduces 
pressure on management to avoid default (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Firms in business 
networks would therefore have more efficient working capital management since these 
firms can be highly leveraged, as suggested in our hypothesis 1. Hence, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firms’ business network affiliation will be positively related to working capital 
management. 
 
3.3.4 Business networks and cash sufficiency 
A firm’s capacity to acquire sufficient capital for investment is crucial to determine 
its survival (Bridges & Guariglia, 2008; Clarke et al., 2012). Given the increasingly 
reported negative impacts of business networks (Morck et al., 2005; Singh & Gaur, 2009), 
it is worth investigating whether firms in business networks are less financially 
constrained over time, particularly for firms in emerging economies. Investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is a popularly used measure of firms’ financial constraints (He et al., 2013; 
Hoshi et al., 1991). It relies on the examination of differences in the investment-cash flow 
relationship between different groups of firms as evidence of financial constraints. The 
measure of investment-cash flow sensitivity involves the manual calculation of cash flow 
to investment in plant and equipment. The measure may create more noise compared 
with the given accounting index. We argue that the accounting index of cash flow 
adequacy ratio provides a more direct proxy for firms’ financial constraints. It measures 
a firm’s ability to generate sufficient cash flow to maintain itself without acquiring 
additional debts or having recourse to equity funding. By using the cash flow adequacy 
ratio, we are able to examine the effects of business networks on firms’ financial 
constraints more directly. 
In a well-functioned market without information asymmetry and financial constraints, 
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a firm should have adequate cash for investment. The presence of asymmetric 
information, agency problems, and transaction costs can create high costs for firms 
needing to generate financial resources in the market (He et al., 2013). Business network 
affiliation helps firms reduce information asymmetry, agency cost, and transaction cost 
(Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Anderson et al., 2003; Manos et al., 2007; Achrol & Kotler, 
1999), which will help firms to access financial resources.  
Moreover, the widely documented virtual capital markets created by business 
networks help affiliates to alleviate problems caused by the under-developed capital 
markets (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Buchuk et al., 2014; Gopalan et al., 2007; He et al., 
2013). Firms can pool their financial resources and reallocate them to finance profitable 
investments. Firms in networks create internal markets that enable them to have superior 
information about investment opportunities (Williamson, 1975).  Internal markets also 
allow firms to access loan guarantees enabling them to take on debt if they fall into 
financial distress (Manos et al., 2007; Malik & Afza, 2015) and provide efficient 
monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). It also helps firms to reduce the risk of opportunism 
and lowers the need for contract enforcement (He et al., 2013). It is therefore expected 
that firms in business networks are less financially constrained. As with the analysis that 
resulted in hypothesis 3, we argue that firms in business networks have more efficient 
working capital management, which means that they have more immediate availability 
of cash flow and hence they are expected to be less financially constrained. And so we 
posit the following hypothesis: 
H4: Firms in business networks are less likely to face financial constraints than 
those that are isolated. 
 
3.3.5 Business networks and ownership 
The effects of business networks are significantly influenced by institutional factors 
(He et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016). Firms affiliate into business networks to fill institutional 
voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 2000). In emerging economies, where firms’ access to 
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financial resources is constrained, business networks are formed to help firms alleviate 
financial pressure. A rational extension of this conjecture is that business networks play 
a more important role when firms are in severe financial conditions. Accordingly, it is 
expected that the effects of business networks in firms’ access to financial resources are 
more pronounced among non-SOEs since they have a greater need for capital and are 
more likely to be financially constrained (Liu et al., 2016; He et al., 2013). 
China has adopted and maintained a state-controlled financial system that in which 
various levels of government control the allocation of financial resources in both the 
banking and securities markets (He et al., 2013). The banking system in China is 
dominated by the four state-owned commercial banks, although there are large numbers 
of regional commercial banks and foreign banks. The government also dominates the 
stock market. A listed company seeking approval by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission must be selected by a provincial government or ministry (He et al., 2013). 
A quota system is adopted by provinces and ministries to process the listing applications, 
which sets limits for the number of firms to be listed. According to Allen et al. (2012), the 
corporate bond market is almost non-existent due to China’s inefficient and unsound 
accounting and auditing systems. Government-guided financial resource allocation 
normally favors a few large-scale state-owned enterprises that are important to the 
economic development of the country or the specific region. Smaller SOEs and most 
non-SOEs face difficulties in accessing financial resources from the state-controlled 
financial systems and suffer from severe financial constraints as a result. Therefore, non-
SOEs must rely on business networks to gain access to financial resources. We 
therefore formulate the following hypothesis. 
H5. The effects of business networks on firms’ access to financial resources are 
more pronounced among non-SOEs than among SOEs. 
 
3.3.6 Nature of business networks 
There are various types of business network that are defined according to the nature 
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of the relations between firms. We have outlined many types of business networks in 
chapter 2. In general, we have classified state ties into ownership ties, collaboration ties, 
and individual ties. These ties constitute different networks. As we summarized in 
chapter 2, defining the network defines its structure. It is therefore self-evident that 
network effects will vary according to the networks’ definition. Prior studies focused on a 
single form of relationship and fail to comment on how the nature of business networks 
shapes the role of business networks. This study contributes to the literature by 
examining the mediating effects of the nature of business networks.  
The rich information we obtained in this study about related party relations also 
provides a valuable opportunity to investigate the different natures of business networks. 
Ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks may be extracted 
separately from the whole network. We argue that different networks are associated with 
different degrees of control or influence that will differentiate the effects of business 
networks. Among three types of business networks, ownership networks identify with the 
strongest control and most direct influence over affiliates. Information-sharing and 
resource mobilization are effective among these firms. Two specific sub-types of 
ownership relations are particularly relevant to this discussion, namely control and 
significant influence (see chapter 2 for details). As regards their influence on network 
members, a ‘control’ relationship is more direct and exerts stronger influence, than 
‘significant influence’.  
We argue that, given the importance of guanxi in the Chinese context (Li, 2013), 
individual networks are significant in affecting firms’ access to resources. Studies have 
shown that firms in China extensively use guanxi to have a competitive advantage (Li et 
al., 2008; Li & Zhang, 2007).  
In comparison to ownership networks and individual networks, collaboration 
networks are relatively weak and indeed firms in collaboration networks may suffer 
operational problems. Evidence suggests that over 50% of alliance networks are in 
trouble within 2 years and the majority of alliance networks disband within 3 (Wu & Lou, 
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2010; Zhang & Cao, 2004). We therefore hypothesize that collaboration networks are 
significantly less likely to influence firms’ access to resources. The following hypothesis 
is proposed. 
H6a: In ownership networks, networks constructed from control relations are 
more prominent in affecting firms’ access to financial resources than networks 
constructed from significant influence relations. 
H6b: Ownership and individual networks have a stronger effect on firms’ access 
to financial resources than collaboration networks. 
 
3.3.7 The effects of network structure 
Network structure is an important factor that shapes the role of business networks. 
Firms with different network position and ego network structure could benefit differently 
(Tsai, 2001; Burt, 1982, 1997, 2005). It is important to understand how a difference in 
network structure affects firms’ access to financial resources since without this 
knowledge, our understanding for business networks is incomplete. Further, firms armed 
with knowledge of the effects of network structure can adjust their network strategy 
accordingly to achieve their organizational goals. In this study, we investigate the roles 
that network position and the tightness of the network play in determining firms’ access 
to financial resources. 
Centrality measures the virtual position of individual network members in their 
networks. Firms in a central network position are more likely to control the flow of 
resources and information within the network (Freeman, 1978). Many studies have 
documented the benefits of occupying a central position, such as superior access to 
scarce resources (Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2001; Wang et al., 2014). Firms in a central position 
are also more likely to increase their creditworthiness and have access to more channels 
that generate financial resources. Apart from central position, the degree of tightness of 
the network is an important factor that may influence firms’ access to resources. Burt 
(1982, 1997, 2005) highlights the advantages of sparse networks with disconnected 
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network partners but in a tighter network, firms are well connected to each other and 
information asymmetries are reduced, which improves firms access resources. The 
tightness of the network’s structure facilitates firms’ access to resources held by other 
network members. We therefore formulate the following hypotheses regarding network 
structure. 
H7a: Firms in central network position have superior access to financial resources. 
H7b: Firms in a tighter ego network structure have better access to financial 
resources. 
 
3.4 Data and summary statistics 
3.4.1 Data 
This study gets all its financial information and network information from the CSMAR 
(China Stock Market & Accounting Research) database issued by GTA (Guo Tai An) 
Research Service Centre. The database provides good coverage of listed companies in 
the market and is widely used in studies investigating Chinese listed companies (Liu et 
al., 2016). Three datasets are used to identify listed company networks via related 
parties and the relevant financial information for individual listed companies. These 
datasets are: listed company related party information data; listed company related party 
transaction data; and listed company financial indicator data, all of which span from 1997 
to 2011. There are a total of 2,341 listed companies included in the sample during the 
sample period. The data contains information about listed companies’ related party 
information, key financial indicators, and basic information about listed companies. By 
dropping some missing observations, we have in total 17,641 firm year observations. As 
we will run several regressions, observations in each regression may vary depending on 
the variables captured. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, listed company related party information data and listed 
company related party transaction data are used to construct business networks in this 
study. Pajek software is used to construct business networks and compute the network 
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structure parameters.  
 
3.4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics and definitions of key variables in this chapter. 
The statistics indicate that about 29% of firms are network affiliated - 25% via relations 
from ownership, 5% from cooperation and 3% from key individuals. The mean value of 
the leverage ratio, long-term leverage and short-term leverage are 45%, 6%, and 38% 
respectively. The figures are either the same or similar in essence to those in other 
studies (e.g. Fan et al., 2012; He et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2014). The debts ratio in China 
is relatively high compared to those seen in developed countries, such as the US and 
the UK (Jiang & Kim, 2015; Fan et al., 2012).  
In terms of trade credit, the results show that Chinese listed companies receive 10.5% 
trade credit and offer 14% trade credit to other firms. The level of trade credit reflects 
previous studies, such as Wu et al. (2014) and Liu et al. (2016) and suggests that trade 
credit is an important channel for firms to obtain financial resources. In terms of working 
capital management, Chinese listed firms have an average cash conversion cycle of 192 
days. The mean value of cash sufficiency ratio of 0.47 suggests that Chinese listed 
companies are generally financially constrained as their cash flow is not sufficient for 
their investment. The growth of sales is 16%, which is very high and consistent with 
China’s impressive economic development. In our sample of listed companies, 64% of 
firms are SOE dominated. The correlation analysis in Panel B of table 13 suggests that 
network affiliation is positively related to firms’ access to long-term debts, trade credit, 
working capital management, and cash sufficiency. The correlation analysis generally 
supports our hypotheses. 
 
<Table 3.1 inserted here> 
 
Table 3.2 presents the univariate test results, where we compare the debt level, 
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average trade credit, working capital management, and cash flow adequacy ratio 
between firms with and without network affiliations. The results show that firms with 
network connections have 7.7% long-term and 40.6% short-term debts, while firms 
without such links have 6.1% long-term and 37.8% short-term debts. The differences are 
both statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. In terms of trade credit, firms 
in networks use 12.1% of trade credit while isolated firms use 9.9% of trade credit. The 
difference of 2.1% is also statistically significant at the 1% level. Regarding working 
capital management, the results show that firms in business networks have a 
significantly shorter cash conversion cycle than those not, which means that firms in 
business networks have more efficient working capital management. Cash flow 
adequacy ratio is also significantly different between networked firms and those not. The 
differences between networked firms and those not in terms of working capital 
management and cash sufficiency are both significant at 1% level. The univariate 
analysis is consistent with our hypotheses regarding firms’ access to financial resources 
and suggests that firms in business networks are less financially constrained than 
isolated firms. 
 
<Table 3.2 inserted here> 
 
3.5 Empirical strategy 
In order to investigate the effect of business network affiliation on firms’ debt 
financing, this study follows Du et al. (2013) and Chakraborty (2013) for its baseline 
model.  
 
Lev𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,t + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                         (1) 
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The dependent variable is the ratio of different debts to total assets of the focal firm 
in year t. Long-term leverage and short-leverage are used respectively as the dependent 
variable. The variable of interest is net, which is a dummy variable suggesting business 
network affiliation status. It is equal to 1 if the focal firm is affiliated into business networks 
in period t, and otherwise equals 0. Furthermore, this study also includes fixed ratio, 
depreciation, firm size, sales growth, firm performance (profitability) and cash flow to 
control for firm-specific characteristics (Ahmed et al., 2002; Shi, 2003; Yu, 2005). Size is 
measured as the logarithm of total sales; Fr is fixed ratio, which is a proxy for asset 
structure and is measured as fixed assets scaled by total assets; growth is measured as 
the percentage change in total sales; dep is depreciation and measured as the ratio of 
depreciation to total assets; and prof refers to operating profit to total assets. Fcf takes 
the value of the ratio of free cash flow for firm to total assets. A non-SOE dummy is also 
included to control for the effects of ownership. 𝑣𝑖 is firm specific fixed effects. 
In terms of H2, we establish the following baseline regression model, which is used 
by Liu et al., (2016): 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑂𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (2) 
 
In equation 2, trade credit is measured by total accounts payable/total assets. 
Network affiliation is the main independent variable. Control variables are growth, firm 
size, profitability, fixed ratio, leverage, and operating cash flow, which are used in 
previous studies, such as Wu et al. (2014). Definitions of control variables are the same 
as in equation 1. Leverage in this equation refers to total liability to total assets. Cash 
flow is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. 
To test H3, this study follows the model in Haron & Nomran (2016) as a baseline 
model to investigate the role of business networks in firms’ working capital management. 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_r𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (3) 
                                            
 
The dependent variable is cash conversion cycle (“ccc”), measured as the number 
of days inventories plus the number of days accounts receivable minus the number of 
days accounts payable. It is the time difference between the purchase of raw materials 
and getting paid for finished goods (Singh & Kumar; 2014). Reducing ccc to a reasonable 
minimum implies more efficient working capital management. The main independent 
variable is business network affiliation. Control variables use the same definitions as 
mentioned above.  
In order to investigate the relationship between business network affiliation and cash 
sufficiency, the following model is established and estimated as a baseline model. 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ sufficiency𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (4) 
 
In equation 4, the dependent variable is the cash sufficiency ratio, which is 
measured via the cash flow adequacy ratio. It is the ratio of cash flow from operations to 
the sum of long-term debt paid, fixed assets purchased, and cash dividends distributed. 
Any result higher than one indicates that a firm is generating sufficient cash flow to 
maintain itself without acquiring additional debt or equity funding (Accounting Tools, 
2017). Business network affiliation is defined the same as in the other equations. Control 
variables take the same definitions as in the above models. 
In order to test H5, the interaction terms of business network affiliation and non-
SOE dummy are added to each baseline model described above. Thus, the model can 
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capture the effects of ownership type on the role played by business networks. For H6, 
we generate network variables that vary according to the type of relations. Ownership 
networks, networks from control relations in ownership networks, networks from 
significant influence relations in ownership networks, collaboration networks, and 
individual networks are added individually into the baseline models established above. 
Moreover, interaction terms of ownership and different network indicators are added to 
investigate the role of ownership types and the effects of different natures of networks. 
To examine H7, we replace the net variable in the above models with network structure 
variables that include network position and ego network structure measures. Centrality 
and aggregate constraints are added individually to each of above models to investigate 
the role of network structure on firms’ access to financial resources. 
Models are estimated using firm specific fixed effects6. This has also been adopted 
in many earlier studies investigating the role of business networks (He et al., 2013; Lin 
et al., 2012; Byun et al., 2013). It controls for any firm level unobservable factors that 
may cause potential endogeneity. In order to further account for the possible 
endogenous formation of business networks, this study proposes controls for 
endogenous treatment effects. Finally, we also test for cross-sectional dependence and 
suggest the Driscoll-Kraay estimator to control for cross-sectional correlation. 
 
3.6 Results and discussion 
3.6.1 Business networks and firms’ debt financing 
Table 3.3 reports the results of the baseline estimation for the impacts of business 
network affiliation on firms’ access to debts which is equation 1. Depreciation is 
significantly negatively related to long-term leverage, suggesting that depreciation acts 
as a substitute for debt in reducing the tax liability of the firm (Huang & Song, 2006). 
Growth is found to be significantly positively related to both long-term leverage and short-
                                                             
6 In Stata, the regression is operated by reghdfe, clustered in firms and years. 
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term leverage. It means that the higher investment opportunities that are open to a firm, 
the more debt it will take on (Du et al., 2013). The fixed ratio is statistically significant 
and positively related to long-term leverage, significantly and negatively associated with 
short-term leverage. This suggests that firms use their fixed assets as collateral to help 
them to secure long-term finance. Short-term finance is not secured against fixed assets 
(Du et al., 2013). Profitability shows a negative and significant coefficient for both long-
term leverage and short-term leverage. It indicates that firms with higher profits will 
reinvest these in their business so that they are less financially constrained, meaning 
they are less likely to raise debt to finance their business. A positive relationship is found 
between firm size and all leverages, which suggests that large firms in general have 
better access to debt. Free cash flow is found to be significantly and negatively related 
to long-term leverage, suggesting that firms with more cash flow are less likely to use 
debts for finance. Non-SOE dummies are found to be negatively and significantly related 
to long-term leverage while being positively and significantly related to short-term 
leverage, suggesting that non-SOEs have greater access to short-term debt while being 
less able to secure long-term debt. 
 
<Table 3.3 inserted here> 
 
Business network affiliation is the variable of interest in our study, and our results 
indicate that business network affiliation is positively related to firms’ access to long-term 
leverage and short-term leverage which support our hypothesis 1. The coefficient of 
business network affiliation is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This 
generally means that business network affiliation can help firms expand their access to 
both long-term and short-term debt. Looking at the impact of ownership type on the role 
of business network affiliation on firms’ debt financing, non-SOEs in business networks 
have significantly less short-term leverage when compared to SOEs. This finding partly 
contradicts the hypothesis 5 proposed. However, as equity is more risk-tolerant than 
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debt, managers of non-SOEs in business networks can be expected to show preference 
for equity (Chakraborty, 2013). High leverage forces firms to cut capital investments, 
which will damage firms’ competitive position (Reich, 1989). Another explanation could 
be that non-SOEs in business networks are less financially constrained, therefore they 
are less likely to need to raise debt for finance. This explanation will be examined in the 
robustness check and further analysis section. 
In order to fully understand the impacts of business networks on firms’ access to 
debt and test the impacts of different business networks on firms’ debt financing, we test 
ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks, one by one in the 
model. The results suggest that all three network affiliations facilitate firms’ access to 
both short-term and long-term debts. However, when compared to ownership networks 
and individual networks, collaboration networks show marginally less significant impact 
on firms’ short-term debt financing which confirm our hypothesis 6b. Firms in ownership 
networks associate with strong connections that foster trust among network members 
and internal capital markets (He et al., 2013; Wang & Lin, 2013), which encourages 
resource sharing among network members. Ownership networks from both control and 
significant influence relations have a statistically significantly positive relationship with 
both long-term and short-term leverage. Interpersonal relationships are very important 
in the Chinese context, enhancing trust and creating social capital for firms (Liu et al., 
2016; Gu et al., 2008), which help firms gain access to financial resources. Evidence 
has suggested that collaboration networks, such as alliance networks, have several 
governance problems that tend to land firms in trouble (Wu & Lou, 2010). We therefore 
expect affiliation to collaboration networks to have less significant influence over member 
firms’ debt financing.  
Regarding the impacts of ownership type on the role of different networks, similar 
results are found to those seen in the general network affiliation model. Non-SOEs in 
ownership networks from significant influence relations, collaboration networks, and 
individual networks have marginally significantly more long-term leverage, which is as 
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expected. However, we did not find evidence for our supposition that non-SOEs in other 
types of business networks have superior access to long-term debts. Non-SOEs in 
ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks have less short-
term leverage in comparison to SOEs. The explanation for this phenomenon is expected 
to be the same as for general network affiliation, which will be analysed in the following 
section. 
Our finding partially explains the continued appeal of business networks in the 
emerging economies irrespective of the significant improvements in the institutional 
environment. Although improved institutions have mitigated the benefits of business 
networks (Singh & Gaur, 2009; Gaur & Delios, 2006), business networks remain effective 
at enabling affiliates to access otherwise scarce financial resources in China. The results 
also suggest that the perspectives of debtholders are systematically different to the 
perspectives of shareholders (Byun et al., 2013). While the increasingly reported 
negative effects of business networks, such as governance challenges, may deflate firm 
value, debt-holders are nonchalant so long as managers keep the firms out of bankruptcy. 
By investigating the role of ownership types and the nature of business networks, we 
can achieve a relatively comprehensive understanding of the role of business network 
affiliation. The impact of business networks on long-term leverage is marginally more 
pronounced among non-SOEs while the impact of business networks on short-term 
leverage is more prominent among SOEs. Relations with different natures would affect 
the link between business network affiliation and firms’ debt financing. These findings 
have significant managerial implications, enabling firm managers to affiliate to the correct 
types of business network for their choice of finance.  
 
3.6.2 Business networks and trade credit 
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results for the role of business network affiliation on 
firms’ access to trade credit which is equation 2. We find that growth is significantly and 
positively associated with firms’ access to trade credit, suggesting that firms with higher 
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investment opportunities generally take on more trade credit to finance their investment. 
Firm size is found to be statistically significantly positively related to firms’ access to trade 
credit, which is consistent with Liu et al. (2016) and Ge & Qiu (2007). The results imply 
that larger firms may have a better established reputation, which will help firms to obtain 
finance through trade credit. Profit is found to be statistically significantly negatively 
related to firms’ trade credit, meaning that profitable firms are less dependent on trade 
credit as they can reinvest their profits to finance their investment. The ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets is statistically significantly negatively associated with firms’ access 
to trade credit, which is in line with Liu et al. (2016) and Wu et al. (2014). Firms with more 
fixed assets have better access to formal finance such as bank loans, using their fixed 
assets as collateral (Du et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016). As a result, these firms have less 
need of trade credit for finance. Leverage is statistically significantly related to firms’ 
access to trade credit because accounts payable are part of leverage. Thus, firms with 
high leverage also have a high level of accounts payable. Operating cash flow is also 
found to be significantly positively related to firms’ access to trade credit, which is 
consistent with Ge & Qiu (2007), Wu et al. (2014), and Liu et al. (2016). It means that 
firms’ with more operating cash flow are better able to repay their payables, so they have 
a lower default risk. In this case, firms are more likely to access trade credit. Non-SOEs 
generally have less trade credit compared with SOEs, reflecting their lesser ability to 
generate finance for investment. 
 
<Table 3.4 inserted here> 
 
Regarding network affiliation, evidence shows that business network affiliation is 
positively related to firms’ access to trade credit. The estimated coefficient of network 
affiliation is statistically significantly positive at 1% significance level. It suggests that 
business networking connections help firms to obtain trade credit, which is consistent 
with our hypothesis 2. As regards the role of different ownership types, the estimated 
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coefficient for the interaction term of non-SOE and business network affiliation is 
negative but is statistically insignificant, showing that the position of non-SOEs in 
business networks is not significantly different to that of SOEs in terms of their access 
to trade credit.  Thereby, hypothesis 5 is not supported in this case. 
By investigating the role of different networks’ affiliation on firms’ access to trade 
credit, we find that ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks 
are all positively related to firms’ access to trade credit. The coefficients estimated are 
statistically significant at 1% level. Across the three types of business networks, 
individual networks are marginally more beneficial for firms wishing to access trade credit. 
The coefficient for individual networks is 0.0143 while the coefficients are 0.00947 and 
0.00537 respectively for collaboration networks and ownership networks. This is a 
reasonable result given the importance of ‘guanxi’ in Chinese economy (Liu et al., 2016; 
Gu et al., 2008; Li, 2013; Peng & Luo, 2000). This confirms our hypothesis 6b. In 
ownership networks, networks from control relations are more prominent than networks 
from significant influence relations in influencing firms’ access to trade credit. This 
confirms our hypothesis 6a. This is reasonable as networks from control relations feature 
more direct and powerful ties. Compared to SOEs, non-SOEs in networks are in 
relatively weak positions; the interaction terms between network affiliation and non-
SOEs are negative even though collaboration networks and individual networks show 
poorly determined coefficients.  
Previous studies have investigated the role of business networks on firms’ access 
to formal finance.  This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that 
informal contracts and institutions help firms to mitigate market frictions, such as 
information asymmetry and moral hazard, and enable firms to access informal finance. 
We have provided evidence that business network affiliation has significant positive 
effects on firms’ access to trade credit, which has important implications for managers 
of those firms that are relatively financially constrained. We also find that some network 
types are more effective than others in influencing firms’ access to trade credit. Firms 
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should be aware that in the Chinese context, the individual relationship is very important 
and helps firms to achieve and sustain competitive advantages (Li et al., 2008). This is 
particularly important for international investors’ intent on investing in China.  
 
3.6.3 Business networks and working capital management 
Table 3.5 reports the estimation results for the impacts of business network affiliation 
on firms’ working capital management which is equation 3. Profitability and free cash 
flow show significantly negative relationships to the cash conversion cycle, which is a 
proxy for firms’ working capital management. This is consistent with Haron & Nomran 
(2016) and Zariyawati et al. (2009). It means that profitable firms and less financially 
constrained firms find it easier to obtain funding. Thus loose cash would be kept at a 
minimum (Wasiuzzaman & Arumugam, 2013). The leverage ratio is found to be positively 
related to the cash conversion cycle, suggesting that firms with high leverage need to 
have high levels of cash available in order to pay back debts. Sales growth is statistically 
negatively related to the cash conversion cycle, which is also consistent with Haron & 
Nomran (2016). It means that firms with more investment opportunities generally have 
more effective working capital management. Firm size is also found to be statistically 
negatively related to the cash conversion cycle, suggesting that larger firms have more 
efficient working capital management. The current ratio is positively related to firms’ 
working capital management. It means that firms with high current ratio are less efficient 
in working capital management. Non-SOE dummy is also positively related to cash 
conversion cycle, suggesting the non-SOEs generally have less efficient working capital 
management. 
 
<Table 3.5 inserted here> 
 
When we examine network affiliation, which is our variable of interest, we see a 
negative relationship to cash conversion cycle. The estimated coefficient is statistically 
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significant at 1% level. This means that firms in business networks have more efficient 
working capital management and hence a readily available cash flow. Our hypothesis 3 
concerning the role of business networks in firms’ working capital is therefore supported. 
When we look at the impact of ownership type, we find that the relationship between 
business networks and working capital management is more pronounced among non-
SOEs, which is consistent with our hypothesis. That is to say, non-SOEs in business 
networks generally have more efficient working capital management because their cash 
is recycled very quickly. This supports our hypothesis 5. 
Looking at different network types, all three types of networks sampled show a 
negative relationship to the cash conversion cycle. The estimated coefficients of network 
affiliation are statistically significantly positive at 1% significance level. This means that 
firms in any kind of business network are associated with superior working capital 
management. Among the three types of business networks, individual networks also 
show stronger marginal effects, which is reasonable given the importance of guanxi in 
the Chinese context (Liu et al., 2016; Li, 2013). This supports our hypothesis 6b. When 
compared to networks of relations from control in ownership networks, we see that 
networks derived from significant influence show poorly determined effects as regards 
firms’ working capital management, which supports our hypothesis 6a. And when we 
investigate the role of ownership types, the results show that non-SOEs in ownership 
networks and collaboration networks have more efficient working capital management. 
However, we do not find evidence that non-SOEs in individual networks are associated 
with more efficient working capital management.  
By looking at the effects of business network affiliation on firms’ working capital 
management this study contributes to the relatively neglected area of short-term finance, 
and provides evidence that informal institutions help firms to achieve more effective and 
efficient working capital management. While prior studies mainly investigated the role of 
working capital management on firms’ profitability, our study, focusing as it does on the 
determinants of working capital management, has profound managerial implications. 
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Managers of firms, particularly those facing financial constraints, can benefit from 
learning a new approach to managing their short-term finance. As individual network 
affiliation provides the biggest marginal effects, firms should be aware that not all types 
of business networks will meet their needs equally. It is essential for firms to establish 
the appropriate connections in order to fulfill their organizational goals. 
 
3.6.4 Business networks and cash sufficiency 
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results for equation 4 examining the role of business 
networks on firms’ financial constraints, measured using the cash sufficiency. Sales 
growth is found to be negatively related to cash sufficiency meaning that firms with higher 
growth opportunities are more likely to be financially constrained. Profitability shows a 
significantly positive relationship to cash sufficiency, suggesting that profitable firms are 
less likely to be financially constrained because they can reinvest their profits. Asset 
structure reports a significantly positive correlation with cash sufficiency, showing that 
firms with more fixed assets are less likely to be financially constrained because they 
can use their fixed assets as collateral when accessing bank loans (Du et al., 2013; Liu 
et al., 2016). Leverage is reported to be negatively related to cash sufficiency, suggesting 
that firms with high leverage are generally more financially constrained, which is 
consistent with He et al. (2013). Free cash flow shows a positive relationship to cash 
sufficiency, indicating that firms with freer cash flow are generally less financially 
constrained. Firm size is positively related to cash sufficiency, suggesting that larger 
firms have better access to financial resources, and hence are less financially 
constrained. The non-SOE dummy is negatively related to cash sufficiency, indicating 
that non-SOEs in China are financially constrained compared with SOEs.  
 
<Table 3.6 inserted here> 
 
The main results show that business network affiliation is positively related to cash 
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sufficiency for investment. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level. 
This means that firms in business networks typically have more cash for investment and 
hence they are less financially constrained. This finding is rational and accords with our 
hypothesis 4. Inspecting the role of different types of ownership, the interaction term of 
network affiliation and non-SOE is positive but is not significant. This means that non-
SOEs in business networks are not significantly different from SOEs in business 
networks in terms of their access to cash for investment. Hypothesis 5 is not supported 
in this case. 
Examining the role of the nature of business networks, we see that ownership 
networks and individual networks significantly affect firms’ access to cash for investment. 
The coefficients are statistically significantly positive at 1% level. Thus, firms in 
ownership networks and individual networks are less financially constrained as they 
have more cash for investment which supports our hypothesis 6b. Again, we find that in 
ownership networks, the networks derived from control show more significant effects on 
firms’ cash sufficiency ratio, which is reasonable and in line with our hypothesis 6a.  
Collaboration networks on the other hand have a poorly determined coefficient, 
suggesting that affiliation to collaboration networks does not significantly influence firms’ 
access to cash for investment; again, this is consistent with our hypothesis. Concerning 
the role of business ownership types, we find that non-SOEs in ownership networks and 
collaboration networks have more cash for investment when compared to SOEs. The 
coefficients for the interaction terms are statistically significant at 10% level, meaning 
that the effects of business networks on firms’ financial constraints are more pronounced 
among non-SOEs in ownership networks and collaboration networks. However, we do 
not find evidence that non-SOEs in individual networks are less financially constrained. 
By examining the relationship between network affiliation and cash sufficiency, we 
gain a more nuanced understanding of the factors affecting firms’ financial constraints. 
This finding offers a potential explanation for the continued boom in business networks 
even though the negative effects of affiliation are increasingly being reported. The finding 
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supports the internal capital view of business networks in China and offers a better 
understanding of China’s rapidly growing economy.  
 
3.6.5 Business network structure and firms’ access to financial resources 
Table 3.7 reports the estimation results of the effects of the various business network 
structures on firms’ access to financial resources. Using the baseline models described 
above (equations 1-4), the results from the control variables are generally rational and 
consistent with the results outlined above.  
In terms of the effects of network position on firms’ access to financial resources, 
we find that firms in central positions have superior access to long-term debts, short-
term debts and trade credit, and they have more efficient working capital management 
and more cash for investments. The coefficients of degree centrality in all specifications 
are statistically significantly positive at 1% significance level. We therefore find that 
central positioning generally helps firms to have better access to resources, which is 
consistent with Wang et al. (2014). This confirms our hypothesis 7a. 
Regarding the effects of network tightness on firms’ access to financial resources, 
it is suggested that firms in a tight ego network structure are more likely to have superior 
access to financial resources. The regression results show that constraint is statistically 
significantly positively related to firms’ access to financial resources at 1% significance 
level which confirms our hypothesis 7b. While Burt (1982, 2005) showed that firms with 
more structural holes in their ego network structure have more novel ideas and 
information, we find that a tight network structure enhances trust, and enables 
reputations to be established and broadcast, facilitating firms’ access to financial 
resources.  
 
<Table 3.7 inserted here> 
 
3.7 Robustness checks and further analysis 
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In this section, we aim to provide additional evidence for our main story while finding 
explanations for results that are not consistent with our hypotheses.  We also address 
potential endogeneity problems by controlling for endogenous treatment effects. The 
following questions will be addressed: (1) whether affiliates in business networks offer 
more trade credit to other firms; (2) why non-SOEs in business networks choose lower 
levels of short-term finance; (3) whether the definition of non-SOEs are robust using 
alternative measures; and (4) whether our results are robust using Heckman’s two stage 
approach. 
 
3.7.1 The effect of business network affiliation on the supply and net position of 
trade credit  
In table 3.8, we use firms’ supply of trade credit, measured as total accounts 
receivable to total assets, as the dependent variable to investigate the relationship 
between network affiliation and the supply of trade credit. The results suggest that 
business network affiliation is positively related to firms’ supply of trade credit. The 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. It indicates that firms in 
business networks have strong incentives to provide trade credit, by which means they 
can establish their reputation and hence receive more trade credit themselves (Liu et al., 
2016). In terms of the differing network natures, the results show that firms in 
collaboration networks are less significant in influencing firms’ supply of trade credit, 
which is a reasonable finding and is consistent with our hypothesis on the different 
natures of business networks. In ownership networks, networks from control relations 
have a stronger impact compared with networks from significant influence relations. 
Compared to SOEs, we find that non-SOEs in ownership networks have a significantly 
lower supply of trade credit, which means that non-SOEs manage their receivables more 
efficiently and collect their money back more efficiently. However, non-SOEs in individual 
networks provide more trade credit to other firms, which is consistent with the findings 
of Liu et al. (2016). 
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<Table 3.8 inserted here> 
 
Panel B of table 3.8 reports the results using the net position of trade credit as the 
dependent variable, measured as the difference between accounts payable and 
accounts receivable to total assets. The results suggest a positive relationship between 
business network affiliation and firms’ net credit received, which means that firms in 
business networks receive more trade credit than they offer. Ownership networks and 
collaboration networks also provide the same results as seen in general networks. The 
net credit received is marginally significantly negatively affected for non-SOEs in 
individual networks. 
 
3.7.2 Business network affiliation and non-SOEs’ short-term leverage 
In our regressions investigating the role of business network affiliation in firms’ short-
term leverage, we find that non-SOEs in business networks have a significantly lower 
level of short-term leverage, which contradicts our hypothesis. However, we argue that 
non-SOEs in business networks choose a lower level of short-term leverage because 
they have a preference for equity over debts and are in any event generally less 
financially constrained, so are less likely to need to resort to short-term debt to finance 
their investments. In this section, we provide empirical evidence to this effect.  
Table 3.9 provides the estimation results. Based on the baseline model investigating 
the role of business network affiliation and firms’ access to short-term debts, we add the 
new interaction terms of network affiliation, ownership type, and cash flow adequacy 
ratio. If adding the extra term reduces the significance of the interaction term between 
network affiliation and non-SOE dummy, our analysis would be evidenced. And indeed, 
from the results, we see that the importance of the interaction term has become either 
less significant or non-significant. We therefore have evidence that non-SOEs are 
generally less financially constrained compared to SOEs because they have more 
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readily available cash in short term. They are thus less likely to use debts for financing 
to reduce pressure on cash in short term.  
 
<Table 3.9 inserted here> 
 
3.7.3 Alternative ownership measures 
In order to test the effects of ownership type on the relationship between business 
network affiliation and firms’ access to financial resources, we used a non-SOE dummy 
to capture the effects of firms that are not SOEs. However, this classification, although 
widely used (Liu et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2006; He et al., 2013), may create noise since 
non-SOEs include foreign firms, which may be less affected by domestic financial 
constraints. In this section, we use an alternative definition of ownership by dropping 
foreign firms from the category of non-SOEs. In this way we can capture only the 
domestic private firms, which more susceptible to the financial constraints of the 
institutional setting in China.  
Table 3.10 presents all regressions estimated using a dummy variable of domestic 
private firms. Results suggest that our results are robust against using an alternative 
measure of ownership types. Domestic firms in business networks have a lower level of 
short-term leverage, marginally less accounts payable, more efficient working capital 
management, and sufficient cash flow. Our results are not weakened by using a domestic 
private dummy variable and are rather strengthened in the specifications of cash flow 
adequacy equation. Our hypothesis about the role of ownership types on the relationship 
between network affiliation and firms’ access to financial resources is generally 
supported. 
 
<Table 3.10 inserted here> 
 
3.7.4 Endogenous treatment effects 
It is likely that the group-affiliation is affected by some unobservable factors, which 
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could influence firms’ access to financial resources. This potentially creates a bias in the 
estimation. The treatment assignment process is endogenous because these 
unobservable components affect both treatment assignment and the potential outcomes 
(Stata Press, 2017). In order to control for the endogenous formation of business 
networks, we follow Wooldridge’s control function approach (2010). The approach 
consists of two steps. Firstly, a probit model for treatment assignment is estimated. 
Secondly, based on the treatment assignment, we estimate a linear model for the 
potential outcome. The approach controls for endogeneity by including the residuals 
from the treatment assignment model as a regressor in the second step model. The 
approach generally treats panel data as pooled cross-sectional data to estimate average 
treatment effects in population. 
In the first stage, we follow He et al. (2013) and Lee & Jin (2009) to model firms’ 
network decisions. 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (5) 
 
The lagged dependent variable is controlled for any reinforcement effect. Size is 
firm size. We control both size and squared term of size to control for a quadratic 
relationship. It is argued that small firms are more likely to be involved in networks to 
smooth their start-ups stage and large firms are more likely to be networked to have a 
competitive advantage (Semrau & Werner, 2013; Lee & Jin, 2009; Ren et al., 2009). 
Current ratio is a liquidity measure. It controls for firms’ network entry for liquidity. Profit 
is also controlled as suggested by Ren et al. (2009) which controls firms’ profitability. 
SOE is added to control whether the firm is a SOE or not. It is argued that SOEs are 
more likely to be involved in networks (Lee & Jin, 2009). Fcf is controlled in order to 
account for cash flow. CTR is a new variable here which is composite tax rate, measured 
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as total tax to operating revenue. It is controlled for the governments’ tax privilege over 
networked firms. Marketization is a measure of developments in financial market. It is an 
index developed by Fan & Wang (2001) which covers the development score for each 
province and major municipality in China. It is argued that firms in less efficient markets 
are more likely to get into networks (He et al. 2013). Fixed ratio is also controlled in this 
model. It is suggested that firms with less fixed assets have more investment 
opportunities and grow faster (Tian & Estrin, 2008) which is an important driver of 
network formation (Colli et al., 2016).  
Based on the model, the residual is estimated and added to the main regression 
models. Firms’ leverage ratio, access to trade credit, working capital management and 
cash sufficiency are investigated respectively after controlling for potential endogenous 
network formation. In order to control for the panel nature of the data, we have applied 
the algorithm described above for each year and generated a time-variate control 
function.  This procedure is described in Wooldridge (2005). Table 3.11 shows the results 
of average treatment effects after controlling for potential endogeneity for both 
algorithms (i.e., considering panel nature v. not considering panel nature). The results 
are generally consistent with our main regression results, and this provides extra comfort 
that our results are reliable 
 
<Table 3.11 inserted here> 
 
After we control for the endogenous treatment effects, our results show that firms in 
business networks generally have better access to debts, trade credit, more efficient 
working capital management, and more ready cash for investment. The table shows that 
network affiliated firms have 0.026 long-term leverage, 0.021 short-term leverage, 0.024 
trade credit, and 0.17 cash sufficiency attainment compared with free standing firms. 
Network affiliated firms have more efficient working capital management as they have a 
shorter cash conversion cycle. We also test for endogeneity with the null hypothesis that 
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treatment and outcome un-observables are uncorrelated. The statistics significantly 
reject the null hypothesis. It is therefore necessary to consider the endogenous treatment 
effects. 
We also performed Heckman’s (1978) two stage approach to control for the 
potential sample selection problem. As it reports consistent findings, we do not report 
the results here again.  
 
3.7.5 Cross-sectional dependence 
In estimating our models, we work on the assumption that disturbances of a panel 
model are cross-sectionally independent. However, the actual information in micro-
econometric panels is often overstated since micro-econometric data are likely to exhibit 
all sorts of cross-sectional and temporal dependencies (Hoechle, 2007). The presence 
of cross-sectional dependence is often the rule rather than the exception. It generally 
occurs because of common shocks and interaction among networks (Chudik & Pesaran, 
2013). According to Petersen (2007), many published articles in leading finance journals 
still fail to appropriately adjust the standard errors. Ignoring a possible correlation of 
regression disturbances between units can lead to biased statistical inferences. 
To investigate cross-sectional dependence in our data, we perform the CD-test 
described in Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran (2015). This test is an investigation of the 
mean correlation between panel units with the null hypothesis indicating either cross-
sectional independence or weak cross-sectional dependence. If the extent of cross-
sectional dependence is sufficiently weak or limited, then its consequences on the 
conventional estimators will be negligible (Chudik & Pesaran, 2013). The test (not 
reported) statistically significantly rejects the null hypothesis and indicates strong 
correlation among panel units. 
To adjust the standard errors of the coefficient estimates for possible dependence 
in the residuals, we adopt the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator. It is evidenced that 
the Driscoll-Kraay estimator is robust to general forms of spatial and temporal 
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dependence. The estimator loosely applies a Newey-West-type correction 7  to the 
sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions (Hoechle, 2007). It 
eliminates the deficiencies of the other approaches that become inappropriate when the 
cross-sectional dimension N gets large.  
Table 3.12 reports estimation results after correcting for cross-sectional 
dependence. The results generally confirm our main regression findings. Firms in 
business networks generally have better access to long-term leverage, short-term 
leverage, trade credit, more efficient working capital management, and more sufficient 
cash for investment. A central network position and tight closed network structure are 
positively related to firms’ access to financial resources. Collaboration networks exert 
poorly determined effects compared with ownership and individual networks in 
influencing firms’ access to financial resources. Our results are therefore quite robust. 
 
<Table 3.12 inserted here> 
3.8 Conclusion 
Business networks are popular in emerging economies, being used as responses 
to market failures due to under-developed institutions. It is stated that an improved 
institutional environment in emerging economies decreases the benefits of business 
networks. Irrespective of this, business networks have maintained and indeed increased 
their popularity in China. Our study offers a partial answer to the question of why this 
might be so by investigating the role of business networks in firms’ access to financial 
resources.  
Using listed companies in China, we construct business networks via related parties 
from 1997 to 2011. We investigate the role of business networks in firms’ debt financing, 
access to trade credit, working capital management, and cash sufficiency, to provide 
evidence not only that firms in business networks are less financially constrained but 
                                                             
7 Newey and West (1987) developed an approach to obtain heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors. It is a generalized method of moments-based covariance matrix estimator. 
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also how this is manifest. We find that firms in business networks have superior access 
to long-term debts, short-term debts, and trade credit.  They have more efficient working 
capital management and sufficient cash for investment. Evidence shows that SOEs in 
business networks have better access to short-term debts and trade credit, while non-
SOEs in business networks have more efficient working capital management and 
sufficient cash than their non-affiliation counterparts. Comparing the effects of ownership 
networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks, we find that individual 
networks have the largest marginal effects overall, while collaboration networks are less 
significant in influencing firms’ access to financial resources. Our study has shed light on 
the theory of firm finance and provides a better understanding of China’s rapidly growing 
economy. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, by investigating the 
impact of business network affiliation on a relatively wide set of financial resources we 
contribute to the literature about the effects of business networks on firms’ financial 
constraints. While previous studies suggest that affiliated firms are less financially 
constrained, they fail to provide evidence about how they are less financially constrained 
compared with unaffiliated companies. We, on the other hand, provide evidence that 
firms in business networks are less financially constrained because they have 
advantages in accessing debts, trade credit, superior working capital management, and 
sufficient cash for investment.  
Second, we extend the existing work on the determinants of the capital structure of 
emerging markets (Newman et al., 2012, Du et al., 2013) by introducing the importance 
of business network strategies to debt financing. We argue that in emerging economies, 
such as China, institutional environments are less developed and less efficient in 
allocating financial resources because these markets are characterized by significant 
and frequent government intervention in the capital markets (Allen et al., 2012; Du et al., 
2013). By affiliating into various business networks, firms can extend their access to 
financial resources through the establishment of a sharing platform among network 
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members, improving their credit-worthiness for potential financiers.  
Third, we contribute to the literature about how informal institutions affect firms’ 
access to informal finance by examining the effects of business networks on firms’ 
access to trade credit. Previous studies have investigated the role of informal contracts 
on firms’ access to forms of external formal finance such as bank loans and equity 
issuing (Liu et al., 2013; Khwaja & Mian, 2005).  However, there is a lack of evidence for 
whether business network connections have any influence on firms’ access to informal 
financial resources. Previous examination of the determinants of trade credit has been 
mainly focused on financial statement variables or firm/product characteristics (Liu et al., 
2016), while few studies inspect the role of business networks on firms’ access to trade 
credit. 
Fourth, by investigating the role of business networks on firms’ management of their 
working capital, this study contributes to the literature on working capital management, 
which has been a much neglected area of study for decades (Singh & Kumar, 2014). 
The few studies focused extensively on the relationship between working capital 
management and firm performance (e.g. Wang, 2002; Deloof, 2003) with hardly any 
investigating the determinants of working capital management. This study expects to 
bridge this gap by shedding light on the effects of business networks on working capital 
management.  
Fifth, this research contributes to the literature on financial constraints. We use cash 
flow adequacy ratio to proxy for the general financial conditions of the focal firm rather 
than investment-cash flow sensitivity. The results indicate that firms in business networks 
have more cash for investment than isolated firms have, suggesting that they are less 
financially constrained.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on business networks by proposing a new 
approach to defining business networks and examining the mediating effects of 
ownership, network nature and network structure. As described in chapter 2, we have 
defined business networks using related party relations, which includes many important 
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relations while excluding relations that may exert little influence. The definition is more 
representative in the market as it includes many relations that are widely observed.  It 
also incorporates relations across different dimensions. We believe that in our definition, 
the results generated can be more reliably applied to a general context. The definition 
also enables us to investigate the role of different networks on network effects. We find 
that when compared to ownership networks and individual networks in China, 
collaboration networks are less dominant in determining firms’ access to financial 
resources. This has been little investigated in prior studies owing to a lack of relations 
from different dimensions (e.g. Chen & Xie, 2011; Sha & Zeng, 2014; He et al., 2013). 
Moreover, by investigating the role of SOEs in business networks, we have clarified the 
impacts of business networks on network effects. We suggest that network effects are 
more prominent among SOEs in relation to firms’ access to short-term leverage and 
trade credit, while the effects are more pronounced among non-SOEs in their access to 
the other financial resources examined in the study. Furthermore, we provide evidence 
that centrality and structural holes are important mediators for network effects. This 
knowledge helps us to have a more complete understanding of network effects and to 
guide firms to strategically use the optimal type of network to achieve their organizational 
goals.  
This study has important implications. Obviously, it has implications for firm 
corporate strategy. Since business networks help firms to obtain superior access to 
financial resources, managers of firms should be cognizant of how advantageous 
network affiliation might be for their firm, particularly for firms that are financially 
constrained. Managers of firms should deliberately determine their network strategy to 
expand their access to financial resources since the network effects are mediated by 
many factors. Additionally, this study also has important implications for the state. By 
examining how network effects are mediated by SOEs, we have generated an 
understanding that network effects are stronger for SOEs seeking access to debts and 
trade credit, while network effects are more pronounced among non-SOEs as regards 
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their working capital management and cash sufficiency. The state should promote a fair 
environment for SOEs and non-SOEs to facilitate their access to financial resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of Chapter 3 
Panel A: summary 
Variable Definition 
Ob
s 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
Network variables 
net Network indicator, =1 if a firm affiliates to any networks 
175
96 
0.29
8  
0.457  
onet Network indicator, =1 if a firm affiliates to ownership networks 
175
96 
0.25
3  
0.435  
cnet Network indicator, =1 if a firm affiliates to collaboration networks 
175
96 
0.05
9  
0.235  
inet Network indicator, =1 if a firm affiliates to individual networks 
175
96 
0.03
5  
0.184  
degree Degree centrality, the number of direct contacts a firm has. 
175
96 
0.51
0 
0.876 
constraint Aggregate constraint, the total constraint the network has to the firm 
175
96 
0.28
3 
0.429 
Leverage variables 
lev Leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets 
175
96 
0.45
5  
0.200  
ltlev Long-term leverage, the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets 
175
93 
0.06
6  
0.085  
stlev Short-term leverage, the ratio of current liabilities to total assets 
175
93 
0.38
7  
0.188  
Trade credit 
payable Ratio of accounts payable to total assets 
174
90 
0.10
6  
0.083  
receivabl
e 
Ratio of account receivable to total assets 
174
95 
0.14
4  
0.107  
netpay Ratio of (accounts payable minus account receivable) to total assets 174
40 
-
0.03
7  
0.110  
Working capital management 
ccc 
cash conversion cycle, number of days inventories+number of days accounts 
receivable-number of days accounts payable 
170
04 
192.
107  
234.1
74  
Cash sufficiency 
cash 
sufficienc
y 
Ratio of cash flow from operations to(long-term debt paid + fixed assets 
purchased + cash dividends distributed) 
175
95 
0.47
5  
0.747  
Control variables 
dep Depreciation, the ratio of Depreciation to Total Assets 
171
45 
0.02
2  
0.016  
growth Growth Rate of Sales 
175
96 
0.16
2  
0.347  
fr Fixed ratio, the ratio of Fixed Assets to Total Assets 
175
96 
0.25
0  
0.172  
prof Profitability, the ratio of Operating Profit to Total Assets 
175
96 
0.05
2  
0.053  
size Logarithm of Sales 
175
96 
19.8
83  
2.245  
fcf Ratio of free cash flow to total assets 171
41 
-
0.38
2  
35.41
9  
opcash Ratio of operating cash flow to total assets 
172
12 
0.04
5  
0.070  
current_r
atio 
Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
175
96 
1.81
1  
1.452  
non-soe Indicator variable, =1 if the firms is controlled by non-soe 
175
96 
0.36
1  
0.480  
Note: In order to keep observations at a maximum, the observations here may be different 
from those in regression models. 
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Panel B: Correlation analysis 
  net onet cnet inet leverage ltleverage stleverage payable_ta receivable_ta 
net 1         
onet 0.9019* 1        
cnet 0.3769* 0.2050* 1       
inet 0.2925* 0.1670* 0.1359* 1      
leverage 0.0919* 0.0922* 0.0197* 0.0660* 1     
ltleverage 0.0791* 0.0765* 0.0511* 0.0292* 0.3807* 1    
stleverage -0.0045 -0.0068 -0.0026 0.0062 0.0580* 0.0284* 1   
payable_ta 0.1172* 0.1228* 0.0440* 0.0727* 0.3479* -0.1372* 0.0092 1  
receivable_ta -0.0576* -0.0564* -0.0300* 0.0121 0.0850* -0.2073* 0.0185* 0.2754* 1 
netpay_ta 0.1457* 0.1493* 0.0660* 0.0517* 0.1784* 0.0919* -0.0058 0.4604* -0.7028* 
ccc -0.1351* -0.1433* -0.0743* -0.0577* 0.0823* -0.0104 0.0137 -0.2837* 0.1797* 
cash_adequacy 0.0745* 0.0790* 0.0288* 0.0273* -0.1514* -0.0780* -0.0015 0.0350* -0.1649* 
depreciation -0.0041 0.003 -0.0192* -0.0076 -0.0192* 0.0992* 0.0194* -0.0652* -0.0995* 
growth_sale 0.0142 0.0141 0.0207* 0.0056 -0.0071 0.0121 -0.0218* 0.0741* -0.0277* 
fixed_ratio -0.0377* -0.0256* -0.0383* -0.0142 0.0101 0.2229* -0.0132 -0.1277* -0.1978* 
prof -0.0286* -0.0273* -0.0053 -0.0180* -0.3164* -0.0581* -0.0305* -0.0998* -0.0885* 
firmsize 0.0992* 0.1034* 0.0415* 0.0339* 0.0316* 0.0340* -0.0262* 0.1937* 0.0233* 
fcf_ta 0.0055 0.0066 -0.0074 0.0035 -0.0421* -0.1408* -0.0405* 0.0209* -0.0161* 
opcash_ta 0.0261* 0.0300* 0.0051 0.0025 -0.1476* -0.0142 -0.0055 -0.0186* -0.2142* 
nonsoe -0.1189* -0.1233* -0.0245* -0.0088 -0.0380* -0.0888* 0.0148* -0.0155* 0.0042 
Note: * suggests the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better 
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Correlation analysis continued 
 
  netpay_ta ccc cash_adequacy depreciation growth_sale fixed_ratio prof firmsize fcf_ta opcash_ta nonsoe 
netpay_ta 1           
ccc -0.3634* 1          
cash_adequacy 0.1771* -0.2573* 1         
depreciation 0.0361* -0.2674* 0.1508* 1        
growth_sale 0.0772* -0.1918* 0.0067 -0.0284* 1       
fixed_ratio 0.0790* -0.2811* 0.1088* 0.6249* -0.0056 1      
prof 0.0015 -0.2228* 0.1680* -0.0051 0.2970* 0.0057 1     
firmsize 0.1160* -0.2960* 0.0767* 0.1191* 0.1365* 0.1129* 0.1645* 1    
fcf_ta 0.0261* -0.1135* 0.1540* 0.2112* -0.0177* 0.2056* 0.1170* 0.0589* 1   
opcash_ta 0.1783* -0.2658* 0.4314* 0.2673* 0.1114* 0.2457* 0.3400* 0.1259* 0.3274* 1  
nonsoe -0.0154* 0.0626* -0.0379* -0.1475* -0.0015 -0.1755* 0.0216* -0.1594* -0.0773* -0.0712* 1 
Note: * suggests the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 3.2: Univariate tests of Chapter 3 
  
 Variables 
Networks Non-networks Difference 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff T-value 
ltlev 0.077004 0.001192 0.061292 0.000687 0.015711 -11.9715*** 
stlev 0.406425 0.002482 0.378775 0.001563 0.02765 -9.5264*** 
payable 0.121019 0.001166 0.099497 0.000671 0.021522 -16.7767*** 
CCC 150.13 2.81575 209.5469 2.060681 -59.4149 16.1618*** 
cash sufficiency 0.550251 0.009314 0.442516 0.006409 0.107734 -9.3127*** 
Notes: ltleverage is the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets. Stleverage is the ratio of 
current liabilities to total assets. Payable_ta is the ratio of accounts payable to total assets. 
CCC is cash conversion cycle and is calculated as the number of days inventories plus the 
number of days accounts receivable minus the number of days accounts payable. Cash flow 
adequacy is calculated as the ratio of cash flow from operations to(long-term debt paid + 
fixed assets purchased + cash dividends distributed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Table 3.3: Business networks and firms’ access to debts 
Note: These tables report the estimation of long-term and short-term leverage respectively as in 
equation 1 using fixed effects. In state, it is operated by reghdfe and clustered in firms and years. The 
definition of variables can be found in table 3.1. 
Panel A: Long-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev 
       
dep -0.245*** -0.246*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.245*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
growth 0.00638*** 0.00643*** 0.00636*** 0.00638*** 0.00642*** 0.00640*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00188) (0.00189) 
fr 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) 
prof -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
size 0.00131*** 0.00132*** 0.00132*** 0.00132*** 0.00132*** 0.00132*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000278) (0.000278) 
fcf -
0.000135*** 
-
0.000135*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) 
nonsoe -0.00605*** -0.00737*** -0.00610*** -0.00641*** -0.00613*** -0.00570*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00167) (0.00144) (0.00163) (0.00144) (0.00161) 
net 0.00928*** 0.00790***     
 (0.00139) (0.00166)     
net_nonsoe  0.00454     
  (0.00296)     
onet   0.00915*** 0.00878***   
   (0.00146) (0.00172)   
onet_nonsoe    0.00129   
    (0.00315)   
onet_123     0.00896*** 0.00949*** 
     (0.00150) (0.00175) 
onet_123_nonsoe      -0.00191 
      (0.00326) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A: Long-term leverage continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev 
       
dep -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
growth 0.00640*** 0.00642*** 0.00637*** 0.00634*** 0.00644*** 0.00649*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) 
fr 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) 
prof -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
size 0.00144*** 0.00145*** 0.00140*** 0.00140*** 0.00143*** 0.00143*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) 
fcf -
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
-
0.000134*** 
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) 
nonsoe -0.00744*** -0.00800*** -0.00729*** -0.00787*** -0.00749*** -0.00798*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00142) (0.00146) (0.00142) (0.00144) 
onet_5 0.0161*** 0.0100**     
 (0.00371) (0.00445)     
onet_5_nonsoe  0.0198**     
  (0.00802)     
cnet   0.0134*** 0.0105***   
   (0.00259) (0.00308)   
cnet_nonsoe    0.00963*   
    (0.00558)   
inet     0.00910*** 0.00510 
     (0.00321) (0.00388) 
inet_nonsoe      0.0126* 
      (0.00685) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.155 0.155 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Short-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.101 0.104 0.103 0.106 0.100 0.102 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0395*** 0.0393*** 0.0395*** 0.0393*** 0.0397*** 0.0395*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0811*** -0.0809*** -0.0821*** -0.0822*** -0.0821*** -0.0821*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.103*** -1.103*** -1.104*** -1.103*** -1.104*** -1.104*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00374*** 0.00373*** 0.00376*** 0.00376*** 0.00375*** 0.00375*** 
 (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000579) (0.000578) 
fcf -7.46e-05 -7.33e-05 -7.34e-05 -7.22e-05 -7.32e-05 -7.24e-05 
 (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.39e-05) 
nonsoe 0.00898*** 0.0137*** 0.00882*** 0.0138*** 0.00881*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.00299) (0.00348) (0.00299) (0.00340) (0.00299) (0.00336) 
net 0.0225*** 0.0274***     
 (0.00291) (0.00345)     
net_nonsoe  -0.0162***     
  (0.00616)     
onet   0.0219*** 0.0278***   
   (0.00304) (0.00358)   
onet_nonsoe    -0.0205***   
    (0.00656)   
onet_123     0.0219*** 0.0261*** 
     (0.00312) (0.00364) 
onet_123_nonsoe      -0.0154** 
      (0.00679) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.213 0.214 0.213 0.214 0.213 0.213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Short-term leverage continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.104 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.104 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0397*** 0.0396*** 0.0397*** 0.0398*** 0.0396*** 0.0396*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0826*** -0.0823*** -0.0822*** -0.0818*** -0.0831*** -0.0831*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.108*** -1.107*** -1.107*** -1.107*** -1.105*** -1.105*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00407*** 0.00405*** 0.00403*** 0.00403*** 0.00394*** 0.00394*** 
 (0.000577) (0.000577) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000577) (0.000577) 
fcf -7.27e-05 -7.24e-05 -7.26e-05 -7.23e-05 -7.46e-05 -7.45e-05 
 (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) 
nonsoe 0.00548* 0.00725** 0.00556* 0.00716** 0.00583** 0.00603** 
 (0.00295) (0.00299) (0.00296) (0.00304) (0.00295) (0.00300) 
onet_5 0.0254*** 0.0445***     
 (0.00773) (0.00927)     
onet_5_nonsoe  -0.0625***     
  (0.0167)     
cnet   0.0145*** 0.0224***   
   (0.00541) (0.00642)   
cnet_nonsoe    -0.0266**   
    (0.0116)   
inet     0.0519*** 0.0536*** 
     (0.00669) (0.00809) 
inet_nonsoe      -0.00532 
      (0.0143) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.211 0.212 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Business networks and firms’ access to trade credit 
Note: This table reports the estimation of trade credit as in equation 2 using fixed effects. 
The command in stata is reghdfe that clustered in firms and years. Definitions of variables 
can be found in table 3.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES payable payable payable payable payable payable 
       
growth 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0161*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
size 0.00489*** 0.00489*** 0.00489*** 0.00489*** 0.00489*** 0.00489*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000240) (0.000240) 
prof -0.0740*** -0.0740*** -0.0739*** -0.0742*** -0.0740*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
fr -0.0765*** -0.0764*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00356) (0.00356) (0.00356) 
lev 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00295) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
opcash 0.0510*** 0.0512*** 0.0511*** 0.0513*** 0.0511*** 0.0513*** 
 (0.00845) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) 
nonsoe -0.00889*** -0.00826*** -0.00890*** -0.00772*** -0.00891*** -0.00795*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00144) (0.00123) (0.00140) (0.00123) (0.00139) 
net 0.00534*** 0.00601***     
 (0.00120) (0.00143)     
net_nonsoe  -0.00219     
  (0.00254)     
onet   0.00537*** 0.00675***   
   (0.00126) (0.00148)   
onet_nonsoe    -0.00480*   
    (0.00271)   
onet_123     0.00526*** 0.00646*** 
     (0.00129) (0.00151) 
onet_123_nonsoe      -0.00431 
      (0.00280) 
       
Observations 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Business networks and firms’ access to trade credit continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES payable payable payable payable payable payable 
       
growth 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
size 0.00496*** 0.00496*** 0.00493*** 0.00493*** 0.00493*** 0.00493*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
prof -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0738*** -0.0739*** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
fr -0.0769*** -0.0769*** -0.0764*** -0.0764*** -0.0769*** -0.0769*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00356) 
lev 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
opcash 0.0516*** 0.0516*** 0.0512*** 0.0513*** 0.0511*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00845) (0.00846) (0.00845) (0.00845) 
nonsoe -0.00973*** -0.00952*** -0.00957*** -0.00944*** -0.00961*** -0.00944*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00123) (0.00122) (0.00125) (0.00122) (0.00124) 
onet_5 0.00470 0.00699*     
 (0.00317) (0.00382)     
onet_5_nonsoe  -0.00740     
  (0.00686)     
cnet   0.00947*** 0.0101***   
   (0.00224) (0.00266)   
cnet_nonsoe    -0.00222   
    (0.00480)   
inet     0.0143*** 0.0157*** 
     (0.00277) (0.00334) 
inet_nonsoe      -0.00437 
      (0.00589) 
       
Observations 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.334 0.334 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5 Business networks and firms’ working capital management 
Note: This table reports estimation results of working capital management as in equation 3 
using firm fixed effects. In state, it is achieved using reghdfe clustered in firms and years. 
Definitions of variables can be found in table 3.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc 
       
prof -533.2*** -533.3*** -533.3*** -533.9*** -533.0*** -533.6*** 
 (31.32) (31.31) (31.31) (31.31) (31.32) (31.32) 
lev 194.1*** 193.3*** 194.2*** 193.3*** 193.5*** 192.8*** 
 (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.76) 
growth -85.64*** -85.84*** -85.63*** -85.80*** -85.76*** -85.88*** 
 (4.449) (4.449) (4.449) (4.449) (4.450) (4.450) 
fcf -26.59*** -26.36*** -26.77*** -26.56*** -26.80*** -26.64*** 
 (8.359) (8.358) (8.358) (8.357) (8.360) (8.360) 
size -20.99*** -21.00*** -20.97*** -20.97*** -20.98*** -20.97*** 
 (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) 
current_ratio 34.98*** 34.84*** 34.96*** 34.84*** 34.96*** 34.85*** 
 (1.581) (1.582) (1.581) (1.581) (1.581) (1.582) 
nonsoe 22.15*** 27.19*** 21.78*** 25.84*** 22.06*** 25.06*** 
 (3.326) (3.871) (3.328) (3.779) (3.332) (3.738) 
net -20.93*** -15.71***     
 (3.244) (3.839)     
net_nonsoe  -17.50**     
  (6.888)     
onet   -23.43*** -18.71***   
   (3.390) (3.978)   
onet_nonsoe    -16.63**   
    (7.330)   
onet_123     -21.52*** -17.84*** 
     (3.480) (4.053) 
onet_123_nonsoe      -13.43* 
      (7.589) 
       
Observations 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 
R-squared 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.428 0.429 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Business networks and firms’ working capital management continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc 
       
prof -534.1*** -534.3*** -534.4*** -534.4*** -533.5*** -533.5*** 
 (31.36) (31.35) (31.35) (31.34) (31.33) (31.33) 
lev 191.1*** 190.9*** 190.9*** 190.4*** 194.0*** 194.0*** 
 (10.76) (10.76) (10.75) (10.75) (10.76) (10.76) 
growth -85.65*** -85.71*** -85.56*** -85.49*** -85.63*** -85.63*** 
 (4.455) (4.455) (4.453) (4.452) (4.451) (4.451) 
fcf -26.40*** -26.26*** -26.61*** -26.57*** -26.02*** -26.02*** 
 (8.369) (8.369) (8.366) (8.364) (8.362) (8.362) 
size -21.30*** -21.30*** -21.21*** -21.21*** -21.23*** -21.23*** 
 (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) (0.677) (0.677) 
current_ratio 35.21*** 35.21*** 35.00*** 34.92*** 35.26*** 35.26*** 
 (1.583) (1.582) (1.583) (1.583) (1.581) (1.581) 
nonsoe 25.39*** 26.46*** 25.06*** 27.31*** 24.98*** 25.11*** 
 (3.290) (3.332) (3.290) (3.377) (3.288) (3.344) 
onet_5 -8.859 2.524     
 (8.666) (10.32)     
onet_5_nonsoe  -38.53**     
  (18.95)     
cnet   -21.89*** -10.59   
   (6.059) (7.173)   
cnet_nonsoe    -38.36***   
    (13.04)   
inet     -40.69*** -39.63*** 
     (7.416) (8.931) 
inet_nonsoe      -3.362 
      (15.84) 
       
Observations 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 
R-squared 0.427 0.427 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.428 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Business networks and cash sufficiency 
Note: This table reports the estimation of cash sufficiency using firm fixed effects as 
described in equation 4. It is operated by reghdfe in stata and clustered in firms and years. 
The variable definitions can be seen in table 3.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
       
growth -0.0754*** -0.0749*** -0.0755*** -0.0750*** -0.0751*** -0.0746*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
prof 1.841*** 1.840*** 1.841*** 1.842*** 1.841*** 1.843*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) 
fr 0.320*** 0.319*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) 
lev -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.425*** -0.424*** -0.423*** -0.421*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
fcf 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.436*** 0.435*** 0.436*** 0.435*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size 0.00882*** 0.00884*** 0.00873*** 0.00874*** 0.00879*** 0.00878*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
nonsoe -0.0487*** -0.0600*** -0.0474*** -0.0590*** -0.0487*** -0.0609*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0137) 
net 0.0634*** 0.0516***     
 (0.0119) (0.0141)     
net_nonsoe  0.0389     
  (0.0251)     
onet   0.0725*** 0.0589***   
   (0.0124) (0.0146)   
onet_nonsoe    0.0470*   
    (0.0267)   
onet_123     0.0642*** 0.0491*** 
     (0.0127) (0.0149) 
onet_123_nonsoe      0.0545** 
      (0.0277) 
       
Observations 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.124 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Business networks and cash sufficiency continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
       
growth -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0758*** -0.0753*** -0.0752*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
prof 1.841*** 1.841*** 1.843*** 1.843*** 1.841*** 1.841*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
fr 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) 
lev -0.414*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.417*** -0.417*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
fcf 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size 0.00968*** 0.00967*** 0.00959*** 0.00958*** 0.00952*** 0.00953*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
nonsoe -0.0585*** -0.0575*** -0.0585*** -0.0640*** -0.0584*** -0.0595*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
onet_5 0.0725** 0.0837**     
 (0.0315) (0.0378)     
onet_5_nonsoe  -0.0365     
  (0.0681)     
cnet   0.0341 0.00656   
   (0.0220) (0.0261)   
cnet_nonsoe    0.0927*   
    (0.0474)   
inet     0.0788*** 0.0695** 
     (0.0273) (0.0330) 
inet_nonsoe      0.0291 
      (0.0582) 
       
Observations 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.124 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Network structure and firms’ access to financial resources 
Note: This table shows the estimation of firms’ access to financial resources using firm fixed 
effects as described above. Variable definitions can be found in table 3.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev stlev stlev payable payable 
       
dep -0.243*** -0.246*** 0.107 0.0989   
 (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.107) (0.107)   
growth 0.00633*** 0.00643*** 0.0394*** 0.0397*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
fr 0.125*** 0.125*** -0.0817*** -0.0812*** -0.0763*** -0.0766*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.00356) (0.00357) 
prof -0.115*** -0.117*** -1.101*** -1.105*** -0.0736*** -0.0741*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
size 0.00127*** 0.00135*** 0.00363*** 0.00381*** 0.00483*** 0.00490*** 
 (0.000278) (0.000277) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
fcf -0.000134*** -0.000135*** -7.38e-05 -7.46e-05   
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.40e-05)   
nonsoe -0.00574*** -0.00648*** 0.00984*** 0.00822*** -0.00830*** -0.00910*** 
 (0.00144) (0.00143) (0.00299) (0.00298) (0.00123) (0.00123) 
net_degree 0.00560***  0.0139***  0.00452***  
 (0.000743)  (0.00155)  (0.000642)  
net_constraint  0.00791***  0.0212***  0.00481*** 
  (0.00149)  (0.00311)  (0.00129) 
lev     0.133*** 0.134*** 
     (0.00295) (0.00294) 
opcash     0.0505*** 0.0511*** 
     (0.00845) (0.00846) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.158 0.156 0.214 0.213 0.336 0.335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Network structure and firms’ access to financial resources continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc cash sufficiency cash sufficiency 
     
prof -533.8*** -533.2*** 1.842*** 1.840*** 
 (31.30) (31.32) (0.114) (0.114) 
lev 195.2*** 193.4*** -0.427*** -0.422*** 
 (10.75) (10.75) (0.0291) (0.0290) 
growth -85.60*** -85.68*** -0.0755*** -0.0752*** 
 (4.448) (4.450) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
fcf -26.52*** -26.45*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 
 (8.355) (8.360) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size -20.90*** -21.04*** 0.00867*** 0.00888*** 
 (0.679) (0.679) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
current_ratio 34.91*** 35.01***   
 (1.580) (1.581)   
nonsoe 21.36*** 22.66*** -0.0477*** -0.0498*** 
 (3.330) (3.319) (0.0122) (0.0121) 
net_degree -12.92***  0.0350***  
 (1.730)  (0.00634)  
net_constraint  -20.92***  0.0676*** 
  (3.465)  (0.0127) 
fr   0.318*** 0.320*** 
   (0.0349) (0.0349) 
     
Observations 16,551 16,551 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.429 0.428 0.125 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Business networks affiliation and firms’ supply of trade credit and net position of 
trade credit 
Note: The table produce the same estimation process as in table 3.4 using receivable and 
netpay as dependent variables respectively. They estimate firm fixed effects. The Definitions 
of variables are available to see in table 3.1. 
Panel A: supply of trade credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES receivable receivable receivable receivable receivable receivable 
       
growth -0.00128 -0.00133 -0.00129 -0.00138 -0.00126 -0.00134 
 (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) 
size 0.00188*** 0.00188*** 0.00188*** 0.00188*** 0.00186*** 0.00187*** 
 (0.000309) (0.000309) (0.000309) (0.000309) (0.000309) (0.000309) 
prof -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
fr -0.160*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** 
 (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) 
lev 0.0481*** 0.0481*** 0.0481*** 0.0479*** 0.0481*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00380) 
opcash -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
nonsoe 0.00871*** 0.0100*** 0.00876*** 0.0109*** 0.00888*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00159) (0.00185) (0.00159) (0.00181) (0.00159) (0.00179) 
net 0.00338** 0.00473**     
 (0.00155) (0.00185)     
net_nonsoe  -0.00445     
  (0.00328)     
onet   0.00372** 0.00625***   
   (0.00162) (0.00191)   
onet_nonsoe    -0.00874**   
    (0.00349)   
onet_123     0.00445*** 0.00682*** 
     (0.00167) (0.00195) 
onet_123_nonsoe      -0.00847** 
      (0.00361) 
       
Observations 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 
R-squared 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.323 0.323 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A: supply of trade credit continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES receivable receivable receivable receivable receivable receivable 
       
growth -0.00129 -0.00130 -0.00128 -0.00125 -0.00128 -0.00123 
 (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00209) (0.00209) 
size 0.00193*** 0.00192*** 0.00193*** 0.00193*** 0.00189*** 0.00190*** 
 (0.000308) (0.000308) (0.000308) (0.000308) (0.000308) (0.000308) 
prof -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
fr -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** 
 (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00460) (0.00459) 
lev 0.0488*** 0.0487*** 0.0489*** 0.0489*** 0.0476*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00380) (0.00379) 
opcash -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.190*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
nonsoe 0.00816*** 0.00852*** 0.00812*** 0.00863*** 0.00835*** 0.00782*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00157) (0.00161) (0.00157) (0.00159) 
onet_5 0.000850 0.00478     
 (0.00411) (0.00493)     
onet_5_nonsoe  -0.0128     
  (0.00889)     
cnet   -0.00126 0.00133   
   (0.00291) (0.00345)   
cnet_nonsoe    -0.00862   
    (0.00623)   
inet     0.0174*** 0.0130*** 
     (0.00359) (0.00434) 
inet_nonsoe      0.0139* 
      (0.00764) 
       
Observations 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 17,111 
R-squared 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.323 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
Panel B: Business network affiliation and firms’ net position of trade credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES netpay netpay netpay netpay netpay netpay 
       
growth 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 
 (0.00216) (0.00217) (0.00216) (0.00217) (0.00216) (0.00217) 
size 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 
 (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000319) 
prof 0.0162 0.0162 0.0163 0.0164 0.0162 0.0164 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
fr 0.0704*** 0.0703*** 0.0702*** 0.0702*** 0.0702*** 0.0702*** 
 (0.00476) (0.00476) (0.00475) (0.00475) (0.00475) (0.00475) 
lev 0.0853*** 0.0853*** 0.0853*** 0.0854*** 0.0855*** 0.0855*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
opcash 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
nonsoe -0.0179*** -0.0183*** -0.0179*** -0.0188*** -0.0180*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00191) (0.00164) (0.00187) (0.00164) (0.00185) 
net 0.00302* 0.00260     
 (0.00160) (0.00191)     
net_nonsoe  0.00135     
  (0.00339)     
onet   0.00308* 0.00202   
   (0.00168) (0.00198)   
onet_nonsoe    0.00363   
    (0.00361)   
onet_123     0.00261 0.00169 
     (0.00172) (0.00201) 
onet_123_nonsoe      0.00331 
      (0.00374) 
       
Observations 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 
R-squared 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Business network affiliation and firms’ net position of trade credit continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES netpay netpay netpay netpay netpay netpay 
       
growth 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 
 (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) 
size 0.00302*** 0.00302*** 0.00298*** 0.00298*** 0.00302*** 0.00301*** 
 (0.000318) (0.000318) (0.000318) (0.000318) (0.000319) (0.000319) 
prof 0.0161 0.0161 0.0165 0.0166 0.0161 0.0161 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
fr 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 0.0707*** 0.0707*** 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00475) (0.00475) (0.00476) (0.00475) (0.00475) 
lev 0.0858*** 0.0859*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0858*** 0.0858*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00392) (0.00391) (0.00391) (0.00392) (0.00392) 
opcash 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
nonsoe -0.0184*** -0.0186*** -0.0182*** -0.0185*** -0.0184*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00164) (0.00162) (0.00166) (0.00162) (0.00165) 
onet_5 0.00198 6.92e-06     
 (0.00424) (0.00509)     
onet_5_nonsoe  0.00644     
  (0.00916)     
cnet   0.0120*** 0.0104***   
   (0.00300) (0.00357)   
cnet_nonsoe    0.00528   
    (0.00643)   
inet     0.00218 0.00665 
     (0.00370) (0.00448) 
inet_nonsoe      -0.0140* 
      (0.00788) 
       
Observations 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 17,056 
R-squared 0.317 0.317 0.318 0.318 0.317 0.317 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9: Further analysis on the role of business networks on non-SOEs’ short-term 
leverage 
Note: The table reports firm fixed effects on the estimation of firms’ short-term lev. In state it 
is operated by reghdfe, cluster in firms and years. Definition of variables can be found in 
table 3.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.106 0.102 0.101 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0393*** 0.0391*** 0.0393*** 0.0391*** 0.0395*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0809*** -0.0806*** -0.0822*** -0.0819*** -0.0821*** -0.0817*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.103*** -1.099*** -1.103*** -1.100*** -1.104*** -1.100*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00373*** 0.00373*** 0.00376*** 0.00376*** 0.00375*** 0.00376*** 
 (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) 
fcf -7.33e-05 -7.33e-05 -7.22e-05 -7.24e-05 -7.24e-05 -7.27e-05 
 (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) 
nonsoe 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0138*** 0.0138*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00340) (0.00340) (0.00336) (0.00336) 
net 0.0274*** 0.0274***     
 (0.00345) (0.00345)     
net_nonsoe -0.0162*** -0.00940     
 (0.00616) (0.00703)     
net_nonsoe_cash  -0.0129**     
  (0.00638)     
onet   0.0278*** 0.0278***   
   (0.00358) (0.00358)   
onet_nonsoe   -0.0205*** -0.0131*   
   (0.00656) (0.00761)   
onet_nonsoe_cash    -0.0136*   
    (0.00707)   
onet_123     0.0261*** 0.0261*** 
     (0.00364) (0.00364) 
onet_123_nonsoe     -0.0154** -0.00444 
     (0.00679) (0.00794) 
onet_123_nonsoe_cash      -0.0201*** 
      (0.00755) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.213 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9: Further analysis on the role of business networks on non-SOEs’ short-term lev 
continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.102 0.100 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.102 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0396*** 0.0397*** 0.0398*** 0.0397*** 0.0396*** 0.0396*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0823*** -0.0823*** -0.0818*** -0.0817*** -0.0831*** -0.0829*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.107*** -1.109*** -1.107*** -1.107*** -1.105*** -1.104*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00405*** 0.00405*** 0.00403*** 0.00403*** 0.00394*** 0.00394*** 
 (0.000577) (0.000577) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000577) (0.000577) 
fcf -7.24e-05 -7.24e-05 -7.23e-05 -7.24e-05 -7.45e-05 -7.44e-05 
 (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) 
nonsoe 0.00725** 0.00726** 0.00716** 0.00716** 0.00603** 0.00603** 
 (0.00299) (0.00299) (0.00304) (0.00304) (0.00300) (0.00300) 
onet_5 0.0445*** 0.0446***     
 (0.00927) (0.00927)     
onet_5_nonsoe -0.0625*** -0.0832***     
 (0.0167) (0.0193)     
onet_5_nonsoe_cash  0.0414**     
  (0.0192)     
cnet   0.0224*** 0.0224***   
   (0.00642) (0.00642)   
cnet_nonsoe   -0.0266** -0.0213   
   (0.0116) (0.0148)   
cnet_nonsoe_cash    -0.00923   
    (0.0160)   
inet     0.0536*** 0.0536*** 
     (0.00809) (0.00809) 
inet_nonsoe     -0.00532 0.00396 
     (0.0143) (0.0171) 
inet_nonsoe_cash      -0.0170 
      (0.0171) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.212 0.212 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.10: Business networks and firms’ access to financial resources using alternative 
ownership measure 
Note: The table reports firm fixed effects on the estimation of firms’ access to financial 
resources. Definitions of variables are available in table 3.1.  
Panel A: Business network and long-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev 
       
dep -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.247*** -0.247*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
growth 0.00639*** 0.00645*** 0.00638*** 0.00640*** 0.00644*** 0.00643*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00188) 
fr 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) 
prof -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
size 0.00130*** 0.00131*** 0.00131*** 0.00131*** 0.00131*** 0.00131*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000278) (0.000278) 
fcf -0.000135*** -0.000135*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** 
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) 
dp -0.00642*** -0.00758*** -0.00646*** -0.00683*** -0.00649*** -0.00614*** 
 (0.00144) (0.00168) (0.00144) (0.00163) (0.00144) (0.00162) 
net 0.00928*** 0.00808***     
 (0.00139) (0.00165)     
net_dp  0.00402     
  (0.00297)     
onet   0.00915*** 0.00871***   
   (0.00146) (0.00171)   
onet_dp    0.00155   
    (0.00316)   
onet_123     0.00895*** 0.00938*** 
     (0.00149) (0.00174) 
onet_123_dp      -0.00156 
      (0.00327) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev 
       
dep -0.246*** -0.245*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.247*** -0.246*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) 
growth 0.00642*** 0.00644*** 0.00639*** 0.00637*** 0.00647*** 0.00652*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00189) 
fr 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) 
prof -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
size 0.00144*** 0.00145*** 0.00140*** 0.00140*** 0.00142*** 0.00143*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000277) 
fcf -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000135*** 
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) 
dp -0.00773*** -0.00826*** -0.00760*** -0.00797*** -0.00781*** -0.00833*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00144) (0.00142) (0.00146) (0.00142) (0.00145) 
onet_5 0.0161*** 0.0104**     
 (0.00371) (0.00441)     
onet_5_dp  0.0190**     
  (0.00810)     
cnet   0.0134*** 0.0116***   
   (0.00259) (0.00306)   
cnet_dp    0.00610   
    (0.00561)   
inet     0.00915*** 0.00487 
     (0.00321) (0.00388) 
inet_dp      0.0135** 
      (0.00686) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.155 0.156 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Business networks and firms’ access to short-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.105 0.108 0.107 0.111 0.104 0.106 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0395*** 0.0393*** 0.0395*** 0.0392*** 0.0396*** 0.0395*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0809*** -0.0807*** -0.0820*** -0.0820*** -0.0819*** -0.0820*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.104*** -1.103*** -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00377*** 0.00375*** 0.00379*** 0.00378*** 0.00377*** 0.00377*** 
 (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000578) 
fcf -7.44e-05 -7.29e-05 -7.31e-05 -7.19e-05 -7.30e-05 -7.21e-05 
 (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.39e-05) 
dp 0.00999*** 0.0149*** 0.00986*** 0.0152*** 0.00985*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00300) (0.00349) (0.00300) (0.00341) (0.00301) (0.00337) 
net 0.0226*** 0.0277***     
 (0.00290) (0.00344)     
net_dp  -0.0171***     
  (0.00618)     
onet   0.0220*** 0.0282***   
   (0.00303) (0.00356)   
onet_dp    -0.0219***   
    (0.00658)   
onet_123     0.0219*** 0.0266*** 
     (0.00311) (0.00363) 
onet_123_dp      -0.0170** 
      (0.00681) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.213 0.214 0.213 0.213 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.107 0.105 0.106 0.107 0.107 0.107 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
growth 0.0397*** 0.0396*** 0.0397*** 0.0397*** 0.0396*** 0.0396*** 
 (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) 
fr -0.0825*** -0.0821*** -0.0821*** -0.0817*** -0.0830*** -0.0829*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
prof -1.108*** -1.107*** -1.108*** -1.108*** -1.105*** -1.105*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
size 0.00410*** 0.00408*** 0.00406*** 0.00406*** 0.00397*** 0.00397*** 
 (0.000577) (0.000577) (0.000577) (0.000577) (0.000576) (0.000577) 
fcf -7.24e-05 -7.21e-05 -7.23e-05 -7.20e-05 -7.44e-05 -7.42e-05 
 (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.40e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.39e-05) 
dp 0.00666** 0.00841*** 0.00671** 0.00833*** 0.00693** 0.00720** 
 (0.00297) (0.00301) (0.00297) (0.00305) (0.00296) (0.00302) 
onet_5 0.0255*** 0.0441***     
 (0.00773) (0.00920)     
onet_5_dp  -0.0627***     
  (0.0169)     
cnet   0.0146*** 0.0225***   
   (0.00541) (0.00639)   
cnet_dp    -0.0270**   
    (0.0117)   
inet     0.0519*** 0.0541*** 
     (0.00669) (0.00808) 
inet_dp      -0.00700 
      (0.0143) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 
R-squared 0.211 0.212 0.211 0.211 0.214 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Business networks and trade credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES payable payable payable payable payable payable 
       
growth 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
size 0.00490*** 0.00490*** 0.00490*** 0.00490*** 0.00490*** 0.00490*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000240) (0.000240) 
prof -0.0742*** -0.0742*** -0.0741*** -0.0743*** -0.0741*** -0.0744*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
fr -0.0766*** -0.0765*** -0.0768*** -0.0768*** -0.0768*** -0.0768*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) 
lev 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00295) (0.00294) (0.00295) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
opcash 0.0508*** 0.0510*** 0.0508*** 0.0511*** 0.0509*** 0.0511*** 
 (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) 
dp -0.00856*** -0.00780*** -0.00856*** -0.00730*** -0.00857*** -0.00753*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00144) (0.00124) (0.00141) (0.00124) (0.00139) 
net 0.00547*** 0.00625***     
 (0.00120) (0.00142)     
net_dp  -0.00262     
  (0.00255)     
onet   0.00550*** 0.00696***   
   (0.00126) (0.00147)   
onet_dp    -0.00515*   
    (0.00271)   
onet_123     0.00540*** 0.00667*** 
     (0.00129) (0.00150) 
onet_123_dp      -0.00465* 
      (0.00281) 
       
Observations 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
Panel C continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES payable payable payable payable payable payable 
       
growth 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
size 0.00498*** 0.00497*** 0.00495*** 0.00495*** 0.00494*** 0.00494*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
prof -0.0744*** -0.0744*** -0.0740*** -0.0741*** -0.0744*** -0.0744*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
fr -0.0771*** -0.0770*** -0.0766*** -0.0765*** -0.0770*** -0.0770*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00356) 
lev 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
opcash 0.0514*** 0.0514*** 0.0510*** 0.0511*** 0.0509*** 0.0510*** 
 (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00846) 
dp -0.00937*** -0.00916*** -0.00922*** -0.00907*** -0.00927*** -0.00912*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00124) (0.00122) (0.00126) (0.00122) (0.00124) 
onet_5 0.00470 0.00698*     
 (0.00318) (0.00379)     
onet_5_dp  -0.00763     
  (0.00692)     
cnet   0.00953*** 0.0103***   
   (0.00224) (0.00265)   
cnet_dp    -0.00265   
    (0.00483)   
inet     0.0144*** 0.0157*** 
     (0.00277) (0.00334) 
inet_dp      -0.00391 
      (0.00590) 
       
Observations 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.334 0.334 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Panel D: Business networks and working capital management 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc 
       
prof -533.2*** -533.3*** -533.3*** -533.8*** -533.0*** -533.6*** 
 (31.32) (31.31) (31.31) (31.31) (31.32) (31.32) 
lev 194.2*** 193.4*** 194.3*** 193.4*** 193.6*** 193.0*** 
 (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) (10.75) 
growth -85.70*** -85.90*** -85.69*** -85.87*** -85.83*** -85.94*** 
 (4.449) (4.449) (4.449) (4.449) (4.450) (4.450) 
fcf -26.34*** -26.10*** -26.53*** -26.30*** -26.56*** -26.38*** 
 (8.360) (8.360) (8.359) (8.358) (8.362) (8.362) 
size -21.00*** -21.00*** -20.97*** -20.97*** -20.98*** -20.98*** 
 (0.679) (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) (0.679) (0.679) 
current_ratio 35.00*** 34.87*** 34.98*** 34.86*** 34.97*** 34.88*** 
 (1.581) (1.582) (1.581) (1.581) (1.581) (1.582) 
dp 22.40*** 27.27*** 22.03*** 26.16*** 22.30*** 25.15*** 
 (3.336) (3.882) (3.339) (3.788) (3.342) (3.747) 
net -21.07*** -16.12***     
 (3.240) (3.818)     
net_dp  -16.95**     
  (6.912)     
onet   -23.56*** -18.82***   
   (3.386) (3.958)   
onet_dp    -17.01**   
    (7.355)   
onet_123     -21.67*** -18.22*** 
     (3.475) (4.035) 
onet_123_dp      -12.81* 
      (7.610) 
       
Observations 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 
R-squared 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.428 0.429 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc 
       
prof -534.0*** -534.2*** -534.3*** -534.3*** -533.4*** -533.4*** 
 (31.36) (31.35) (31.34) (31.34) (31.33) (31.33) 
lev 191.2*** 190.9*** 191.0*** 190.5*** 194.1*** 194.1*** 
 (10.76) (10.76) (10.75) (10.75) (10.76) (10.76) 
growth -85.73*** -85.78*** -85.64*** -85.59*** -85.70*** -85.71*** 
 (4.455) (4.454) (4.453) (4.453) (4.451) (4.451) 
fcf -26.13*** -26.02*** -26.34*** -26.30*** -25.74*** -25.76*** 
 (8.371) (8.370) (8.368) (8.367) (8.364) (8.364) 
size -21.31*** -21.31*** -21.22*** -21.22*** -21.24*** -21.24*** 
 (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) (0.677) (0.677) 
current_ratio 35.23*** 35.23*** 35.02*** 34.94*** 35.29*** 35.29*** 
 (1.582) (1.582) (1.583) (1.583) (1.581) (1.581) 
dp 25.51*** 26.69*** 25.21*** 27.19*** 25.16*** 25.34*** 
 (3.305) (3.346) (3.304) (3.392) (3.302) (3.359) 
onet_5 -8.773 3.559     
 (8.666) (10.24)     
onet_5_dp  -43.35**     
  (19.17)     
cnet   -21.99*** -12.20*   
   (6.058) (7.141)   
cnet_dp    -33.95***   
    (13.12)   
inet     -40.87*** -39.39*** 
     (7.415) (8.919) 
inet_dp      -4.742 
      (15.87) 
       
Observations 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 16,551 
R-squared 0.427 0.427 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.428 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Business networks and cash sufficiency ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
       
growth -0.0752*** -0.0747*** -0.0754*** -0.0748*** -0.0750*** -0.0744*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
prof 1.842*** 1.842*** 1.843*** 1.844*** 1.842*** 1.845*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) 
fr 0.318*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) 
lev -0.424*** -0.423*** -0.425*** -0.423*** -0.422*** -0.421*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
fcf 0.435*** 0.434*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.434*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size 0.00874*** 0.00877*** 0.00865*** 0.00867*** 0.00871*** 0.00871*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
dp -0.0521*** -0.0649*** -0.0508*** -0.0638*** -0.0521*** -0.0654*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0122) (0.0137) 
net 0.0633*** 0.0501***     
 (0.0119) (0.0140)     
net_dp  0.0444*     
  (0.0252)     
onet   0.0723*** 0.0573***   
   (0.0124) (0.0145)   
onet_dp    0.0532**   
    (0.0268)   
onet_123     0.0641*** 0.0477*** 
     (0.0127) (0.0148) 
onet_123_dp      0.0599** 
      (0.0278) 
       
Observations 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
cash 
sufficiency 
       
growth -0.0753*** -0.0754*** -0.0753*** -0.0756*** -0.0751*** -0.0750*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
prof 1.842*** 1.842*** 1.844*** 1.844*** 1.843*** 1.842*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
fr 0.313*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0350) (0.0349) (0.0349) 
lev -0.414*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.412*** -0.417*** -0.417*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
fcf 0.436*** 0.436*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.434*** 0.435*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size 0.00962*** 0.00961*** 0.00953*** 0.00952*** 0.00946*** 0.00948*** 
 (0.00235) (0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
dp -0.0614*** -0.0606*** -0.0614*** -0.0672*** -0.0614*** -0.0627*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0123) 
onet_5 0.0721** 0.0805**     
 (0.0315) (0.0375)     
onet_5_dp  -0.0284     
  (0.0688)     
cnet   0.0341 0.00609   
   (0.0220) (0.0260)   
cnet_dp    0.0964**   
    (0.0476)   
inet     0.0791*** 0.0684** 
     (0.0273) (0.0330) 
inet_dp      0.0335 
      (0.0583) 
       
Observations 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.124 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel F: Network structure and firms’ access to financial resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev stlev stlev payable payable 
       
dep -0.245*** -0.248*** 0.111 0.103   
 (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.107) (0.107)   
growth 0.00635*** 0.00645*** 0.0394*** 0.0396*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
fr 0.125*** 0.125*** -0.0815*** -0.0810*** -0.0765*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.00356) (0.00357) 
prof -0.115*** -0.117*** -1.101*** -1.105*** -0.0738*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
size 0.00126*** 0.00134*** 0.00366*** 0.00383*** 0.00484*** 0.00492*** 
 (0.000277) (0.000277) (0.000578) (0.000578) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
fcf -0.000134*** -0.000135*** -7.36e-05 -7.43e-05   
 (3.55e-05) (3.55e-05) (7.39e-05) (7.40e-05)   
dp -0.00612*** -0.00683*** 0.0108*** 0.00926*** -0.00799*** -0.00876*** 
 (0.00144) (0.00144) (0.00300) (0.00299) (0.00124) (0.00123) 
net_degree 0.00560***  0.0140***  0.00458***  
 (0.000742)  (0.00155)  (0.000641)  
net_constraint  0.00792***  0.0213***  0.00494*** 
  (0.00149)  (0.00311)  (0.00129) 
lev     0.133*** 0.134*** 
     (0.00295) (0.00294) 
opcash     0.0503*** 0.0508*** 
     (0.00845) (0.00846) 
       
Observations 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,138 17,106 17,106 
R-squared 0.158 0.156 0.215 0.213 0.336 0.334 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel F continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc cash sufficiency cash sufficiency 
     
prof -533.9*** -533.2*** 1.844*** 1.842*** 
 (31.30) (31.32) (0.114) (0.114) 
lev 195.3*** 193.5*** -0.427*** -0.422*** 
 (10.75) (10.75) (0.0291) (0.0290) 
growth -85.66*** -85.75*** -0.0754*** -0.0750*** 
 (4.447) (4.450) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
fcf -26.27*** -26.20*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 
 (8.357) (8.362) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
size -20.90*** -21.04*** 0.00859*** 0.00881*** 
 (0.679) (0.678) (0.00236) (0.00236) 
current_ratio 34.92*** 35.03***   
 (1.580) (1.581)   
dp 21.65*** 22.90*** -0.0512*** -0.0531*** 
 (3.340) (3.330) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
net_degree -13.00***  0.0350***  
 (1.728)  (0.00633)  
net_constraint  -21.07***  0.0675*** 
  (3.461)  (0.0127) 
fr   0.317*** 0.318*** 
   (0.0349) (0.0349) 
     
Observations 16,551 16,551 17,141 17,141 
R-squared 0.429 0.428 0.125 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.11: Endogenous treatment effects correction 
Note: The table reports estimation of average treated effects of long-term lev, short-term 
lev, trade credit, working capital management and cash sufficiency controlling for 
endogenous treatment effects. In stata, this is achieved by eteffects. Definitions of 
variables can be found in table 3.1. 
ltlev Without panel With panel 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
ATE 
net 
(1 vs 0) 
 
 
.0265 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.0269 
 
 
0.000 
POmean 
net 
0 
 
 
.0625 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.0680 
 
 
0.000 
 
stlev Without panel With panel 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
ATE 
net 
(1 vs 0) 
 
 
.0206 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.0209 
 
 
0.000 
POmean 
net 
0 
 
 
.3959 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.3979 
 
 
0.000 
 
trade 
credit 
Without panel With panel 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
ATE 
net 
(1 vs 0) 
 
 
0.0244 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.02515 
 
 
0.000 
POmean 
net 
0 
 
 
.1016 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.1074 
 
 
0.000 
 
ccc Without panel With panel 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
ATE 
net 
(1 vs 0) 
 
 
-98.6508 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
-108.0739 
 
 
0.000 
POmean 
net 
0 
 
 
229.1596 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
201.3711 
 
 
0.000 
 
cash 
sufficiency 
Without panel With panel 
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
ATE 
net 
(1 vs 0) 
 
 
.1715 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.1901 
 
 
0.000 
POmean 
net 
0 
 
 
. .4556 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
.4744 
 
 
0.000 
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Test of endogeneity 
Outcome variable Treatment variable Null hypothesis Prob>chi2 
ltlev net Outcome and 
treatment 
unobservables are 
uncorrelated 
0.0000 
stlev net Outcome and 
treatment 
unobservables are 
uncorrelated 
0.000 
payable net Outcome and 
treatment 
unobservables are 
uncorrelated 
0.000 
ccc net Outcome and 
treatment 
unobservables are 
uncorrelated 
0.000 
cash sufficiency net Outcome and 
treatment 
unobservables are 
uncorrelated 
0.000 
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Table 3.12: Correction for cross-sectional dependence 
Note: These tables report estimations of firms’ access to financial resources using Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors to control for cross sectional dependence. In stata, it is operated by 
xtscc, fe. Definitions of variables can be found in table 3.1. 
Panel A: Long-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev ltlev 
       
dep -0.436*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.441*** -0.435*** -0.439*** 
 (0.0977) (0.0986) (0.0975) (0.0989) (0.0957) (0.0976) 
growth 0.00361 0.00366 0.00379* 0.00356 0.00346 0.00363 
 (0.00208) (0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00215) (0.00223) (0.00215) 
fr 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0455*** 0.0424*** 0.0430*** 0.0422*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0119) 
prof -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.136*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0189) 
size -0.000112 -0.000115 -0.000126 -4.61e-05 -4.68e-05 -4.90e-05 
 (0.000421) (0.000421) (0.000426) (0.000421) (0.000425) (0.000421) 
fcf -0.000123*** -0.000122*** -0.000122*** -0.000122*** -0.000122*** -0.000122*** 
 (1.09e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.10e-05) 
nonsoe 0.0121*** 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 0.0131*** 0.0129*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.00334) (0.00330) (0.00328) (0.00373) (0.00363) (0.00368) 
net 0.0120***      
 (0.00397)      
onet  0.0134***     
  (0.00397)     
onet_123   0.0136***    
   (0.00431)    
onet_5    0.0121***   
    (0.00277)   
cnet     0.0112**  
     (0.00504)  
inet      0.00335 
      (0.00501) 
Constant 0.0663*** 0.0665*** 0.0669*** 0.0693*** 0.0687*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.00779) (0.00763) (0.00775) (0.00857) (0.00863) (0.00867) 
       
Observations 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 
Number of 
groups 
2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Shot-term leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev stlev 
       
dep 0.571*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 0.564*** 0.564*** 0.571*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0780) (0.0790) (0.0830) (0.0832) (0.0825) 
growth 0.0249*** 0.0250*** 0.0252*** 0.0249*** 0.0250*** 0.0249*** 
 (0.00752) (0.00756) (0.00759) (0.00759) (0.00754) (0.00752) 
fr -0.0224 -0.0229 -0.0227 -0.0269 -0.0273 -0.0262 
 (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0197) 
prof -0.706*** -0.708*** -0.708*** -0.716*** -0.717*** -0.713*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) 
size 0.00476*** 0.00477*** 0.00475*** 0.00485*** 0.00485*** 0.00484*** 
 (0.000566) (0.000571) (0.000569) (0.000594) (0.000591) (0.000596) 
fcf -7.49e-05** -7.43e-05** -7.44e-05** -7.41e-05** -7.41e-05** -7.51e-05** 
 (2.70e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.72e-05) (2.75e-05) (2.75e-05) (2.70e-05) 
nonsoe 0.0280** 0.0279** 0.0279** 0.0294** 0.0293** 0.0291** 
 (0.00968) (0.00961) (0.00967) (0.00999) (0.00998) (0.0101) 
net 0.0175***      
 (0.00505)      
onet  0.0171***     
  (0.00462)     
onet_123   0.0176***    
   (0.00412)    
onet_5    0.00933   
    (0.00814)   
cnet     -0.00166  
     (0.00664)  
inet      0.0305*** 
      (0.00666) 
Constant 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0130) 
       
Observations 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 
Number of groups 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
Panel C: Trade credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES payable payable payable payable payable payable 
       
growth 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0109*** 0.0106*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00107) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00109) (0.00109) 
size 0.000810* 0.000810* 0.000799* 0.000861* 0.000860* 0.000860* 
 (0.000432) (0.000433) (0.000429) (0.000455) (0.000451) (0.000450) 
prof -0.0674** -0.0678** -0.0682*** -0.0716*** -0.0703** -0.0712*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
fr -0.0276*** -0.0276*** -0.0274*** -0.0309*** -0.0304*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.00805) (0.00795) (0.00786) (0.00936) (0.00911) (0.00933) 
lev 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) 
opcash 0.0670*** 0.0671*** 0.0672*** 0.0687*** 0.0690*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.00467) (0.00460) (0.00466) (0.00569) (0.00549) (0.00558) 
nonsoe 0.00740*** 0.00729*** 0.00727*** 0.00820*** 0.00810*** 0.00812*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00207) 
net 0.0117***      
 (0.00321)      
onet  0.0128***     
  (0.00386)     
onet_123   0.0131***    
   (0.00396)    
onet_5    0.00728**   
    (0.00270)   
cnet     0.00774**  
     (0.00296)  
inet      0.0102** 
      (0.00454) 
Constant 0.0362* 0.0365* 0.0368* 0.0380* 0.0376* 0.0380* 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
       
Observations 17,116 17,116 17,116 17,116 17,116 17,116 
Number of groups 2,131 2,131 2,131 2,131 2,131 2,131 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D: Cash conversion cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc ccc 
       
prof -344.8*** -342.4*** -340.3*** -331.6*** -336.9*** -333.3*** 
 (68.05) (67.44) (66.70) (72.85) (72.44) (72.44) 
lev 83.04*** 83.80*** 83.65*** 69.77*** 70.86*** 73.67*** 
 (11.54) (11.28) (11.30) (11.58) (11.23) (11.61) 
growth -83.68*** -84.00*** -84.51*** -83.16*** -82.79*** -83.20*** 
 (17.50) (17.59) (17.71) (17.61) (17.66) (17.51) 
fcf 2.018 1.562 1.442 4.170 3.642 3.967 
 (9.651) (9.750) (9.677) (10.23) (10.03) (10.14) 
size -8.726*** -8.708*** -8.657*** -9.000*** -8.976*** -9.006*** 
 (2.666) (2.667) (2.664) (2.774) (2.761) (2.751) 
current_ratio 23.58*** 23.64*** 23.59*** 23.91*** 23.92*** 24.01*** 
 (5.272) (5.214) (5.218) (5.545) (5.468) (5.523) 
nonsoe -41.48*** -40.96*** -40.95*** -45.41*** -44.95*** -45.03*** 
 (9.172) (8.846) (8.887) (10.85) (10.71) (10.76) 
net -48.56***      
 (11.22)      
onet  -53.87***     
  (12.77)     
onet_123   -54.17***    
   (12.93)    
onet_5    -7.217   
    (10.22)   
cnet     -30.90***  
     (9.009)  
inet      -44.47*** 
      (11.13) 
Constant 354.9*** 353.2*** 351.4*** 351.4*** 352.1*** 351.0*** 
 (63.57) (63.36) (63.37) (65.95) (65.89) (65.44) 
       
Observations 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 
Number of groups 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Cash sufficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES cash  
sufficiency 
cash  
sufficiency 
cash  
sufficiency 
cash  
sufficiency 
cash  
sufficiency 
cash  
sufficiency 
       
growth -0.0245 -0.0241 -0.0232 -0.0256 -0.0252 -0.0251 
 (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0185) 
prof 1.109*** 1.106*** 1.100*** 1.079*** 1.077*** 1.080*** 
 (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.276) (0.272) (0.274) 
fr -0.133** -0.133** -0.133** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.158*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0457) (0.0451) (0.0442) (0.0440) (0.0443) 
lev -0.369*** -0.371*** -0.369*** -0.345*** -0.343*** -0.348*** 
 (0.0548) (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0610) 
fcf 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0690) (0.0690) (0.0689) 
size 0.000206 0.000184 0.000127 0.000588 0.000567 0.000573 
 (0.00282) (0.00280) (0.00283) (0.00295) (0.00294) (0.00292) 
nonsoe 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0456) 
net 0.0942***      
 (0.0284)      
onet  0.107***     
  (0.0337)     
onet_123   0.102**    
   (0.0356)    
onet_5    0.0766**   
    (0.0329)   
cnet     -0.00134  
     (0.0303)  
inet      0.0684*** 
      (0.0224) 
Constant 0.541*** 0.543*** 0.547*** 0.555*** 0.558*** 0.557*** 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) 
       
Observations 17,159 17,159 17,159 17,159 17,159 17,159 
Number of 
groups 
2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel F: Network structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ltlev ltlev stlev stlev payable payable 
       
dep -0.425*** -0.438*** 0.583*** 0.567***   
 (0.0972) (0.0979) (0.0776) (0.0800)   
growth 0.00360 0.00364 0.0249*** 0.0250*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00208) (0.00750) (0.00753) (0.00104) (0.00105) 
fr 0.0464*** 0.0444*** -0.0217 -0.0232 -0.0263*** -0.0284*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0177) (0.0181) (0.00772) (0.00827) 
prof -0.127*** -0.131*** -0.704*** -0.708*** -0.0660** -0.0683** 
 (0.0171) (0.0181) (0.111) (0.112) (0.0226) (0.0229) 
size -0.000120 -0.000100 0.00476*** 0.00476*** 0.000810* 0.000813* 
 (0.000425) (0.000420) (0.000568) (0.000569) (0.000432) (0.000433) 
fcf -0.000123*** -0.000123*** -7.49e-05** -7.48e-05**   
 (1.09e-05) (1.10e-05) (2.70e-05) (2.71e-05)   
nonsoe 0.0121*** 0.0123*** 0.0282** 0.0281** 0.00743*** 0.00746*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00341) (0.00974) (0.00966) (0.00175) (0.00176) 
net_degree 0.00771***  0.00964***  0.00735***  
 (0.00200)  (0.00319)  (0.00200)  
net_constraint  0.0103**  0.0172***  0.0111*** 
  (0.00367)  (0.00520)  (0.00325) 
lev     0.116*** 0.118*** 
     (0.0140) (0.0142) 
opcash     0.0679*** 0.0668*** 
     (0.00451) (0.00483) 
Constant 0.0656*** 0.0672*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.0361* 0.0366* 
 (0.00804) (0.00793) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0178) (0.0180) 
       
Observations 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,156 17,116 17,116 
Number of groups 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,141 2,131 2,131 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel F continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ccc ccc cash sufficiency cash sufficiency 
     
prof -349.4*** -342.1*** 1.112*** 1.104*** 
 (67.51) (68.74) (0.259) (0.260) 
lev 87.75*** 79.95*** -0.370*** -0.366*** 
 (11.58) (11.60) (0.0546) (0.0551) 
growth -83.84*** -83.64*** -0.0246 -0.0244 
 (17.63) (17.48) (0.0185) (0.0183) 
fcf 0.960 2.870 0.317*** 0.315*** 
 (9.705) (9.829) (0.0682) (0.0672) 
size -8.705*** -8.753*** 0.000275 0.000191 
 (2.652) (2.679) (0.00288) (0.00281) 
current_ratio 24.00*** 23.54***   
 (5.210) (5.306)   
nonsoe -41.60*** -41.80*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 
 (9.206) (9.268) (0.0439) (0.0434) 
net_degree -29.51***  0.0473***  
 (6.741)  (0.0156)  
net_constraint  -46.77***  0.0979*** 
  (11.10)  (0.0294) 
fr   -0.131** -0.137** 
   (0.0462) (0.0458) 
Constant 351.8*** 354.9*** 0.543*** 0.542*** 
 (63.48) (63.85) (0.110) (0.109) 
     
Observations 16,567 16,567 17,159 17,159 
Number of groups 2,125 2,125 2,141 2,141 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 4 Managing business networks: the role of concentrated ownership 
4.1 Introduction 
The influence and reach of various business networks has been considerable in the 
emerging economies, including those where the institutional environment is improving (Ma 
et al., 2006; Guest & Sutherland, 2010). Study of the performance of business networks has 
surged in the past decades, particularly in emerging economies (Carney et al., 2011; Lee et 
al., 2008; Ramaswamy et al., 2012). An examination of the performance of network affiliated 
firms could, among other things, contribute to the understanding of economic achievements 
in the emerging countries, including China.  
However, there remains ambiguity about the advantages of business networks (Keister, 
2000; Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016). The link between networks and firm performance has 
attracted interest from scholars in the fields of organization and strategy (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Carney et al., 2009). Different explanations have been 
developed for the existence and prominence of business networks, which indicate their 
benefits. The literature has identified both the advantages and liabilities of business 
networks. We have outlined some of these in Chapter 1 and we provide more detail here to 
illustrate the tension between the costs and benefits.  
On the one hand, numerous studies (e.g. Markoczy et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; 
Guest & Sutherland, 2010) have reported the positive effects of joining various business 
networks. Business networks can fill the institutional voids caused by the absence of 
supportive institutions for business activities in many parts of the world (Leff, 1978; Goto, 
1982). Moreover, business networks can help firms to reduce transaction costs by 
internalizing market transactions (Chang, 2006; Bugador, 2015). Furthermore, both the 
resource-based view (Penrose, 1995) and the entrepreneurial process view (Iacobucci & 
Rosa, 2005; Lechner & Leyronas, 2009) suggest that business networks help firms to 
expand their access to external resources by establishing sharing platforms among member 
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firms, thereby enabling firms to achieve growth. Colli et al. (2016) argue that business 
networks, if not the only way to grow, are at least the easiest way to reach a reasonable 
size. He et al. (2013) examine the effects of business groups’ affiliation on firm performance 
and find positive effects. Guest & Sutherland (2010) also indicate that firms in business 
groups perform better in terms of profitability when compared to isolated firms. 
On the other hand, business networks also have limitations that negatively affect 
affiliated firms. Isobe et al. (2006) argue that affiliates may feel individual repercussions from 
membership of a business group with liabilities. For example, a business group’s bad 
reputation is a liability for its affiliated members, and their performance will be impaired 
rather than improved. Research from the political economy perspective suggests that firms 
form networks in order to obtain favorable treatment from the power structure, which will 
pose a barrier to the operation of competitive forces in allocating resources efficiently 
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Moreover, even though internal lending among member firms 
may mitigate pressure on group affiliates’ cash flow, it is also a major source of endless 
“triangle debts” and will in the long run have an adverse impact on the performance of 
affiliates (Peng & Luo, 2000). Furthermore, the complexity of the ownership structure in 
conglomerate type business groups presents them with significant governance challenges, 
and thus additional costs (Gaur & Kumar, 2009). Singh & Gaur (2009) examined the effects 
of business group affiliation on firm performance in China and India, and found that group 
affiliates perform worse than free-standing firms. Dong et al. (2013) also investigate the 
effects of business ties in cultivating marketing channels in China and found negative 
impacts. Ma et al. (2006) found that as institutional environments improved in China, there 
were negative impacts from business group affiliation on firm performance.  
This finding is further supported by Carney et al. (2009) who that found that the positive 
effects of business groups on firm performance decrease over time as the institutional 
environment improves.  
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In the literature both the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between networks and financial performance are mixed. The effect of affiliation 
on performance remains an open question that deserves additional investigation. In this 
study, we investigate the role of business networks on firm performance by considering the 
effects of the management fee ratio. We argue that previous studies have under-estimate 
the costs of business networks, which may be less reliable. Firms must invest time and 
money in order to develop and maintain network connections, and this process generates 
management costs for them. By examining the effects of business networks on firms’ 
management costs we can open a new channel of explanation for the relationship between 
network affiliation and firm performance, thereby adding to the literature. 
Aside from the consequences of affiliation, little research has been done to examine 
the strategies of network affiliates (Carney et al., 2011). There is therefore little evidence as 
to whether strategizing can affect the relationship between affiliation and financial 
performance. In this study, we expect to add to the literature by examining the effects of 
corporate governance on the relationship between business networks and firm performance. 
Corporate governance has become an increasingly important issue for scholars and 
managers all over the world in a context of increasing integration of global economies (Singh 
& Gaur, 2009). In emerging economies where the institutional environment is improving, 
business network affiliation provides firms with valuable governance options because they 
are associated with superior information processing and flexible monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 
1999). However, business network affiliation also could impair firms’ independence since 
firms in networks may need to sacrifice their own self-interest for the common good.  
Corporate governance, based on agency theory, has mainly focused on conflicts 
between shareholders and managers (Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). The prominence of 
business networks in the emerging economies has provided new empirical questions for 
corporate governance (Singh & Gaur, 2009). Moreover, the complex governance structure 
183 
 
of firms in business networks challenges the principal-agent conflicts that are traditional in 
the developed economies since in the emerging economies principal-principal conflicts are 
much more common among firms. Studies of corporate governance have facilitated our 
understanding of firm performance (e.g. Singh & Gaur, 2009). We argue that in emerging 
economies corporate governance is an important factor in the relationship between 
business networks and firm performance. In this study, we investigate one aspect of firm 
governance; namely, concentrated ownership. By examining how within-firm governance 
affects the relationship between business networks and firm performance, we expect to 
contribute to the literature on corporate governance by providing more comprehensive 
empirical findings and theoretical foundations.  
Furthermore, we propose a new approach to defining business networks using related 
relations. The relations are widely seen in the marketplace. Using this definition, we can 
gain a more generalized understanding of the consequences of business networks on firms’ 
performance in terms of profitability. Moreover, our approach to constructing business 
networks includes relatively comprehensive relations comprising relations from ownership, 
relations from collaboration, and relations from key individuals. This rich variety of relations 
provides us with valuable opportunities for examining the role of different relations on firm 
performance. In doing so, we expect to add a more holistic understanding to the literature 
on business networks.  
Some studies have empirically investigated firm performance implications of business 
networks in China. We argue that the data used in prior studies are constrained. Studies 
that heavily rely on surveys tend to have a small sample size of around 300 firms, while the 
use of seven-point Likert scales may lead to a lack of objectivity by its reliance on 
interviewees’ assessment of their personal feelings (e.g. Lee & Jin, 2009; Wu, 2015). 
Moreover, previous studies normally investigate business networks in China limited to 
specific sectors, such as the manufacturing industry (e.g. Wu, 2015; Carney et al., 2009). 
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Furthermore, most studies statically investigate networks without taking into account the 
dynamics of these networks (e.g. Li et al., 2014; Wang, 2008). Unlike these studies, we rely 
on panel data spanning relatively extended periods of time and systematically investigating 
business networks in China.  We believe that our data are valuable in complementing the 
understanding about the network economy in the country since our results, unrestrained by 
the shortcomings of previous studies, can therefore be generalized to reveal an 
understanding of the relationship between business networks and firm performance in the 
national economy. By having a panel data from 1997 to 2011 of listed companies in China, 
we construct a relatively representative sample. We believe that our results are more 
trustworthy and convincing. 
The following sections of the study are organized as follows: the next two sections 
outline the background and hypothesis development; the research design follow; after that, 
we demonstrate the results; and finally, we present the discussion and conclusion. 
 
4.2 Background 
China has attracted wide attention for its rapid economic development. It is special as 
it is a transition economy as well as a transition economy (Peng et al., 2008). Like many 
other emerging economies, China’s institutional environment is relatively weak and is 
characterized by ill-functioning markets (Ma et al., 2006). As suggested by Li (2013) the 
dominant governance system in China is still relation-based even though it is making efforts 
to transition to rule-based governance. As an emerging economy, its institutional 
infrastructures are imperfect in that they cannot provide consistent and sufficient protection 
for business activities (Jia & Wang, 2013). Governments often implement policies for 
specific regions and industries; and they tailor policies towards firms of specific size or type 
of ownership (Child & Tse, 2001). According to Allen et al. (2005), the overall level of investor 
protection in mainland China is among the worst in the world. Poor investor protection 
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increases the cost of arms-length contracting and market monitoring. Business networks 
have widely emerged among firms and help them to reduce the transaction costs and 
uncertainty associated with the market (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). Various business networks 
are promoted, including the National Trial Groups established in 1991 and 1997, which are 
known as ‘National Team’ (Nolan, 2001). We argue that an important feature of China’s 
economy is that various business networks are present in economic activities. An 
understanding of business networks and financial performance relationship is therefore 
crucial for understanding the economy. 
China has continuously worked on improving its corporate governance standards since 
good corporate governance practices are essential for the development of a market-based 
economy and prosperous society (Singh & Gaur, 2009). China’s government has 
implemented numerous laws and regulations during its economic reform. The first step was 
the Company Law in 1993, further modified in 1999. In 1998, the Securities Law was 
enacted to regulate the stock markets in China. However, even with these laws, China was 
still faced with several corporate scandals. In order to further regulate listed companies and 
establish more advanced corporate governance standards, the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies was issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. Despite this, China continued to rank very low in several corporate 
governance rankings. For example, a report by the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (Gill & Allen, 2007) has ranked China at the bottom of 11 Asian Markets. 
Evidence shows that China is nowhere near the western economies in terms of its corporate 
governance standards. We argue that business networks affiliation in an emerging economy 
is also a governance mechanism as it is associated with superior information processing 
and flexible monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). In this chapter, we expect to elaborate the 
performance effects and management cost effects of network affiliation, along with firm level 
governance mechanism-concentrated ownership. 
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4.3 Theory and hypotheses 
4.3.1 Business network and firm performance 
Business networks are particularly popular in emerging markets where the institutional 
environment is developing. The conduct and performances of firms can be more fully 
understood by investigating the networks of relationships in which the firms are embedded 
(Gulati et al., 2000). However, the impacts of business networks on corporate performance 
are mixed in the literature (He et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2006; Carney et al., 2009; Singh & 
Gaur, 2009; Guest & Sutherland, 2010; Ren et al., 2009). Previous studies employ relatively 
old data and short panel data which may constrain the representativeness of the results. 
Moreover, prior studies have focused on either the advantages of business networks or the 
disadvantages of business networks. A study that balances the two aspects and investigates 
the net effects of business networks is therefore necessary. Furthermore, there has been 
limited academic focus on the management cost of business network affiliation and how 
such costs would affect firm performance. In order to examine the effects of business 
networks on firm performance, we first investigate the theoretical foundation that attempts 
to explain the presence of various business networks. 
Scholars have proposed several explanations for the prevalence of business networks. 
These include the resource-based view (Lee & Jin, 2009; Ren et al., 2009), market-based 
view (Leff, 1978; Goto, 1982), institutional voids perspecitve (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000), 
transaction cost view (Bugador, 2015), entrepreneurial process view (Lacobucci & Rosa, 
2005; Lechner & Leyronas, 2009), and state activism view (Lee, 2006).Within these 
theoretical frameworks, the resource-based view and institutional perspective dominate.  
As the resource-based view (Penrose, 1995) suggests, firms need to utilize their 
available ‘resources’ profitably. Such a view posits that the growth of the firm is based on 
the internal resources available to it. Firms therefore affiliate into business networks to 
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expand their access to the resources that are owned by other network members. Thus, 
business networks provide mechanisms for firms to access otherwise scarce resources (He 
et al., 2013). Moreover, business networks are associated with better information processing 
(Achrol & Kotler, 1999) and firms in business networks can access and mobilize resources 
and information. These factors could help to enhance firm performance. Furthermore, a firm 
can benefit from the reputational capital of the business network (Peng et al., 2005) which 
could help the focal firm to achieve sustained superior performance (Barney, 1991). 
However, such benefits can be mitigated by other factors. For example, even though 
business network affiliation can help firms to generate greater access to credit, it also brings 
about a debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977). A high debt ratio could induce operational 
risks for firms. Moreover, even though inter-firm lending could mitigate firms’ cash flow 
pressure, it is also a source of the endless “triangle debts” which would negatively affect 
firm performance (Peng & Luo, 2000). Firms affiliated into business networks would also be 
tainted by the liabilities of that network (Isobe et al., 2006). For example, a firm’s 
performance would deteriorate if it belongs to a business network with a bad reputation 
(Chang & Hong, 2000). Many scholars have argued that the potential advantages of 
business networks affiliation are often not realized for a firm because of the various offsetting 
costs of affiliation (Claessens et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Carney et al., 2011). 
An institutional perspective of business networks suggests that the prevalence of 
business networks is due to institutional voids and state activism (Singh & Gaur, 2009). Thus, 
business networks could help firms to overcome the problems that arise due to inadequate 
institutional support, particularly in the emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000). 
By filling the institutional voids, business networks help firms to access information, 
resources, markets, and technologies (Singh & Gaur, 2009). Moreover, business networks 
in emerging economies help firms to obtain benefits through the network’s connection to 
government, and these benefits are not easily secured by free-standing firms (Singh & Gaur, 
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2009). However, such benefits primarily arise due to the context and are heavily reliant on 
the extent of the inefficiencies in the external governance environment (Singh & Gaur, 2009). 
As institutions develop to support market-based transactions, these benefits would 
decrease and, indeed, studies have shown that the benefits of business networks decrease 
as the institutional environment is improved (Gaur & Delios, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2005). 
In recent years, there has been considerable improvement in the governance standards and 
institutional environment in the emerging economies (Gaur, 2007), which partially fills the 
institutional voids.  
Moreover, even though business network affiliation fills institutional voids and helps 
firms to generate resources, the interdependence between the networks’ affiliates poses 
challenges for governance, and consequently increases the costs of affiliation (Gaur & 
Kumar, 2009). First, firms in business networks are less likely to act independently and their 
decision-making is subject to reactions from other network members (Gadde et al., 2003). 
This will increase firms’ management cost, which will harm firms’ performance. Moreover, 
firms in business groups could have principle-principle agency problems; these arise due to 
the conflict between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. Such 
problems could result in resource misallocation, which is detrimental to firm performance. 
Furthermore, related party transactions between network members could result in tunneling 
resources from one firm to another (Bertrand et al., 2002). Finally, firms may need to support 
unprofitable firms in business networks simply in order to sustain their own operations 
(Goplan et al., 2007) and the otherwise profitable firm will be negatively affected by the 
adverse spillovers of other member firms (He et al., 2013). This will negatively affect firms’ 
performance. Looking at the benefits and costs of business networks, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Business networks affiliation negatively affect firms’ performance with regard to 
profitability. 
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4.3.2 Business network and management cost 
Even though business networks are associated with superior information processing 
and flexible monitoring (Achrol & Kotler, 1999), affiliation into business network also bears 
costs that may affect business operations. Prior studies have investigated many factors that 
may influence the relationship between network affiliation and firm performance, such as 
institutional factors (Ma et al., 2006; Carney et al., 2009) and industrial factors (Purkayastha 
& Lahiri, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between business network 
affiliation and firms’ management cost is not directly examined in the literature. In this section, 
we demonstrate the relationship between business network affiliation and firms’ 
management costs. By doing so, we expect to contribute to the literature about how network 
affiliation affects firm performance.  
Business network affiliation means that firms establish relationships with other firms. 
Building these relationships incurs expense. Moreover, once the relationships have been 
forged, firms need to maintain them and this means that they will need to continue to spend 
time and money. For example, firms affiliated into industrial associations need to pay 
association fees and attend the organized activities to keep themselves involved. If they fail 
to do so, the relationship could be broken. Nine out of ten “bridge” relationships disappear 
in a year (Burt, 2002). Studies (Uzzi, 1997) have suggested that the increasing cost of 
maintaining relationships would become a financial burden for firms.  
Furthermore, business network affiliation brings challenges for independence (Ma et 
al., 2006; Singh & Gaur, 2009). Firms in business networks may need to sacrifice self-
interest to satisfy the joint stake of business networks. The governance system of business 
networks is a set of norms and rules developed through interactions (Jia & Wang, 2013). 
Such norms and rules are not necessarily more efficient for the individual firms in the market. 
Firms in business networks are interdependent (Hakansson & Ford, 2002) and this 
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interdependence means that firms have limited capability to act, or even to develop their 
own independent strategy (Gadde et al., 2003). Having to take into account the reactions of 
the other network members will influence the decision-making of the affiliated firm. As a 
result, focal firms’ management cost is affected.  
Thereby, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Business network affiliation would be positively related to management cost ratio. 
 
4.3.3 Nature of business networks 
There are different types of business networks that depend on the relationship defined 
between firms. As mentioned in chapter 2, the definition in previous studies of business 
networks using state ties comes generally from 3 dimensions. These are: relations from 
ownership; relations from collaboration; and relations from key individuals. We argue that 
different networks are associated with different strengths of control, which will differentiate 
the effects of business networks. Business groups, which are a typical kind of business 
network defined through ownership, are very popular in emerging economies. Business 
groups normally have very complex ownership structures (Singh & Gaur, 2009) which may 
lead to governance problems. Such governance problems will incur agency cost and could 
result in tunneling activities. Such problems will affect firms’ management cost and hence 
negatively influence firms’ performance. As a result, we expect that firms in ownership 
networks experience higher management cost and perform worse than isolated firms. 
Moreover, in this study we further divide ownership networks into networks derived from 
control relations and networks derived from significant influence relations. As control 
relations are stronger than significant influence in influencing firms’ governance, we say that 
network effects on firms’ profitability are stronger in networks from control relations.  
However, we do not expect to see different network effects on firms’ management cost for 
relations from control and relations from significant influence as both these relations 
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introduce governance cost. 
Regarding business networks defined through collaboration, alliance networks are 
typical examples. These networks are looser than networks based on ownership since the 
relations linking the firms are more ephemeral. However, firms in alliance networks still need 
to consider their alliance partners’ interest when they are making decisions. This will affect 
firms’ independence, which will influence firms’ operational competence. Many firms face 
operational problems after forming alliances with other firms. Evidence shows that over 50% 
of alliance networks are in trouble in 2 years, and the majority of alliance networks disband 
within 3 years (Wu & Lou, 2010; Zhang & Cao, 2004). Consequently, firms in these networks 
have governance problems that will affect firms’ management cost and firm performance. 
We expect that firms in collaboration networks have higher management cost and hence 
worse performance. 
Regarding business networks via key individuals, a typical example of this would be 
business networks formed by interlocking directors. In this case, two firms are connected 
because the key individual has roles in both organizations. The individual that connects two 
firms acts as a bridge for these firms, enabling them to share and mobilize information and 
resources. However, such connections are also weak since the individual may leave the 
organization at any time. Nevertheless even these weak connections will bridge non-
redundant information and resources (Granovetter, 1973). Compared to ownership relations 
and collaboration relations, individual relations are mainly personal behaviors that may be 
less likely to affect firms’ management cost and firm performance. It is not expected that 
firms in individual networks will have better management cost and performance. Therefore, 
we formulate the following hypotheses. 
H3a: Business networks defined via ownership negatively affect firms’ profitability. 
H3b: Business networks defined via ownership are positively related to firms’ 
management cost. 
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H3c: In ownership networks, networks from control relations show a stronger effect 
than networks from significant influence relations on firms’ profitability. 
H3d: Business networks defined via collaboration negatively affect firms’ profitability. 
H3e: Business networks defined via collaboration are positively related to firms’ 
management cost. 
H3f: Business networks defined via key individuals do not affect firms’ performance 
H3g: Business networks defined via key individuals do not affect firms’ management 
cost. 
 
4.3.4 Corporate governance issue-concentrated ownership 
While studies abound that investigate the role of business network affiliation in firm 
performance, there has been limited academic focus on how firm strategy influences the 
relationship between network affiliation and firm performance (Carney et al., 2011). As 
business networks have both positive and negative effects, it is to be expected that different 
firm strategies could produce different effects in promoting the benefits and alleviating the 
costs of business networks. In this study, we investigate the role of concentrated ownership, 
an aspect of corporate governance, in generating network effects. 
Concentrated ownership within firms means that firms are owned and monitored by one 
or more of their large shareholders (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Concentrated ownership has 
attracted wide attention (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The literature on concentrated ownership 
is very much based on agency theory (Varma, 1997). Several advantages of ownership 
concentration have been outlined in previous studies. First, ownership concentration can 
help firms to alleviate agency problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) suggest that 
concentrated ownership empowers large shareholders with the rights, means, and 
incentives to monitor their firms. In firms with concentrated ownership, owners are able to 
monitor managers and take action to protect the firm’s interests, and even to take outright 
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control of the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Demsetz (1983, 1986) also indicates that the 
existence of concentrated ownership is primarily due to the degree of control and oversight 
that it brings. Furthermore, concentrated ownership brings efficient and fast decision-making 
(Carney, 2005). In the changing environment that is typical of emerging economies, efficient 
decision-making will contribute to the competitive advantage of the firm. Moreover, 
ownership concentration will encourage owners to be actively involved in their firms’ 
operations even if it is only to protect their own interests (Gaur, 2007). In this case, owners 
will actively bring their own political and social capital to help firms to access materials, 
finance, and the market (Singh & Gaur, 2009). 
However, concentrated ownership also causes problems. As LaPorta et al. (1999) point 
out, owners with a high ownership concentration actually control their firms and these 
controlling shareholders may exploit the minority shareholders. Bertrand et al. (2002) 
suggest that high ownership concentration may empower large shareholders to exploit 
minority shareholders, and to pursue actions that are not always in the best interests of the 
firm. There are many ways in which controlling shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholders by using intercorporate loans, favorable transfer pricing for related parties, and 
the dilution of new shares (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Johnson et al. (2000) refer to such activities 
as tunneling. These tunneling activities are firm-destroying and negatively affect firms’ value 
(Bai et al., 2000). 
As we previously elaborated, even though business network affiliation can help firms in 
accessing resources, the liabilities of the business networks can lead to problems in 
operational independence and firm governance, and hence negatively affect firms’ 
profitability. Moreover, firms in business networks would experience higher management 
costs in their efforts to maintain network connections. It is interesting to investigate how firm 
governance in the context of concentrated ownership may affect the relationship between 
network affiliation, and firms’ management cost and profitability. Higher concentrated 
194 
 
ownership can mitigate agency problems and enable efficient decision making for firms but 
also introduce the risks of tunneling. Thus, the way in which concentrated ownership 
interacts with business networks, and consequently impacts on management cost and firm 
performance is a question for empirical study.  
Since high ownership concentration has both positive and negative effects, we argue 
that firms in business networks with high ownership concentration do not feel any additional 
effects on their profitability due to the cancelling-out effects of ownership-concentration 
benefits and liabilities. However, in collaboration networks, the agency problems are severe, 
as described in 4.3.3. The links between firms are loose and the degree of monitoring and 
governance in these networks is less efficient and effective when compared with those in 
ownership networks. We therefore expect to see that firms in collaboration networks with 
high ownership concentration would have greater opportunities to conduct tunneling 
activities, which will destroy firm value. Consequently, we expect to see that firms with high 
concentrated ownership in collaboration networks will have additional negative effects on 
their performance. 
As regards firms’ management cost, we expect that ownership concentration has 
mediating effects on the relationship between business networks and firms’ management 
cost. As ownership concentration introduces higher opportunities for tunneling, firms need 
to maintain firm value by managing the potential risk. The literature also documents that 
firms in networks tend to avoid expropriation by using higher levels of leverage (Paligorova 
& Xu, 2012). We argue that firms’ high ownership concentration in business networks is 
associated with higher management cost in order to manage the potential negative effects.  
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Firms’ with high ownership concentration in business networks are less 
profitable than those not. 
H4b: Firms’ with high ownership concentration in business networks experience 
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higher management cost. 
 
4.3.5 The effects of network structure 
As we elaborated in 3.3.7, network structure is significantly influential on network effects. 
Network centrality and tightness are important factors determining the effects of networks 
on affiliated firms. Previous studies (Chen & Xie, 2011; Ahuja, 2000; Phelps et al., 2012) 
have outlined the benefits of central position. However, we argue that these findings are 
based on the precondition that business networks invariably help firms to achieve superior 
profitability. These studies have largely ignored the cost of networks. As we mentioned 
above, network benefits are often not realized due to various offsetting costs. The negative 
effects of business networks often dominate business performance overall.  Firms in central 
position are well connected to the other firms in the network. Such central firms will therefore 
have more severe governance problems and will need to invest more heavily in their 
networks since they need to properly manage their connections and act as an intermediary 
in information and resource mobilizations. Moreover, as firms in networks are influenced by 
adverse spillovers, firms in a central position will feel the concentrated force of these 
negative effects.  As a result, we expect that central firms in networks are more likely to be 
negatively affected. 
In terms of structural holes, studies have indicated that there are benefits of affiliating 
to sparse networks with disconnected partners (Burt, 2005; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Firms 
with more structural holes are argued to have greater opportunities for acquiring novel 
information and for entering into power bargains with other network members, thereby 
providing firms with superior capability for performing well. Firms in networks with more 
structural holes can hold bridging positions, which enable them to have superior bargaining 
power. Given this increase in bargaining power, we argue that such firms are more likely to 
perform better and experience lower management cost than those not in loose networks.  
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Thereby, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H5a: A central network position is negatively related to profitability for the focal firm. 
H5b: Firms in networks with more structural holes perform better than those not. 
H5c: Firms centrally positioned in business networks experience higher management 
costs. 
H5d: Firms in networks with more structural holes experience reduced management 
costs. 
 
4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Data  
This study investigates the role of business networks and concentrated ownership in 
firm profitability and firms’ management costs, using firms in China as empirical evidence. 
The data employed in this study are from CSMAR database issued by GTA (Guo Tai An) 
Research Service Centre. CSMAR data are reliable and widely used in research about 
China’s listed companies (e.g. Chen et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014; 
Berkman et al., 2014). We use listed company related party information data and listed 
company related party transaction data to construct business networks via related parties. 
Listed company financial indicator data are used to identify key characteristics of listed firms 
and financial data. Listed company corporate governance data provide information on firm 
governance structures. By merging these data, a complete dataset for this study is 
generated, which spans from 1999 to 2011. After dropping missing values, we have 16,333 
total observations. 
Business networks are constructed using Pajek software based on the 11 types of 
relations discussed in chapter 2. Three types of sub-networks are established according to 
the classification of 11 relations, which are ownership networks, collaboration networks, and 
individual networks. Ownership networks are further differentiated by the strength of 
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influence into networks from control relations and networks from significant influence 
relations. 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive analysis and summary statistics of the main financial 
variables and network variables used in this study. The statistics suggest that firms sampled 
have 4% profit on average and 12% management fees. The results show that in China the 
listed firms’ 5 largest shareholders own, on average, over half of the firm. Compared to 
ownership concentration in the United States and many other developed economies, 
ownership is more highly concentrated in China (Jiang & Kim, 2015; LaPorta et al., 1998). 
In China, high ownership concentration can potentially reflect good governance outcomes, 
which is similar to the findings obtained in western developed economies (Singh & Gaur, 
2009). The growth rate is 16%, which is consistent with China’s rapid economy growth. 
Regarding network variables, the results indicate that on average 32% of listed companies 
are affiliated into business networks via related parties, which is a lower figure than that 
found in prior studies. We believe that this is to be expected since our definition of business 
networks is stronger than in previous studies because we have excluded many connections 
that are relatively weak. The correlation analysis in Panel B suggests that network affiliation 
is negatively related to firm performance. 
 
<Table 4.1 inserted here> 
 
4.4.2 Model specification 
This study follows the model of Greenaway et al. (2014) to examine the impacts of 
business networks on firm performance.  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡         (1)  
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This study employs profitability as a performance indicator. We use the ratio of 
operating profit to total assets as a proxy for profitability. Different network indicators are 
individually added into the model to investigate the respective role of different networks. 𝑣𝑖 
is firm fixed effects. Size, leverage ratio, fixed asset ratio, growth, and management fee ratio 
are used as control variables. Size takes account of the fact that larger firms may have 
better access to external finance and benefit from economies of scale, which can facilitate 
firms’ performance. The leverage ratio, which measures the firms’ debt problem, is expected 
to have a negative impact. Fixed asset ratio is expected to negatively affect firm 
performance because firms with more intangible assets tend to have more investment 
opportunities and grow faster (Tian and Estrin, 2008). SOE is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the ultimate controller is an SOE. This variable is expected to affect firm 
performance negatively since SOEs are associated with governance problems (Driffield and 
Du, 2007). Management fee ratio is expected to be negatively related to firms’ performance. 
Growth is the annual percentage change in total sales; it is expected to be positively related 
to firm performance. Share5 is used in earlier studies and is the percentage of shares hold 
by the top 5 shareholders 
To investigate the impacts of business network affiliation on firms’ management cost, 
we formulate the following model. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝛼6𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼8𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                  (2) 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of the management fee to total revenue in year. It 
is a given variable in the database. Business network, ownership network, collaboration 
network, and individual network are individually added into the model to test the effects of 
different networks. Leverage in this specification is the ratio of liabilities to total assets. SOE 
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is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm is SOE dominated. Firm size is measured as 
the logarithm of total sales; asset structure is measured as fixed assets scaled by total 
assets; and growth is measured as the percentage change in total assets. Firm size 
captures the fact that larger firms can reap the benefits of economies of scale. It is expected 
to be negatively related to management cost ratio. Leverage captures debt problems and 
may be supposed to be positively related to management fee ratio. Asset structure is 
projected to be positively related to management fee ratio since more fixed assets require 
higher management cost. Growth is argued to be positively related to management fee ratio 
since firms that are expanding incur more management cost. Share5 is the percentage of 
shares held by top 5 shareholders,  which is consistent with the measure used by Jiang & 
Kim (2015). 
In order to test the contingency effects of ownership concentration on the impacts of 
business network affiliation with regards to firms’ management cost and profitability, we add 
interaction terms of business network affiliation and concentrated ownership to the above 
models. To test the effects of network structure, we individually drop centrality and structural 
hole measures into the variable net in the above baseline models. In this study, all the 
models are estimated using firm fixed effects 8  to control for firm-level time-invariable 
unobservable factors that may cause potential endogeneity. The approach is widely used in 
the literature that examines network effects (He et al., 2013; Byun et al., 2013). 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Business network and firm performance 
In this section, we investigate the impact of business network affiliation on firms’ 
profitability. Table 4.2 reports the empirical results for equation 1. Leverage is found to be 
                                                             
8 In stata, it is operated by reghdfe, clustered in firms and years. 
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negatively related to performance, which is to be expected because of the overhanging 
debts problems (Myers, 1977). The fixed ratio is negatively related to performance, which 
confirms that firms with more non-fixed assets tend to grow faster and have more investment 
opportunities (Tian & Estrin, 2008). Management fee ratio is negatively related to 
performance in our models meaning that firms with high operational capability are more 
profitable than others. The dummy variable SOE is also negatively related to firm 
performance, which is expected since SOEs are associated with severe governance 
problems. Growth is positively related to firm performance, suggesting that firms with higher 
growth opportunities are generally more profitable. Regarding firm size, this is also positively 
related to firm performance, indicating that large firms benefitting from economies of scale 
are more profitable. 
 
<Table 4.2 inserted here> 
 
In terms of the area of interest of this study, we find that business network affiliation 
generally negatively affects firm performance. Our results are consistent with Ma et al. (2006) 
and Singh & Guar (2009). The coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level. This means 
that even though business network affiliation enables firms to access information and 
resources, there are associated costs, such as governance problems, which will mitigate 
the benefits. As the institutional environments improve, the benefits of business networks 
decrease. H1 is gently supported. 
In order to examine H3, we further investigate the impacts of ownership networks, 
collaboration networks, and individual networks. Evidence shows that ownership network 
affiliation is negatively related to firms’ profitability. The coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%. The regression coefficients also show that network effects are more 
pronounced among networks from control relations, which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
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Thus, H3a and H3c are supported. However, we do not find evidence concerning the 
relationship between firm performance and affiliation to collaboration or individual networks. 
Thereby, we fail to provide evidence of hypothesis 3d while confirms hypothesis 3f. As 
individual networks are informal networks arising from key individuals having roles in more 
than one company, the personal behaviour of the individuals may be less significant in 
influencing firms’ performance.  
Moreover, we investigate the interaction effects of business network affiliation and 
concentrated ownership on firms’ profitability. In general, concentrated ownership helps to 
reduce agency cost and enables efficient decision making, thereby enhancing firm 
performance.  The coefficients of share5 are statistically significantly positive at 1% 
significance level. Based on data availability and the precedents in the literature on 
measuring ownership concentration, we use the percentage of shares held by the top 5 
shareholders as our measurement of ownership concentration. The interaction term of 
business network affiliation and concentrated ownership shows a poorly determined 
coefficient.  In terms of different networks, the interaction term of collaboration network 
affiliation and ownership concentration is negatively related to firms’ profitability, which is 
expected as hypothsis 4a. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. We argue that concentrated ownership has enhanced the probability of 
expropriation, which is a major concern in business networks (Paligorova & Xu, 2012). 
However, we do not find evidence that firms in ownership and individual networks with high 
concentrated ownership have compounding effects.  
 
4.5.2 Business networks and management cost ratio 
By using the ratio of the management fee to total revenue, we are able to proxy for 
firms’ management cost. Table 4.3 gives the results for the impacts of business network 
affiliation on firms’ management cost which is equation 2. Firm size is found to be negatively 
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related to the ratio of the management fee to total revenue. This means that large firms 
benefit from economies of scale; lower management costs mean that they have better 
operational competencies. Leverage, being the ratio of liabilities to total assets, is positively 
related to management fee’s ratio. This means that firms with high leverage need to spend 
more to manage these liabilities. For example, firms require more expenditure when 
managing their relationship with creditors. Fixed ratio is found to be negatively related to 
management cost. This means that firms with more fixed assets generally spend less in 
management costs. Growth is found to be negatively related to the management fee ratio 
meaning that firms with a high growth rate spend less in management cost. SOE dummy is 
not significant in our specifications. Share5 shows a significant negative effect on firms’ 
management cost, evidencing that ownership concentration enables fast and efficient 
decision making, which reduces management cost. 
 
<Table 4.3 inserted here> 
 
In terms of the network variables, business networks affiliation is positively related to 
the management fee’s ratio. The coefficient is statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
This generally means that firms that are affiliated into business networks need to invest 
more in management fees to establish and maintain their network relationships. Our 
hypothesis 2 is therefore supported.  
In order to test H3, we further investigate the role of different business networks in firms’ 
management cost. The results suggest that affiliation to ownership business networks and 
collaboration networks is positively related to management fees. The coefficients are both 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. This means that firms in ownership networks 
and collaboration networks generally need to invest more to manage their network 
connections. However, we do not find evidence that firms in individual networks incur greater 
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management costs. We argue that this could be potentially attributable to the nature of these 
networks. Business networks established via ownership and collaboration are formal inter-
organizational networks that requirement managerial investment from affiliated firms. 
Individual networks on the other hand are relatively informal networks formed through social 
interactions. Such interactions are mainly derived from the individual’s personal behavior 
that may be less likely to affect firms’ management cost. 
Moreover, we examine the contingent value of concentrated ownership. We argue that 
the relationship between business network affiliation and firms’ management cost is 
contingent on concentrated ownership; this is because ownership concentration may 
empower firms with rights and the power to expropriate. The results in the table suggest that 
the two-way interaction terms between general networks, ownership networks affiliation, 
and concentrated ownership are positively related to firms’ management fee ratio. The 
coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. Generally, the results indicate that firms in 
networks with high ownership concentration do in fact experience higher management cost.  
These results are consistent in ownership networks and are, we argue, driven by the 
potential expropriation that ownership concentration brings. Firms tend to monitor these 
behaviors to avoid value destroying effects. To control for these negative effects, firms need 
to spend more by way of management costs to minimize the risks. As described in the 
hypotheses development section, we find no other significant results for collaboration 
networks and individual networks. 
 
4.5.3 The effects of network structure 
In order to capture the effects of network structure, we further investigate the role of 
network centrality and network tightness on firms’ profitability and management cost. Table 
4.4 reports the estimation results. Generally, control variables generate sensible results that 
are consistent with those in the main regression. 
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<Table 4.4 inserted here> 
 
Turning to the variables of interest for this study, centrality shows a statistically 
significantly negative relationship with profitability, and a statistically significantly positive 
relationship with firms’ management cost. These coefficients are significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that firms occupying a central position in business 
networks performs worse and experience higher management cost which are supportive for 
H5a and H5c. Even though our results contradict Chen & Xie (2011) and other studies that 
show a positive relationship between centrality and performance, we argue that our results 
are rational. As we described in our hypothesis development, firms in central network 
positions are well connected to other network members; this imposes additional governance 
challenges and such central firms must invest more heavily in the network in order to 
maintain their connectedness.  
By contrast, we find that structural holes are statistically positively related to firms’ 
profitability and negatively related to firms’ management cost. The results are statistically 
significant at 1% significance level. The results show that firms with more structural holes in 
their ego network structure generally perform better and experience reduced management 
cost which confirm our hypothesis 5b and 5d. Our study confirms the advantages of sparse 
networks with disconnected partners, as was suggested by Burt (1982, 1997, 2005). Firms 
are more likely to have increased bargaining power over connected partners due to their 
strong bridging position.  
 
4.5.4 Robustness checks 
In order to provide further confidence in our results, we use an alternative measure of 
profitability and concentrated ownership. Return on assets, a widely used accounting 
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measure of profitability, is used as a dependent variable in our robustness check. Table 4.5 
reports the estimation results. Control variables provide results that are consistent to those 
found in the main regression, which also provides comfort for our results. In terms of network 
affiliation, the results suggest that business network affiliation is significantly negatively 
related to firm performance in terms of ROA, which is again consistent with our main results. 
However, the results are insignificant. 
 
<Table 4.5 inserted here> 
 
Regarding the effects of different business networks. The results indicate that 
ownership networks are negatively related to firm performance, which is in line with our main 
regression results. Again, ownership networks derived from control relations show more 
prominent effects than do networks from significant influence relations. Collaboration 
networks and individual networks show poorly determined coefficients, suggesting that 
these networks are less significant in affecting firm performance. The interaction term 
between ownership network affiliation and concentrated ownership again shows a 
marginally positive relationship, suggesting that firms with high ownership concentration 
perform marginally better in ownership networks. This is reasonable since ownership 
networks are associated with strong ties that enable close monitoring of expropriating 
activities. Concentrated ownership in ownership networks could therefore contribute to 
reduced agency cost and fast decision making. The interaction term between collaboration 
networks and ownership concentration provides consistent results. Our results are robust 
using different measures of firm performance. 
Moreover, we use an alternative measure of concentrated ownership to test the 
mediating effects of ownership concentration. We use the aggregated shares held by the 
top 10 shareholders of the listed company to measure ownership concentration. This is 
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another widely used measure of ownership concentration. Table 4.5 displays the results. 
We suggest the results are consistent with our main regression results. Firms with highly 
concentrated ownership find that affiliating in business networks will help them to reduce 
management cost and enhance their performance.  Use of the different measure of 
ownership concentration provides confidence that our results are robust.  
Finally, as mentioned in chapter 3, our data suffers from cross-sectional dependence 
problems that may lead to biased statistical inference. The CD-test suggests there are 
strong cross-sectional correlations. Adopting the estimator referenced in chapter 3, we are 
able to control the effects and generate consistent results. Table 4.6 reports the estimation 
results. The results produce findings consistent to the main regression. Firms in business 
networks experience higher management costs and perform worse. Central network 
position is negatively related to firm performance and positively related to management cost 
while structural hole is positively related to firm performance and negatively related to 
management cost. 
 
<Table 4.6 inserted here> 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates the role of business networks in firms’ performance and 
management cost, with particular consideration being given to the impact of concentrated 
ownership and network structure. This study makes many contributions.  
First, while previous studies emphasize the benefits of business networks (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Chang & Hong, 2002; He et al., 2013; Byun et al., 2013), we investigate the 
cost of business network affiliation in terms of the management fee ratio. We find that 
business network affiliation is associated with significant costs incurred by developing and 
maintaining network connections, which lead to high management cost ratio. The high 
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management cost ratio could potentially result in weaker firm performance, particularly when 
the benefits of business networks decrease with improvements in the institutional 
environment (Singh & Gaur, 2009).  
Second, we contribute to the literature concerning the impacts of business networks on 
firm performance by providing a new approach to explain the relationship between business 
networks and firms’ performance. Given the improved institutional environment, the benefits 
of business networks are decreasing and the costs of business networks are amplified. 
Analysis of the effects of business networks on firms’ management costs helps us to 
approach an improved understanding of the relationship between business networks and 
firm performance in terms of profitability.  
Third, we also add to the literature on concentrated ownership. As the institutional 
environment is improving, the benefits of business networks are disappearing. How firm 
strategy affects the relationship between business networks and firm performance deserves 
additional investigation (Carney, 2011). By investigating the contingent value of ownership 
concentration on the relationship between business network affiliation and management 
cost ratio, as well as on firm performance, we find that firms with high concentrated 
ownership in business networks generally incur more management cost and perform worse. 
We have provided a new insight into the role of concentrated ownership on the impact of 
business networks.  
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature about networks by providing a new 
approach to constructing network connections. Understanding the relationship between 
business networks and firm performance using our definition produces more reliable results 
given that network effects are contextually sensitive (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Moreover, 
business networks defined through related parties covers relations from ownership, 
collaboration, and key individuals. It therefore provides valuable opportunities for exploiting 
the role of subnetworks. By investigating the role of different networks on firms’ management 
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costs and firm performance, we find that affiliation to ownership networks and collaboration 
networks is positively related to firm management cost, and negatively related to firm 
performance. This has contributed to the knowledge about the effects of the different types 
of business networks. 
Fifth, this study examines the role of network structure on firms’ profitability and 
management cost to provide a thorough understanding of business networks. We have 
suggested that maintaining a central network position is associated with higher 
management costs and lower firm profitability. Unlike previous studies that suggest a 
positive relationship between centrality and firm performance, we argue that a central 
position brings with it more governance problems, and is more likely to be affected by 
adverse spillover, which counteracts the benefits of increased access to information and 
resources. We also confirm the benefits of structural holes for firms’ performance. By 
examining the effects of network structure in a dynamic setting, we provide a more reliable 
understanding of networks.  
Empirically, we use a large and representative database of listed companies in China 
over a 15 year period to investigate the role of business networks’ affiliation on firms’ 
management cost and firm performance. Even though previous work has set out to study 
the impacts of business networks (Ma et al., 2006; Guest & Sutherland, 2010), the studies 
have relied on small datasets in relation to a single region of a country, and on relatively 
static data over one particular year or a short period. By using objective financial data 
covering a longitudinal timeframe, we provide robust empirical evidence that firms in 
business networks incur more management costs and are less profitable than non-affiliated 
firms. 
This study has several implications for managers and policymakers. First of all, firms 
need to consider not just the benefits to be gained from network affiliation but also its 
negative impacts. We have shown that business network affiliation is positively related to 
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management cost and negatively related to firm performance. In order to maintain the 
network connection, firms need to sustain their interactions in these networks, which costs 
them time and money. Firms may also need to sacrifice their independence to adhere to the 
interests of the network and firm governance may be affected. Consequently, firms in 
business networks are less profitable. Firms need to be aware of these costs and benefits 
when making the appropriate networking decisions. Additionally, managers of firms also 
need to be mindful of the fact that firm strategy is going to affect the relationship between 
network affiliation, management cost, and firm performance. In order to lower management 
cost and promote firm performance, firms could choose to reduce their ownership 
concentration to control for the potential for expropriation. Moreover, it is significant to know 
that not all networks carry the same degree of influence over management cost and firm 
performance. Different networks have different network effects; firms need to carefully 
choose the appropriate networks to fulfill their organizational goals. Furthermore, the 
structure of the network is an important factor to consider. Firms need to occupy a suitable 
network position and affiliate to the appropriate network structure to maximize the benefits 
of networks and avoid the costs.  
Further, this study raises implications for policymakers. As we have seen in China, the 
formation of business networks is an important issue for policy makers. Policy makers 
should be aware that in an improving institutional environment the benefits of business 
networks are decreasing and, thus, whether to continue to promote their development is a 
question that needs to be considered. 
In summary, this study investigates the impacts of concentrated ownership on firms’ 
performance and management costs in a network relationship context. Using China as the 
empirical setting, we model the impacts of business networks and estimate them using fixed 
effects. We also use robustness checks to provide extra security in our results. We find that 
business networks affiliation is overall negatively related to firm performance. Evidence 
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suggests that firms in business networks experience higher management cost. Among the 
three types of business networks, ownership networks and collaboration networks are found 
to have significant influence over firms’ management cost and performance. We find that 
central position is positively related to management cost and negatively related to 
profitability, while structural holes are positively related to firm performance and negatively 
related to management cost. Concentrated ownership imposes a mediating effect on the 
relationship between business networks, firm performance, and management cost. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive analysis and summary statistics of key variables in Chapter 4 
Panel A: summary 
Variable Definition Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
prof Ratio of Operating Profit to Total Assets 16333 0.0479  0.0525  
management Ratio of management fee to revenue 16333 0.1249  0.1395  
Network variables 
net Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is network affiliated 16333 0.3263  0.4689  
onet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is affiliated to ownership 
networks 16333 0.2822  0.4501  
cnet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is affiliated to collaboration 
networks 16333 0.0630  0.2430  
inet 
Dummy variable, =1 if the firms is affiliated to individual 
networks 16333 0.0391  0.1939  
net_degree Degree centrality, the number of direct contacts a firm has 16333 0.5382 0.8934 
net_constraint 
Constraint, the aggregate constraint a network has to the 
firm 16333 0.2962 0.4338 
Firm characteristics 
fr Fixed ratio, ratio of Fixed Asset to Total Assets 16333 0.2582  0.1740  
lev Leverage, ratio of liabilities to assets 16333 0.4700  0.1977  
size Logarithm of Sales 16333 20.6666  1.2924  
share5 Percentage of shares hold by top 5 shareholders 16333 54.5501  15.2268  
soe Indicator variable, =1 if the firms is controlled by soe 16333 0.6570  0.4747  
growth Growth Rate of Sales 16333 0.1666  0.3424  
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Panel B: Correlation analysis 
  prof manag~t net onet cnet inet fr Lev size share5 soe growth 
prof 1            
management -0.3602* 1           
net -0.0136 -0.0333* 1          
onet -0.0156* -0.0449* 0.9008* 1         
cnet 0.003 0.0089 0.3726* 0.2003* 1        
inet -0.0132 -0.0114 0.2900* 0.1654* 0.1322* 1       
fr 0.0004 -0.1000* -0.0382* -0.0262* -0.0398* -0.0132 1      
lev -0.3101* 0.0754* 0.0890* 0.0906* 0.0153 0.0645* 0.0229* 1     
size 0.2287* -0.4242* 0.2715* 0.2794* 0.1427* 0.0935* 0.0252* 0.1367* 1    
share5 0.1604* -0.1482* -0.0127 -0.0138 -0.0043 -0.0123 0.1091* -0.1343* 0.1091* 1   
soe -0.0356* -0.1025* 0.1345* 0.1389* 0.0271* 0.0121 0.1842* 0.0486* 0.1824* 0.1278* 1  
growth 0.2969* -0.2465* 0.0128 0.0116 0.0200* 0.0043 -0.0081 -0.0052 0.2038* 0.0888* 0.0004 1 
*suggests the correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 4.2: Business networks and firms’ profitability 
Note: These tables report estimation of firms’ profitability using firm fixed effects as in 
equation 1 in this chapter. In stata, it is operated by reghdfe and clustered by firms and years. 
Definitions of variables can be found in table 4.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES prof prof prof prof prof Prof 
       
size 0.00636*** 0.00637*** 0.00641*** 0.00641*** 0.00641*** 0.00641*** 
 (0.000349) (0.000349) (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.000349) (0.000349) 
lev -0.0765*** -0.0766*** -0.0765*** -0.0765*** -0.0765*** -0.0765*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00187) 
fr -0.0118*** -0.0119*** -0.0118*** -0.0119*** -0.0118*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
management -0.0845*** -0.0845*** -0.0844*** -0.0845*** -0.0845*** -0.0846*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) 
growth 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
soe -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.000814) (0.000814) (0.000814) (0.000814) (0.000815) (0.000815) 
share5 0.000206*** 0.000190*** 0.000206*** 0.000181*** 0.000206*** 0.000190*** 
 (2.47e-05) (3.01e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.91e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.88e-05) 
net -0.00208*** -0.00463     
 (0.000786) (0.00290)     
share5_net  4.71e-05     
  (5.14e-05)     
onet   -0.00280*** -0.00742**   
   (0.000821) (0.00300)   
share5_onet    8.55e-05   
    (5.34e-05)   
onet_123     -0.00288*** -0.00572** 
     (0.000842) (0.00280) 
share5_onet_123      5.25e-05 
      (4.92e-05) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2: Business networks and firms’ profitability continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES prof prof prof Prof prof Prof 
       
size 0.00620*** 0.00621*** 0.00627*** 0.00626*** 0.00622*** 0.00622*** 
 (0.000343) (0.000344) (0.000346) (0.000346) (0.000344) (0.000344) 
lev -0.0768*** -0.0768*** -0.0768*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00187) 
fr -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0117*** -0.0118*** -0.0116*** -0.0117*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
management -0.0848*** -0.0848*** -0.0845*** -0.0846*** -0.0847*** -0.0847*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) 
growth 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0298*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
soe -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.000808) (0.000808) (0.000807) (0.000807) (0.000807) (0.000807) 
share5 0.000207*** 0.000203*** 0.000206*** 0.000222*** 0.000207*** 0.000214*** 
 (2.47e-05) (2.50e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.55e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.52e-05) 
onet_5 0.000538 -0.00506     
 (0.00205) (0.00733)     
share5_onet_5  0.000105     
  (0.000133)     
cnet   -0.00235 0.0102*   
   (0.00145) (0.00540)   
share5_cnet    -0.000231**   
    (9.57e-05)   
inet     -0.00141 0.00864 
     (0.00178) (0.00682) 
share5_inet      -0.000188 
      (0.000123) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3: Business networks and firms’ management cost 
Note: These tables show estimation of management cost using firm fixed effects as in 
equation 2 in this chapter. It is operated by reghdfe in stata. Firms and years are clustered. 
Definitions of variables are available in table 4.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES management management management management management management 
       
size -0.0475*** -0.0474*** -0.0473*** -0.0473*** -0.0472*** -0.0472*** 
 (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000874) (0.000874) 
lev 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00502) 
fr -0.0423*** -0.0426*** -0.0429*** -0.0432*** -0.0430*** -0.0434*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) 
growth -0.0621*** -0.0621*** -0.0622*** -0.0622*** -0.0622*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) 
soe 0.00255 0.00255 0.00279 0.00276 0.00302 0.00303 
 (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) 
share5 -0.000377*** -0.000488*** -0.000377*** -0.000478*** -0.000379*** -0.000471*** 
 (6.72e-05) (8.18e-05) (6.72e-05) (7.91e-05) (6.72e-05) (7.85e-05) 
net 0.0113*** -0.00684     
 (0.00214) (0.00789)     
share5_net  0.000334**     
  (0.000140)     
onet   0.00960*** -0.00948   
   (0.00223) (0.00818)   
share5_onet    0.000353**   
    (0.000145)   
onet_123     0.00781*** -0.00877 
     (0.00229) (0.00762) 
share5_onet_123      0.000306** 
      (0.000134) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.284 0.285 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3: Business networks and firms’ management cost continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES management management management management management management 
       
size -0.0467*** -0.0467*** -0.0473*** -0.0473*** -0.0467*** -0.0467*** 
 (0.000861) (0.000861) (0.000865) (0.000865) (0.000862) (0.000862) 
lev 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.00501) (0.00502) (0.00501) (0.00501) (0.00502) (0.00502) 
fr -0.0431*** -0.0432*** -0.0419*** -0.0419*** -0.0434*** -0.0434*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) 
growth -0.0625*** -0.0625*** -0.0622*** -0.0623*** -0.0625*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) 
soe 0.00395* 0.00395* 0.00382* 0.00384* 0.00404* 0.00403* 
 (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) 
share5 -0.000377*** -0.000380*** -0.000375*** -0.000362*** -0.000381*** -0.000395*** 
 (6.72e-05) (6.82e-05) (6.71e-05) (6.94e-05) (6.72e-05) (6.85e-05) 
onet_5 0.0159*** 0.0103     
 (0.00559) (0.0200)     
share5_onet_5  0.000105     
  (0.000361)     
cnet   0.0257*** 0.0360**   
   (0.00393) (0.0147)   
share5_cnet    -0.000189   
    (0.000261)   
inet     0.00500 -0.0140 
     (0.00484) (0.0186) 
share5_inet      0.000355 
      (0.000335) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.284 0.284 0.285 0.285 0.283 0.283 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4: Effects of network structure 
Note: This table reports estimation of profit and management cost using firm specific fixed 
effects. I used the same command in stata as described in the tables above. Definitions are 
the same as in previous tables and can be found in table 4.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES prof prof management management 
     
size 0.00646*** 0.00632*** -0.0477*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.000350) (0.000347) (0.000876) (0.000870) 
lev -0.0763*** -0.0766*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00502) (0.00502) 
fr -0.0118*** -0.0118*** -0.0424*** -0.0425*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00617) (0.00618) 
management -0.0843*** -0.0846***   
 (0.00288) (0.00288)   
growth 0.0298*** 0.0298*** -0.0620*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00283) (0.00283) 
soe -0.0104*** -0.0106*** 0.00228 0.00287 
 (0.000814) (0.000813) (0.00222) (0.00221) 
share5 0.000206*** 0.000206*** -0.000378*** -0.000377*** 
 (2.47e-05) (2.47e-05) (6.72e-05) (6.72e-05) 
net_degree -0.00155***  0.00687***  
 (0.000419)  (0.00114)  
net_constraint  -0.00175**  0.0104*** 
  (0.000838)  (0.00228) 
     
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.318 0.318 0.285 0.284 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Regression results using alternative measures 
Note: These results are estimated using firm specific fixed effects. Definitions of variables 
can be found on table 4.1 
Panel A: Alternative measure of profitability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES roa roa roa roa roa roa 
       
size 0.00842*** 0.00842*** 0.00848*** 0.00848*** 0.00848*** 0.00847*** 
 (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000333) 
lev -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
fr -0.0259*** -0.0259*** -0.0259*** -0.0260*** -0.0259*** -0.0260*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) 
management -0.0627*** -0.0627*** -0.0626*** -0.0627*** -0.0627*** -0.0627*** 
 (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) 
growth 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) 
soe -0.00912*** -0.00912*** -0.00901*** -0.00901*** -0.00900*** -0.00900*** 
 (0.000777) (0.000777) (0.000778) (0.000778) (0.000778) (0.000778) 
share5 0.000241*** 0.000227*** 0.000240*** 0.000216*** 0.000241*** 0.000223*** 
 (2.36e-05) (2.87e-05) (2.36e-05) (2.78e-05) (2.36e-05) (2.75e-05) 
net -0.000913 -0.00309     
 (0.000751) (0.00277)     
share5_net  4.02e-05     
  (4.91e-05)     
onet   -0.00175** -0.00643**   
   (0.000784) (0.00287)   
share5_onet    8.65e-05*   
    (5.10e-05)   
onet_123     -0.00179** -0.00489* 
     (0.000804) (0.00267) 
share5_onet_123      5.72e-05 
      (4.70e-05) 
       
Observations 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 
R-squared 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES roa roa roa roa roa roa 
       
size 0.00835*** 0.00835*** 0.00834*** 0.00832*** 0.00836*** 0.00836*** 
 (0.000328) (0.000328) (0.000330) (0.000330) (0.000328) (0.000328) 
lev -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
fr -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0258*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00217) 
management -0.0628*** -0.0628*** -0.0628*** -0.0629*** -0.0628*** -0.0628*** 
 (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) 
growth 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 0.0305*** 0.0306*** 0.0306*** 
 (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) 
soe -0.00924*** -0.00924*** -0.00924*** -0.00920*** -0.00924*** -0.00923*** 
 (0.000771) (0.000771) (0.000771) (0.000771) (0.000771) (0.000771) 
share5 0.000241*** 0.000239*** 0.000241*** 0.000264*** 0.000241*** 0.000246*** 
 (2.36e-05) (2.39e-05) (2.36e-05) (2.44e-05) (2.36e-05) (2.40e-05) 
onet_5 0.000257 -0.00275     
 (0.00196) (0.00700)     
share5_onet_5  5.67e-05     
  (0.000127)     
cnet   0.000320 0.0190***   
   (0.00138) (0.00516)   
share5_cnet    -0.000344***   
    (9.14e-05)   
inet     -0.000828 0.00555 
     (0.00170) (0.00651) 
share5_inet      -0.000119 
      (0.000117) 
       
Observations 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 16,329 
R-squared 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Alternative measure of ownership concentration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES prof prof prof prof prof prof 
       
size 0.00621*** 0.00621*** 0.00625*** 0.00625*** 0.00625*** 0.00625*** 
 (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.000348) 
lev -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0755*** -0.0755*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) 
fr -0.0118*** -0.0118*** -0.0117*** -0.0118*** -0.0117*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
management -0.0841*** -0.0841*** -0.0841*** -0.0841*** -0.0842*** -0.0842*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287) 
growth 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0294*** 0.0294*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
soe -0.0103*** -0.0103*** -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.000812) (0.000812) (0.000813) (0.000813) (0.000813) (0.000813) 
share10 0.000295**
* 
0.000296*** 0.000294*** 0.000283*** 0.000294*** 0.000284*** 
 (2.49e-05) (3.07e-05) (2.49e-05) (2.96e-05) (2.49e-05) (2.92e-05) 
net -0.00199** -0.00184     
 (0.000785) (0.00285)     
share10_net  -2.60e-06     
  (4.75e-05)     
onet   -0.00269*** -0.00468   
   (0.000819) (0.00294)   
share10_onet    3.46e-05   
    (4.91e-05)   
onet_123     -0.00277*** -0.00462 
     (0.000841) (0.00299) 
share10_onet_12
3 
     3.24e-05 
      (5.00e-05) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321 0.321 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES prof prof prof prof prof prof 
       
size 0.00605*** 0.00605*** 0.00612*** 0.00610*** 0.00607*** 0.00607*** 
 (0.000343) (0.000343) (0.000345) (0.000345) (0.000343) (0.000343) 
lev -0.0758*** -0.0758*** -0.0758*** -0.0756*** -0.0757*** -0.0756*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00187) 
fr -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0117*** -0.0117*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) (0.00227) 
management -0.0844*** -0.0844*** -0.0842*** -0.0842*** -0.0844*** -0.0844*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00288) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00287) 
growth 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
soe -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.000806) (0.000806) (0.000806) (0.000806) (0.000806) (0.000806) 
share10 0.000296*** 0.000293*** 0.000295*** 0.000313*** 0.000296*** 0.000302*** 
 (2.49e-05) (2.53e-05) (2.49e-05) (2.58e-05) (2.49e-05) (2.54e-05) 
onet_5 0.000547 -0.00463     
 (0.00205) (0.00775)     
share10_onet_5  9.10e-05     
  (0.000131)     
cnet   -0.00229 0.0110**   
   (0.00144) (0.00526)   
share10_cnet    -0.000231***   
    (8.77e-05)   
inet     -0.00145 0.00563 
     (0.00177) (0.00643) 
share10_inet      -0.000124 
      (0.000108) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.320 0.320 0.321 0.321 0.320 0.321 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES management management management management management management 
       
size -0.0475*** -0.0475*** -0.0474*** -0.0474*** -0.0472*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000873) (0.000874) (0.000874) 
lev 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00503) (0.00503) 
fr -0.0428*** -0.0433*** -0.0434*** -0.0439*** -0.0435*** -0.0440*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00617) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00618) 
growth -0.0619*** -0.0618*** -0.0619*** -0.0619*** -0.0620*** -0.0619*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) 
soe 0.00217 0.00210 0.00241 0.00232 0.00264 0.00259 
 (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00222) 
share10 -
0.000356*** 
-
0.000484*** 
-
0.000356*** 
-
0.000477*** 
-
0.000358*** 
-
0.000468*** 
 (6.78e-05) (8.36e-05) (6.78e-05) (8.07e-05) (6.79e-05) (7.96e-05) 
net 0.0113*** -0.00831     
 (0.00214) (0.00777)     
share10_net  0.000340***     
  (0.000130)     
onet   0.00953*** -0.0118   
   (0.00223) (0.00802)   
share10_onet    0.000372***   
    (0.000134)   
onet_123     0.00771*** -0.0130 
     (0.00229) (0.00815) 
share10_onet_123      0.000362*** 
      (0.000136) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.284 0.285 0.284 0.284 0.283 0.284 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES management management management management management management 
       
size -0.0468*** -0.0468*** -0.0473*** -0.0474*** -0.0468*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.000861) (0.000861) (0.000865) (0.000865) (0.000862) (0.000862) 
lev 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00502) (0.00501) (0.00501) (0.00503) (0.00503) 
fr -0.0436*** -0.0437*** -0.0423*** -0.0423*** -0.0439*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00617) (0.00617) (0.00618) (0.00618) 
growth -0.0623*** -0.0623*** -0.0620*** -0.0621*** -0.0622*** -0.0623*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00283) 
soe 0.00356 0.00356 0.00343 0.00345 0.00364* 0.00362* 
 (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) 
share10 -
0.000359**
* 
-
0.000366**
* 
-
0.000356**
* 
-
0.000341**
* 
-
0.000362**
* 
-
0.000381**
* 
 (6.79e-05) (6.89e-05) (6.78e-05) (7.02e-05) (6.79e-05) (6.93e-05) 
onet_5 0.0161*** 0.00362     
 (0.00559) (0.0212)     
share10_onet_
5 
 0.000220     
  (0.000359)     
cnet   0.0257*** 0.0370***   
   (0.00393) (0.0143)   
share10_cnet    -0.000195   
    (0.000239)   
inet     0.00504 -0.0173 
     (0.00484) (0.0176) 
share10_inet      0.000392 
      (0.000295) 
       
Observations 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 16,333 
R-squared 0.283 0.283 0.285 0.285 0.283 0.283 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: Correction for cross-sectional dependence 
Note: These results are estimated using Driscoll-Kraay estimator. Definitions of variables 
are the same as in table 4.1. 
Panel A: Profitability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES prof prof prof prof prof prof 
       
size 0.00196* 0.00195* 0.00191* 0.00161 0.00184 0.00166 
 (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00110) (0.00111) (0.00108) 
lev -0.0838*** -0.0838*** -0.0838*** -0.0840*** -0.0840*** -0.0839*** 
 (0.00688) (0.00687) (0.00686) (0.00687) (0.00688) (0.00684) 
fr -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0214*** -0.0217*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00234) (0.00227) (0.00234) 
management -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) 
growth 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00117) (0.00118) 
soe -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00166) (0.00167) 
share5 0.000276 0.000276 0.000277 0.000285 0.000283 0.000284 
 (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000192) (0.000193) (0.000192) 
net -0.00253***      
 (0.000671)      
onet  -0.00248***     
  (0.000658)     
onet_123   -0.00217**    
   (0.000794)    
onet_5    -0.000343   
    (0.00156)   
cnet     -0.00599***  
     (0.00153)  
inet      -0.00246 
      (0.00190) 
Constant 0.0553** 0.0555** 0.0562** 0.0614** 0.0570** 0.0604** 
 (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0210) 
       
Observations 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 
Number of groups 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Management cost 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES management management management management management management 
       
size -0.0402*** -0.0399*** -0.0398*** -0.0381*** -0.0389*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00701) (0.00696) (0.00680) (0.00659) (0.00685) 
lev 0.0885* 0.0890* 0.0892* 0.0903* 0.0904* 0.0902* 
 (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0441) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440) 
fr -0.0319* -0.0323** -0.0323** -0.0331** -0.0322** -0.0332** 
 (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0146) 
growth -0.0598*** -0.0599*** -0.0599*** -0.0608*** -0.0606*** -0.0607*** 
 (0.00866) (0.00859) (0.00862) (0.00885) (0.00878) (0.00884) 
soe -0.0139* -0.0138* -0.0138* -0.0140* -0.0141* -0.0140* 
 (0.00763) (0.00765) (0.00766) (0.00775) (0.00775) (0.00770) 
share5 -0.00144*** -0.00145*** -0.00145*** -0.00150*** -0.00149*** -0.00150*** 
 (0.000327) (0.000328) (0.000330) (0.000338) (0.000336) (0.000339) 
net 0.0157***      
 (0.00297)      
onet  0.0138***     
  (0.00325)     
onet_123   0.0129***    
   (0.00284)    
onet_5    0.00793   
    (0.00790)   
cnet     0.0219***  
     (0.00421)  
inet      0.00620 
      (0.00443) 
Constant 1.015*** 1.011*** 1.009*** 0.980*** 0.994*** 0.982*** 
 (0.113) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.109) (0.113) 
       
Observations 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 
Number of 
groups 
2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
Panel C: Network structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES prof prof management management 
     
size 0.00222* 0.00184 -0.0412*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00108) (0.00674) (0.00687) 
lev -0.0836*** -0.0839*** 0.0876* 0.0892* 
 (0.00691) (0.00686) (0.0440) (0.0438) 
fr -0.0219*** -0.0215*** -0.0308* -0.0324** 
 (0.00235) (0.00239) (0.0146) (0.0148) 
management -0.116*** -0.116***   
 (0.0228) (0.0229)   
growth 0.0248*** 0.0249*** -0.0594*** -0.0601*** 
 (0.00115) (0.00117) (0.00857) (0.00870) 
soe -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0141* -0.0138* 
 (0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00769) (0.00763) 
share5 0.000272 0.000278 -0.00142*** -0.00145*** 
 (0.000191) (0.000191) (0.000323) (0.000330) 
net_degree -0.00206***  0.0108***  
 (0.000357)  (0.00170)  
net_constraint  -0.00201**  0.0136*** 
  (0.000769)  (0.00302) 
Constant 0.0503** 0.0575** 1.034*** 1.004*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.112) (0.114) 
     
Observations 16,350 16,350 16,350 16,350 
Number of groups 2,134 2,134 2,134 2,134 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5 Business networks and firm stock return volatility 
5.1 Introduction 
Stock return volatility is an important issue for the equity markets, attracting worldwide 
interest from researchers, investors, and policymakers. In emerging markets, where the 
institutional environment is underdeveloped and its markets are normally associated with 
risk and financial and political uncertainty, stock price volatility is relatively high (Vo, 2015). 
Turbulence in the global equity markets in recent years has witnessed higher price volatility 
with significant influence on investors (Vo, 2016). Policymakers in the emerging economies 
are increasingly aware of the importance of understanding the factors that affect volatility. 
Stock price volatility in the emerging equity markets is therefore of itself an interesting study.  
Volatility can be defined broadly as anything that is changeable or variable (Kevin, 2011). 
The more the variable changes or fluctuates over time, the more volatile the variable is said 
to be. Volatility is associated with unpredictability, uncertainty, and risk (Kevin, 2011). 
Understanding stock return volatility in the emerging markets is particularly important, but 
even so is less studied than are the markets in the developed economies (Mahender et al., 
2014) partly because most emerging markets are characterized by high stock return volatility. 
There are several reasons stock return volatility is important per se. First of all, when 
stock returns fluctuate sharply, it may undermine confidence in the stock.  This results in 
reduced capital flow for the company since the investors are likely to focus more on 
perceived issues with the firm rather than to examine the fundamental economic factors 
underlying the fluctuation. As investors by nature are risk averse, stock return volatility is a 
measure of the level of risk they are exposed to (Guo, 2002). Secondly, stock return volatility 
is an important issue in determining the probability of the firm going bankrupt (Kevin, 2011). 
The more highly volatile a firm is, and controlling for other factors, the higher becomes the 
likelihood of default. Thirdly, the level of volatility also affects firms’ hedging techniques, such 
as their portfolio insurance, because the price of insurance increases commensurate with 
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the level of volatility (John & Simon, 2007). Finally, increased stock return volatility over a 
period may result in intervention from regulatory agencies and providers of capital, which 
may influence the firm’s operations and its resource allocation efficiency (Kevin, 2011). More 
generally, stock return volatility is a serious matter of concern for investors and policymakers 
as it can exert huge pressures on the economy (Vo, 2015). 
A plethora of papers in the literature have contributed to an understanding of stock 
return volatility in general and to the drivers of such volatility in the equity markets in 
particular. The body of literature is extensive and still growing (Clark, 1973; Garman & Klass, 
1980; Li et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Gharbi et al., 2014; McMillan & Evans, 2014; Vo, 
2015; Vo, 2016). Various factors, such as trading volume (Gallant, 1992) and ownership 
structure (Vo, 2015), have been identified as elements that significantly influence stock 
return volatility. However, Mittnik et al. (2015) argue that using different perspectives to 
identify the factors affecting stock volatility is critical. One interesting question that remains 
unexplored is whether business network affiliation and network structure may have an 
impact on stock return volatility.  
The popularity of business networks is widely witnessed in emerging economies, where 
the institutional environment is underdeveloped. For example, business groups are widely 
used by business units as a response to market inefficiency in India and China (e.g. Carney 
et al., 2009; Chakraborty, 2013). In emerging markets, where the institutional environment 
is relatively weak and the market is inefficient, transaction costs such as finding cost, 
negotiation cost, and contracting cost are very high. Business networks provide a 
mechanism to reduce transaction costs and the uncertainty associated with them (Achrol & 
Kotler, 1999), and allow firms to access pooled resources and expertise. In networks, 
members are familiar with each other and exchange favors for the good of the organizational 
purpose (Gu et al., 2008). Through repeated interactions, norms and trust would be 
established, and these govern networked firms’ sharing and exchanging of expertise, 
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information, knowledge, and resources. As well as filling lacunae in the market, business 
networks are associated with superior information processing and flexible monitoring 
(Achrol & Kotler, 1999) which are favored by business units. 
Studies on business networks that investigate inter-firm relationships are particularly 
useful at explaining finance, corporate governance, and corporate performance (e.g. 
Markoczy et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Guest & Sutherland, 2010; Byun et al., 2013; Isobe 
et al., 2006). The bright and dark sides of business networks are both discussed in the 
literature. On the one hand, business networks are viewed as mechanisms for reducing 
information asymmetries and transaction costs in the marketplace that occur in an 
underdeveloped institutional environment (Markoczy et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Guest 
& Sutherland, 2010). In addition, business networks, serving as a resources pool for network 
members, can mobilize resources from one affiliate to another one. Consequently, network 
members bonded together can share risks in the market. On the other hand, business 
networks are associated with a complicated governance structure and can even facilitate 
various “tunneling” activities by the controlling shareholder (e.g. Byun et al., 2013; Isobe et 
al., 2006), which may negatively affect corporate operations. As firms in business networks 
grow more connected, they are increasingly exposed to other network members in frequent 
interactions. Firms are thus more likely to be affected by the adverse spillovers of networks, 
which can lead to higher operational risks. 
It is an empirical question to investigate the relationship between business network 
affiliation and firm stock return volatility in emerging economies. This is a relatively under-
addressed question which will contribute to the understanding of the role of business 
networks on stock return volatility in emerging markets. The co-insurance effects of business 
groups are evidenced (Byun et al., 2013). Firms in business networks are shown to have a 
lower probability of default, which may lead to lower volatility. However, the adverse effects 
of business networks, such as governance problems, may also result in higher volatility. 
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Business network affiliation by its very nature means that firms are more exposed to other 
network members. Gopalan et al. (2007) suggest that firms in networks are more likely to 
suffer from negative spillovers caused by bad news for other network members. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no prior study that directly investigates the role of business 
networks on firms’ return volatility. This study expects to fill that knowledge gap. 
Moreover, different network structures offer affiliated firms different capabilities in 
various aspects. Earlier studies (e.g. Chen & Xie, 2011; Tsai, 2001) mainly focus on network 
position in terms of centrality. In this study, we expect to add to the literature by investigating 
relatively broad aspects of business network structures, including network size, diversity, 
position within the network, network structure, and network dominator. It is suggested that 
a particular network structure may have both positive and negative impacts for the 
performance of its affiliated firms. For example, centrality is found to be positively related to 
firm performance (Chen & Xie, 2011). However, studies suggest that a central position would 
lead to over reliance on other network members, which may bring negative effects for firm 
performance (e.g. Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). Actors also need to invest a considerable 
amount of money and effort to maintain strong network ties (Uzzi, 1997). The role of 
business network structure on firm stock return volatility is something that should be 
empirically tested, not least because network effects are contextually sensitive (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002).  
The high levels of stock return volatility and their effects on investors and firms during 
crises such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the more recent global financial crisis 
in 2008 also motivate this study. Stock return volatilities during these periods have affected 
investors and the market significantly. Consequently, research into stock return volatility, 
especially into the drivers of volatility, is increasingly important. By understanding the 
determinants of stock return volatility, we can have a better understanding of the economy 
and are more able to temper volatility to achieve organizational goals. 
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We use Chinese listed companies from 1997-2011 to investigate the relationship 
between listed companies’ related party networks and stock return volatility. The data are 
from CSMAR and Datastream databases. We use China as the empirical setting for the 
following reasons. First of all, there are various types of business networks in China, which 
play significant roles in its national economy. For example, 50% of China’s listed companies 
are involved in listed company cross-shareholding networks (Sha & Zeng, 2014) and 
business groups in China contribute close to 60% of the nation’s industrial output (China 
Development Research Center of the State Council, 2000). Thus, China provides a good 
and relevant context for the study of networks and their impact on a national economy. 
Secondly, China is an emerging economy as well as a transition economy. It has seen its 
equity market capitalize 23 trillion RMB as in 2013 (SHSE and SZSE, 2013) since the 
establishment of its stock market in the 1990s. Its enormous growth potential is increasingly 
attractive for both domestic and foreign investors. The volatility of stock return is crucial for 
these investors. Moreover, as the second largest economy in the world ranking after US 
(Ling & Li, 2012), it is increasingly being integrated into the global economy, particularly after 
it entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). A systematic and comprehensive 
understanding of business networks operating in China, and the relationship between such 
networks and stock return volatility, would help China’s trading partners to get up to speed 
with financial rules in China and would assist their investment decisions. As a typical 
emerging economy, understanding the links between business networks and stock return 
volatility would also have implications for an understanding of other emerging economies. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The second part outlines the 
relevant literature and hypothesis development. We then discuss the data and methodology. 
The findings and discussion are then presented. Finally, the conclusion of this study is 
outlined. 
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5.2 Literature and hypothesis development 
5.2.1 Related literature 
It is clear from the number of asset pricing studies that have stock return volatility at 
their core that this is a topic that attracts interest from both investors and policymakers 
(Zhang, 2010). In this section, we briefly examine the literature on the determinants of stock 
return volatility. Fundamentals-based theories are derived from traditional asset pricing 
principles while those related to microstructure and the financial systems are trading 
volume-based theories (Zhang, 2010). Theoretically, stock return volatility is positively 
related to the conditional variance of future dividends since the stock price is the present 
value of expected stock dividends (Zhang, 2010). Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that stock 
return volatility is positively related to earnings and dividends. Anwar et al. (2015) also 
document that cash dividend announcements are positively related to stock return volatility. 
Caner et al. (2005) examined sources of volatility in emerging markets and found that 
dividends are a major factor influencing stock return fluctuation. Schwert (2002) suggests 
that volatility is positively related to the value of growth opportunities as it is a component of 
stock prices, and Cao et al. (2008) concur. Gharbi et al. (2014) suggest that R&D 
investments are positively related to firms’ stock return volatility because R&D represents 
uncertainty for the firm in the future.  
Trading-based theories argue that trading volume causes high stock return volatility. 
However, the relationship between stock return volatility and trading volume is ambiguous. 
Some studies argue that increasing trading volume leads to better accounting standards 
and information, which would reduce volatility (e.g. Schwert, 2002). Other studies posit that 
stock return volatility is positively related to trading volume (e.g. Gallant, 1992). Moreover, 
studies also show that as the amount of institutional trading increases institutional ownership 
is significantly positively associated with stock return volatility (e.g. Xu et al., 2003; Bennett 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, it is suggested that foreign ownership helps firms to reduce their 
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stock return volatility (e.g. Vo, 2015; Li et al., 2011), theorizing that the stabilizing effect of 
foreign ownership outweighs the potential destabilizing impacts. However, these studies do 
not investigate the role that informal contracts among firms, such as business network 
affiliation and network structure, may have on stock return volatility. Given the importance 
of stock return volatility in the emerging economies (Chen et al., 2013; Vo, 2015; Vo, 2016) 
and the prevalence of business networks in those markets (He et al., 2013; Byun et al., 
2013; Sha & Zeng, 2014), an investigation into the relationship between business networks 
and stock return volatility is called for. The effects of business networks are evidenced to 
touch on some factors that may influence stock return volatility, such as information 
asymmetry; a direct investigation about the nature of the relationship has therefore become 
essential to developing an understanding of business networks and stock return volatility. 
In the literature about business networks, empirical studies have found they have both 
positive and adverse effects (Byun et al., 2013). On the one hand, by compensating for 
underdeveloped markets in finance, labour, and products, business networks may promote 
exchanges that could not happen in the marketplace. By affiliating to business networks, 
firms obtain superior access to scarce resources, which provides firms with higher 
combinative potential and increases their ability to respond flexibly and efficiently to market 
demand (Ahuja et al., 2008). These benefits enable firms in networks to share risks in the 
market and decrease the probability of default (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), which would also 
help firms to reduce stock volatility.  There is empirical evidence of such risk sharing among 
network members. Gopalan et al. (2007) found that firms in business groups support each 
other to avoid default and affiliated firms are less likely to go bankrupt than free-standing 
ones. He et al. (2013) documented the internal capital markets function that is carried out 
by business groups in China and found that those firms that are affiliated to networks are 
less financially constrained and are at less at risk of going bankrupt than independent firms. 
Hoshi et al. (1991) also suggest that bank systems in Japan reduce agency and bankruptcy. 
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Bae et al. (2008) indicate that member firms’ announcement of increased earnings have 
positive spill over into other member firms’ market value. However, although these studies 
have suggested that firms in business networks are less risky in terms of bankruptcy, they 
do not directly link business network affiliation to firm stock return volatility. We acknowledge 
that higher stock return volatility may induce a higher likelihood of default. However, a lower 
probability of default does not necessarily imply lower stock return volatility.  Furthermore, 
previous research does not consider the effects of different network structures, which carry 
with them different network effects.  We therefore submit that the manner in which the 
structure of the business network affects firms’ stock return volatility is an area requiring 
investigation. 
Theoretical models predict that stock return volatility is positively related to information 
asymmetry (Gharbi et al., 2014). Attanasio (1990) shows that stock prices tend to be more 
volatile in the presence of information asymmetry. Gennotte & Leland (1990) suggest that 
stock return volatility can be explained by the trades of informed investors in a context of 
information asymmetry. Business networks are effective at reducing information asymmetry 
among affiliates since firms in networks grow familiar with other network members through 
frequent interactions. However, affiliation into business networks could also increase the 
probability of member firms becoming informed investors and this may create information 
asymmetry between those firms in networks and the public investors outside the networks. 
As no study has directly investigated the link between business network affiliation and stock 
return volatility, it is unclear whether the relationship between business networks and stock 
return volatility is unambiguously virtuous. 
Another area of research suggests that business networks perform negatively for 
member firms, which may result in higher stock return volatility. We have outlined the 
negative aspects of business networks in previous chapters. These effects could lead to 
inferior firm performance and consequently lead to higher stock return volatility. It is 
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suggested that firms in emerging markets exhibit higher stock return volatility due to the risk 
of potential expropriation that is pervasive in weak institutional environments (Bae et al., 
2002). The internal markets found in business networks provide a platform for internal 
transactions, which clearly provides an opportunity for firms to expropriate.  
Generally, affiliating to business networks may induce both positive and negative effects 
for member firms, and the extent and nature of these effects can be examined empirically. 
Moreover, a detailed understanding of the role of the structure of the business network will 
facilitate a holistic understanding of business networks, including their impact on stock 
return volatility. 
 
5.2.2 Hypothesis development 
As the literature suggests, firms in networks can mobilize resources and share risks 
and this results in less risk of bankruptcy for the members. However, this does not 
necessarily imply lower stock return volatility since firms in business networks feel not only 
the positive effects of networks, they also suffer from their liabilities. Intra-lending among 
network members can result in endless “triangle debts” (Peng & Luo, 2000), which will lead 
to a bad reputation for the network. As suggested by Gharbi et al. (2014), firms with a higher 
leverage ratio are more volatile. Studies have suggested that firms in business networks 
generally have a higher leverage ratio because co-insurance effects enhance a firm’s ability 
to pay back the debts it raised (Goplan et al., 2007; Paligorova & Xu, 2012; Manos et al., 
2007; Kuo & Wang, 2015). In this case, firms in networks are expected to be riskier than 
isolated ones because of the overhanging debt problem (Myer, 1977). Thus, firms in 
networks are more likely to be volatile than non-affiliated firms. Additionally, even though 
firms in networks can have reduced information asymmetry among network members, 
networking can lead to a larger number of informed traders. In addition, firms in networks 
usually have a more complicated ownership structure and this brings its own governance 
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challenges. It is widely recognized that “tunneling” activities in business networks may 
undermine firm performance (Bae et al., 2002). In such cases, the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders is increased. It is suggested that stock return volatility 
increases as the degree of information asymmetry becomes higher (Gharbi et al., 2014). 
Thus, firms in networks can be expected to be more volatile than others.  
Moreover, Gopalan et al. (2014) suggest that firms in business groups pay out 
significantly more dividends than their non-affiliated counterparts. Vuolteenaho (2002), and 
Anwar et al. (2015) suggest that stock return volatility is positively related to dividends. Thus, 
we expect stock return volatility to be positively related to business network affiliation since 
stock price is the present value of expected stock dividends (Zhang, 2010).  
The entrepreneurial process view (Iacobucci & Rosa, 2005; Lechner & Leyronas, 2009) 
also provides valuable insight, particularly for small firms, in explaining the emergence of 
business networks. This view argues that business network formation is an outcome of 
growth processes linked to entrepreneurial diversification. Colli et al. (2016) claim that the 
formation and diffusion of business networks are the only way to grow a firm or, at least, the 
easiest way to reach a reasonable size. As firms in business networks encounter more 
opportunities for growth, we expect firms in business networks to be more volatile than those 
not so affiliated. This is because of the received wisdom in finance that stock price is 
determined as the sum of the current value of earnings and growth opportunities (Zhang, 
2010). Finally, firms that become networked are less independent because they must 
subjugate their own interests to benefit the joint stake of the network (Singh & Gaur, 2009). 
Through frequent interactions, firms in business networks are increasingly exposed to other 
network members. Gopalan et al. (2007) claim that when a firm in a network encounters a 
crisis, will have adverse spillovers for other network members. Given these findings, we 
expect to see a positive relationship between business networks and stock return volatility. 
Based on the above analysis, we propose the first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: Business network affiliation in China is positively related to stock return volatility. 
 
In addition to the above, we believe that the structure of a business network will also 
make a difference to the degree of stock return volatility since networks with different 
structures imply different network effects. Previous studies have overlooked the 
consequences of business network structure on stock return volatility, and this is where this 
study expects to contribute to the literature. Unlike previous studies examining network 
structures that focus on network position (e.g. Chen & Xie, 2011; Sha & Zeng, 2014), we 
use a relatively wide net of network structures, including network size, network diversity, 
network position, and network dominator. 
In order to understand the relationship between network structure and firms’ stock 
return volatility, we need to bear in mind that stock return volatility is caused by the flow of 
private information (Roll, 1988). Stock prices change as relevant information becomes 
available. Lin et al (2014) have suggested that stock volatility in China reflects stock price 
informativeness. Many studies have suggested that stock return volatility is positively related 
to information disclosure. Anwar et al. (2015) show that cash dividend announcements are 
positively related to stock return volatility while Shi et al. (2016) find that the public 
information flow is positively related to return volatility. Upon receiving news, investors trade 
accordingly, which will lead to changes in the stock price. We therefore expect to see an 
increase in return volatility as informativeness increases.  
Network size refers to the number of firms in a network. Empirical evidence suggests 
that resource availability increases with network size (Greve & Salaff, 2003; Liao & Welsch, 
2005; Soh, 2010). However, when firms establish network connections with other firms, they 
need to establish a governance system, and such systems come with at a price that may 
negatively affect firms’ performance. When network size reaches a peak, the benefits from 
the economies of scale will help firms to minimize these costs.  The relationship between 
239 
 
network size and firm return volatility is therefore expected to exhibit an inverted U shape. 
Moreover, as network size increases, the availability of information is increased and 
becomes asymmetrical, which may cause higher volatility. However, further increases in 
business network size could generate redundant information (Semrau & Werner, 2013) and 
reduce the information asymmetry between firms and the wider public since information may 
disseminate to outside the network. Based on the above analysis, we expect a positive 
relationship between firm return volatility and business network size in the first stage. After 
reaching a peak, firm return volatility decreases with further increases in network size. 
 Network diversity measures the variety of industries operated by network members. 
Diversification is a common strategy for firms wishing to lower their operational risks. Firms 
in different industries form business networks to gain scale or scope advantages, and to 
mitigate the disadvantages of inefficient or absent intermediate institutions (Purkayastha & 
Lahiri, 2016). However, previous studies have inadequately accounted for the management, 
organization, and other costs of diversification in emerging economies (Granovetter, 2005). 
When networks initially expand their diversity, firms will need to establish a sharing platform 
to lower their risks. Establishing a governance mechanism incurs fixed costs for firms in 
business networks (Chang & Hong, 2002). We therefore expect that the level of firm risk will 
increase during the first stage of network diversity. When network diversity reaches an 
optimal level, the scale or scope advantages could help firms to effectively minimize their 
market risk. Thus, we expect to see an inverted U shape relationship between network 
diversity and stock return volatility. 
In terms of network position, this is measured by the centrality or peripherality of the 
focal firm’s position. Studies (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2001; Wang et al., 2014; Coleman, 
1988, 1990) suggest that occupation of a central position in networks means that firms are 
more likely to gain access to crucial resources and information. The central firm is therefore 
a conduit of information for all other members in the network and this higher availability of 
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information will affect the volatility of the central firm to a greater degree than might be 
experienced by firms on the periphery of the network. Moreover, as we explained in chapter 
4, firms in a central network position generally perform worse than those not.  We therefore 
expect to see higher volatility for firms in central network position. In terms of the effects of 
network structure, Burt (1982, 1997, 2005) highlights the advantages of sparse networks 
with disconnected network partners. Firms that hold a bridging position in a network can 
gain the benefits of being the broker for resource flows within the network (Semrau & Werner, 
2013). We use constraints as a measure of the structural holes in firms’ ego networks. More 
constraints imply fewer structural holes (Nooy et al., 2005). Firms with more network 
constraints will have more information channels in the network than will firms in networks 
with fewer constraints. In sparse networks, information diffusion is less extensive than in 
dense networks. Consequently, we argue that firms in network bridging positions are 
expected to be less volatile since they are more able to gain benefit through their bargaining 
power over other network members. As we discussed and proved in chapter 4, firms in 
networks with more structural holes tend to perform better than firms in tighter networks, 
which can result in lower stock return volatility. 
We next turn to the property of networks.  A network’s property is defined by the 
properties of its central players.  In this study we investigate the role of two types of business 
network dominator, namely SOE dominated networks and financial institution dominated 
networks. SOEs dominated networks may have superior information channels thanks to 
their closer relationships with government. Financial institution dominated networks also 
have superior information availability because of their relationships with banks. 
Consequently, we expect firms in both networks to have a higher level of stock return 
volatility.   
We propose the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Network size and firm return volatility exhibit an inverted U shape relationship 
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in China. 
H2b: Network diversity and firm return volatility exhibit an inverted U shape 
relationship in China. 
H2c: Network central position is positively related to firm stock return volatility in 
China. 
H2d: Network intermediate position is negatively related to firm stock return volatility 
in China. 
H2e: Firms in a SOE dominated network are more volatile than others in China. 
H2f: Firms in a financial institution dominated network are more volatile than others 
in China 
 
5.3 Data and methodology 
5.3.1 Data and construction of business networks 
To investigate the impacts of business networks and network structure on stock return 
volatility in China, this study focuses on companies listed on either the Shanghai or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Listed companies are required to publish their financial 
performance regularly to the public. Data are easy to access through open channels, for 
example from the official website of the two stock exchanges. These data are more reliable 
and accurate than those obtained from surveys.  
This study uses data from two databases, which are CSMAR database and Datastream 
database. CSMAR database is maintained by GTA (Guo Tai An) Research Service Centre 
and we adopt it to construct business networks and identify key financial indicators. The 
database provides good coverage of listed companies in the market and is used in studies 
about China’s listed companies (He et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016). Three datasets are 
extracted: listed company related party information data; listed company related party 
transaction data; and listed company financial indicator data. Our data covers the period 
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from 1997 to 2011. The data contains information about listed companies' related party 
information, key financial indicators, and basic information about listed companies, which 
we use to construct business networks and identify key financial indicators of listed 
companies. For the construction of stock return volatility, this study extracts stock price data 
on a daily basis from the Datastream database. Using stock price daily data, annualized 
stock return volatility is constructed for each firm in each year. Then the volatility data is 
merged with data about network information and financial information. After data cleaning, 
we have a dataset of 1,971 listed companies and 16,567 observations. 
In order to construct business networks, this study explores related relations among 
listed companies. As mentioned above, a related party is an agent that controls or 
significantly influences the listed company’s policy and decision-making (Michele, 2013). 
The construction of business networks is explained in detail in chapter 2. The business 
network constructed captures many relations that are widely seen in the marketplace. It is 
particularly helpful in understanding firms’ stock return volatility since the relations included 
are associated with either control or significant influence. We argue that information sharing 
among defined business networks is more efficient and effective. The completeness of our 
definition helps us to generalize our findings on the relationship between business networks 
and firms’ stock return volatility. We then use different variables related to network structure 
that are calculated using Pajek software. These variables are network size, network diversity, 
centrality, constraint, and network dominator.  
 
5.3.2 Model and variables 
Similar to Chen et al. (2013), Vo (2015), Li et al. (2011), we set up the following model: 
 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
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Where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡  denotes the volatility of firm i in year t. As the main objective is to 
investigate the impacts of business network affiliation and network structure on stock return 
volatility, the construction of the stock return volatility indicator is crucial. The volatility 
measure constructed in this study is similar to that used by Chen et al. (2013) and consistent 
with Li et al. (2011) and Bae et al. (2004). Based on daily stock prices in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges in China for the period from 1997 to 2011, we construct two 
measure of return volatility as follows. 
 
𝑉𝑂𝐿1𝑖,𝑡 = √
1
𝑛 − 1
∑ (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡)2
𝑛
1
 
 
And 
 
𝑉𝑂𝐿2𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ ln (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑘)
2
𝑛
1
 
 
Where 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑘  is the daily return of stock i in day k, n is the number of trading days 
for stock i in a year, 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the annual average of stock returns in year t of firm i.  
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the variable that we are interested in. It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if 
firm i affiliates to a business network in year t, and 0 otherwise. Our control variables are 
selected based on the literature that recognizes that stock return volatility is driven by firm 
characteristics (Vo, 2015). Firm size, leverage ratio, trading turnover, sales growth, foreign 
dummy, and SOE dummy are included as control variables in the model. Firm size is the 
logarithm of the sales at the end of the fiscal year. It is expected to be negatively related to 
stock return volatility (Bae et al., 2004; Li et al., 2011). Leverage is included as suggested 
by Wei & Zhang (2006). Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liability to total assets 
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and is expected to be positively related with volatility of return. Growth is defined as the 
annual growth rate of sales. It is expected to be positively related to return volatility (Zhang, 
2010). Trading turnover is the annual average number of shares traded in a day divided by 
the number of shares outstanding during the year. Foreign dummy variable indicates if the 
firm’s ultimate controller is a foreign company. SOE dummy indicates if the firm’s ultimate 
controller is an SOE. In order to control for market risk, this study adds market volatility as 
a control variable. The measures of market volatility are consistent with those used to 
measure firm return volatility. The Shanghai Composite Index and Shenzhen Composite 
Index are used to construct market volatility. Moreover, this study controls for industrywide 
and time differences in volatility using dummy variables. 𝑣𝑖 is firm specific fixed effects. 
In order to investigate the impacts of business network structure, this study further 
develops the model to include variables of network structure. The following model is 
constructed.  
 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
The definition of volatility and the control variables are the same as above. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 refers to the matrix of network structure. It consists of network size, network 
diversity, network centrality, constraint, and the property of networks. Network size is 
measured using the number of companies in a network. Network diversity refers to the ratio 
of the number of industries to network size. Moreover, this study adopts network position 
measures to capture the effects of network structures. Centrality measures the virtual 
position of an individual network member in its networks. A central network position brings 
the company more access to resources and information (e.g. Ahuja, 2000). Central positions 
are measured using degree centrality, which measures the number of direct contacts a focal 
245 
 
firm has. Moreover, we employ aggregate constraint to measure the tightness of such 
networks. Both of these measures are calculated using Pajek software. The property of a 
network is determined by the property of the central firm in a network. We use dummies for 
SOE dominated and financial institution dominated to measure the property of the central 
firm. The SOE dominated dummy equals one if the center of the network is an SOE. 
Financial institution dummy indicates if the center of the network is a financial institution or 
not.  
We use firm specific fixed effects to estimate these models, which is suggested by the 
literature and data structure. The Hausman test was adopted to choose the appropriate 
estimating strategy and firm fixed effects are suggested. This approach is widely taken in 
previous studies such as Vo (2015), Vo (2016), and Chen et al. (2013).  
 
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of key variables. The mean value of stock return 
volatility is 0.028 and -8.364 according to the two measures described above. These figures 
are similar in essence to Chen et al. (2013) and Vo (2015). Figure 5.1 shows the dynamics 
of firm return volatility during the period. It is clear that firms’ stock returns have generally 
experienced significant volatility since 2007 as a result of the global financial crisis. In terms 
of firm size measured as the logarithm of sales, the mean value is 19.905 with a standard 
deviation of 2.306. The average value of leverage is 0.467 with a standard deviation of 0.194, 
which is consistent with He et al. (2013) and Fan et al. (2012). This means that listed 
companies on average have 46.7% liabilities, which is relatively high compared to firms in 
the developed economies, such as US (Jiang & Kim, 2015). The growth of sale on average 
is 16.6%, which is consistent with the amazing growth rate of the Chinese economy. The 
trading turnover in the Chinese market is relatively high with an average of 231.9%, which 
is similar to that found by Chen et al. (2013). 
246 
 
 
<Table 5.1 inserted here> 
 
<Figure 5.1 inserted here> 
 
Regarding network variables, it is suggested that on average 31.3% of listed companies 
are affiliated into related party networks, which is much lower than is reported by other 
studies. We argue that the definition of business networks in our study is stronger than those 
used in other studies, resulting from our dropping many weak connections. Table 5.2 
displays firm return volatility for firms that are in networks and those that are not. It shows 
that by both measures firms in networks are more volatile than isolated firms. Network size 
varies significantly with an average of 1.76. Network diversity varies with a mean value of 
0.22. On average, each firm has 0.512 partners in networks. Among all firms, 17.4% of listed 
companies are in an SOE dominated network and 0.8% of listed companies are in a financial 
institution dominated network. 
 
<Table 5.2 inserted here> 
 
Table 5.3 reports correlation coefficients amongst the variables in this study. At first 
glance, we see that network affiliation is positively related to stock return volatility, which 
means that network affiliation may lead to higher stock return volatility. Network size, 
network diversity, network position, and network dominators are all found to be positively 
related to return volatility.  
 
<Table 5.3 inserted here> 
5.4 Results 
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Table 5.4 reports the regression results of the relationship between business networks 
and stock return volatility where the dependent variable is VOL1. Market volatility also shows 
significant positive coefficients. This means that firm return volatility is consistent with market 
volatility. Interestingly, we find that firm size is significantly positively related to stock return 
volatility, which contradicts our expectations. However, the result is consistent with results 
provided by Chen et al. (2013) and He et al. (2013), and suggests that firms in China become 
more volatile as the firm size is increased. In terms of trading turnover, this is positively 
related to volatility, which is consistent with both our expectations and the results found by 
Chen et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2011).  Thus, the higher the firm’s turnover, the higher the 
risk of return. As regarding leverage, we find that highly leveraged firms are significantly 
more volatile, which is consistent with our expectation that increased leverage makes firm’s 
stock riskier (Gharbi et al., 2014). Growth is found to be significantly negatively related to 
volatility, and suggests that firms with higher growth potential are less volatile. Even though 
this contradicts our hypothesis, it is consistent with Vo (2015). As regards foreign dummy, 
we find that foreign-controlled firms in China are associated with greater stock return 
volatility. Even though many papers have argued that foreign investors can help to reduce 
risks for firms and accelerate better management practice, hence reducing return volatility 
(Vo, 2015; Li et al., 2011), many authors document a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and return volatility. It is argued that foreign ownership increases risk exposure 
to international market risks and could destabilize the local market due to short-term 
speculations (Bae et al., 2004). SOE dummy is found to be positively related to stock return 
volatility.  
 
<Table 5.4 inserted here> 
 
Turning now to network affiliation, which is the variable of interest, table 5.4 suggests 
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that network affiliation is statistically significantly positively related to stock return volatility. 
The estimated coefficient is significant at 1% significance level. This means that firms in 
related party networks are more volatile than free-standing firms. Our hypothesis 1 is 
supported. Even though business networks are beneficial for firms wishing to access various 
resources in inefficient markets, and although affiliation lowers the risk of default because 
of the internal support found in such networks (He et al., 2013; Gopalan et al., 2007), firms 
in networks in China actually suffer from higher return volatility. In business networks, firms 
are more exposed to the shocks experienced by other network members, which causes 
higher volatility. Whether the news for a member is good or bad, business networks will 
diffuse the information, which increases the number of transactions in the market and leads 
to stock return volatility. Moreover, business networks come with certain liabilities that may 
negatively affect firm performance (Singh & Gaur, 2009) and potentially lead to volatility in 
returns.  
Moreover, the nature of the network structure makes a difference to the volatility of 
returns. Network size is found to have an inverted U shape relationship with firm return 
volatility. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
Firms’ return volatility maps increases in network size until volatility peaks.  It then decreases 
with further increases in network size. Our hypothesis 2a is therefore supported. In terms of 
network diversity, we see that just as for network size, there is an inverted U shape 
relationship with firm return volatility. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1% significance level and suggest that as network diversity increases and firms are 
exposed to more sectors, firm return volatility increases. Once the degree of diversification 
has reached a peak, firm return volatility decreases with further increases in diversity as 
firms start to reap the benefits of scope. Consequently, our hypothesis 2b is supported.  
As regards network position, we hypothesized that central firms are more volatile than 
peripheral ones because risks are directed to the central firm. The degree of centrality is 
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found to be statistically positively related to return volatility, which confirms our H2c. The 
estimated coefficient is significant at 1% level. In terms of network tightness, the aggregated 
constraint is statistically significantly positively related to firm return volatility. The estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant at 1% significance level and means that firms in 
intermediate network positions are generally less volatile than those not, presumably due to 
their superior bargaining power over network partners which confirms our H2d. Finally, we 
also provide evidence that firms in SOE dominated networks are generally more volatile 
than those not which is H2e. The findings are consistent with our hypotheses. The estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level. However, we do not find 
evidence that firms in financial institution dominated networks experience more stock return 
volatility. 
Table 5.5 reports the regression results when the dependent variable is VOL2. Control 
variables generally have the same effects as were found in the above results. The only 
difference is firm size. It is found that firm size is significantly negatively related to firm return 
volatility using VOL2. The coefficients are expected. It means that large firms are less 
volatile than small firms. The results are consistent with Chen et al. (2013). The impact of 
business network affiliation and network structure on stock return volatility is generally 
consistent with the results in table 5.4. Network affiliation is positively related to return 
volatility. Network size in this specification shows a positive relationship with return volatility. 
Network diversity exhibits an inverted U shape relationship with stock return volatility. 
Central network position is positively related to firm return volatility, while networks with 
structural holes are negatively related to return volatility. Firms in SOE dominated networks 
are more volatile than those not. The similar results from the two regressions suggest that 
our results are quite robust.  
 
<Table 5.5 inserted here> 
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As another robustness test, we employ a range-based volatility measure, which is a 
high-low volatility estimator. This is believed to incorporate more information about return 
volatility and is more efficient than the standard measures (Garman & Klass, 1980; 
Parkinson, 1980; Brandt & Jones, 2006), such as the two we used in this study. The high-
low volatility estimator takes the value of the logarithm of difference between the high and 
low prices in a trading day. Table 5.6 reports the results where the dependent variable is 
constructed using a high-low volatility estimator, VOL3. The results support the finding that 
business network affiliation leads to higher stock return volatility. The coefficient is positive 
and significant at 1% level. Regarding network structure, network size and network diversity 
both show an inverted U shape relationship with firm return volatility; central network position, 
SOE dominated networks, and financial institution dominated networks lead to higher 
volatility. The results also suggest that structural hole is negatively related to firm return 
volatility. The results are consistent with findings using VOL1 and VOL2, which provides 
extra comfort for our results. 
 
<Table 5.6 inserted here> 
 
In order to ensure that the dependent variable and independent variable are stationary, 
we further adjust our model using the differences in non-stationary variables. In our model, 
firm size and growth are said to be non-stationary. By replacing them with differences in firm 
size and growth opportunities, we re-estimated our model and table 5.7 shows the 
estimation results. It is suggested that all the results are consistent with our main regression 
results, which provides further confidence in our results. 
 
<Table 5.7 inserted here> 
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This study then examines the dynamic relationship between network affiliation and firm 
return volatility by adopting the dynamic GMM estimation of Arellano and Bond (1991), 
which is used to control for the potential endogeneity problem. This approach has been 
employed by Vo (2016) to settle the endogeneity issue. Table 5.8 shows the estimation 
results of the dynamic GMM estimation. A combination of lagged values and differenced 
forms of variables are used as instruments. It is suggested that all of the estimated 
coefficients for network affiliation are positive. The coefficients are statistically significant at 
1% significance level. The Hansen test suggests that the overidentifying restriction is valid 
in this study. Therefore, the estimation results further confirm our previous estimation results.  
 
<Table 5.8 inserted here> 
 
Generally, our regression analysis shows that in China business network affiliation is 
associated with higher stock return volatility. Network size, network diversity, and degree 
centrality are found to be positively related to stock return volatility. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that foreign-controlled firms are more volatile in China. 
The study is prone to cross-sectional dependence as individual units can be correlated 
due to network interactions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ignoring cross-sectional correlation 
could lead to biased results. The CD-test statistically significantly rejects cross-sectional 
independent or weak cross-sectional correlation. Using the Driscoll-Kraay estimator, we 
controlled for cross-sectional correlation and delivered results consistent with the main 
regression. Table 5.9 reports the estimation results controlling for cross-sectional 
dependence. Network affiliation is proved to be positively related to stock return volatility. 
Network size and diversity exhibit inverted a U shape relationship with stock return volatility.  
Network centrality, network constraint and SOE dominated networks are positively related 
to return volatility. 
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<Table 5.9 inserted here> 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates the role of business network affiliation and network structure on 
stock return volatility in China. This study makes many contributions. Theoretically, we add 
to the literature about the drivers of volatility by introducing and examining the effects of 
business networks. As business networks cause both positive and adverse consequences, 
the role of business networks in firms’ return volatility can be investigated empirically. We 
argue that in emerging economies, such as China, the institutional environments are less 
developed and less efficient at allocating financial resources as a result of the frequent and 
significant government intervention in the capital markets (Allen et al., 2012; Du et al., 2013). 
Even though affiliation into business networks enables firms to access resources and 
information, and co-insurance of business networks helps firms to lower default risks 
(Goplan et al., 2007), firms in business networks are more exposed to other network 
members through interactions, which will lead to higher stock return volatility. As we 
established in chapter 3, firms in networks raise more debts. Thus, it is likely that firms will 
be more volatile since high leverage make firms riskier. Additionally, as network members 
are stakeholders for each other, networks impose significant governance challenges for 
firms. Affiliates may suffer from principle-principle agency problems because of the 
conflicting interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The widely 
documented “tunneling” activities will inhibit firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010). It is 
therefore argued such governance problems render networked firms more volatile. 
Furthermore, since firms in networks pay higher dividends than independent firms, stock 
return volatility for affiliates is theoretically higher since the stock price is the present value 
of expected stock dividends (Zhang, 2010). This study provides evidence that network 
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affiliation is positively related to stock return volatility.  
Moreover, while prior studies have focused on the fundamentals-based and volume-
based factors influencing firm return volatility (Zhang, 2010), this study investigates the role 
of informal contracts, such as business networks, on firms’ return volatility. While previous 
studies identified many factors that influence firm return volatility such as trading volume 
(Zhang, 2010; Mahender et al., 2014) or the presence of informed traders (Gangopadhyay 
et al., 2014), there is no study investigating the role of business networks on firm stock 
return volatility. By investigating and finding a statistically positive relationship between 
business network affiliation and firm stock return volatility, we add to the knowledge about 
the determinants of stock return volatility. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that explores and exploits the relationship between business networks and stock return 
volatility. 
We also make important theoretical contributions by investigating the effects of network 
structure on firm stock return volatility. It is widely known that the form of network structure 
makes a difference to the degree of access to resources and information (Soh, 2010; Ahuja, 
2000; Tsai, 2001). However, it is less well studied whether such differing effects lead to 
different results in stock return volatility. Unlike previous studies that focused more on 
network position (Chen & Xie, 2011; Sha & Zeng, 2014), we include a relatively wide set of 
network structures. We employ network size, network diversity, network position, and 
network dominators to examine the effects of network structures. Network size and network 
diversity exhibit an inverted U shape relationship with stock return volatility. Central position 
is found to be positively related to stock return volatility while an intermediate position is 
negatively related to stock return volatility. Moreover, firms in SOE dominated networks are 
more volatile than those not. By introducing to the literature a consideration of the impacts 
of network structure, we have proved that different network structures can be drivers of stock 
return volatility. Firms can therefore strategically adjust their return volatility by controlling 
254 
 
for network structure. 
Moreover, this study contributes to literature about networks by providing a new 
approach to the construction of network connections, and a detailed assessment of the 
impacts of network structure. We argue that listed company networks via related parties 
capture important connections among listed companies, which disclose the important 
components of the national economy. Such connections enable companies in networks to 
share information more efficiently.  Networks constructed through such connections are 
more representative and the findings are more likely to be generalizable.  
Empirically, we use a large and representative database of 1,971 listed companies over 
a 15 year period to investigate (i) the effects of business network affiliation on firm return 
volatility and (ii) how network structure shapes the impact of business networks on firm 
return volatility. Even though previous work has started to investigate the impacts of 
business networks (Ma et al., 2006; Guest & Sutherland, 2010), it has relied on small 
datasets for a single region of a country, and on relatively static data in a particular year or 
other short period. By using objective financial data over a longitudinal timeframe, we 
provide robust empirical evidence that business networks would lead to high stock return 
volatility in China. Moreover, we clarified the role of foreign ownership in the Chinese market. 
Even though the literature has documented both the bright and dark sides of foreign 
ownership, we provide evidence that in China foreign-controlled firms are more volatile than 
others. Unlike domestic firms in China that better understand the rules and can access local 
support, foreign firms are hampered by relative ignorance and can rarely access local 
support. Thus, foreign firms in China are more volatile than domestic firms.  
Finally, this study contributes to the understanding of emerging markets by investigating 
business networks and stock return volatility in the emerging markets. Since stock return 
volatility has been widely investigated in the developed economies, examining the emerging 
economies through the lens of that understanding can enhance our knowledge, which in 
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turn is important for those engaged in the international portfolio and risk management 
(McMillan & Evans, 2014). 
This study has several implications for managers and policymakers. Firstly, when 
operating in emerging economies where the institutional framework is underdeveloped, 
managers can use network strategies to improve firms’ access to otherwise scarce 
resources. However, firms also need to take into account the negative impacts of network 
affiliation. As we see in this study, business network affiliation leads to high stock return 
volatility. Firms need to manage the costs of being affiliated into networks. In order to 
maintain the network connection, they need to maintain the level of their interactions and 
this involves an investment of time and money. Firms may also need to sacrifice their 
independence so as to uphold the interests of the network, and firm governance may be 
affected. Firms need to balance the benefits and costs of business network affiliation.  
Additionally, different network structures are associated with different effects. An 
understanding of the relationship between business network and firm return volatility helps 
managers to use the appropriate network strategies to maximize the benefits of networks 
and achieve strategic goals for firms. For example, a firm’s manager could use this 
knowledge to manage the firm’s strategies to attract different investors. Conservative 
investors may prefer low stock return volatility while gamblers are interested in highly volatile 
stocks. Some knowledge of the effects of business networks and network structure on firm 
return volatility can help managers’ decision-making in order to attract specific types of 
investors. Moreover, this study also emphasizes the importance of policymakers improving 
the institutional environment so that firms, particularly foreign firms, can operate in a fair 
competitive environment. Policymakers also need to regulate the establishment of business 
networks and minimize the cost of such networks. Understanding the effects of business 
networks on firm return volatility is important for policy setting. Understanding the drivers of 
stock return volatility is particularly important in such a large emerging economy since the 
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stock market is acutely vulnerable to shocks in the global market. 
In summary, this study investigates the relationship between business network 
affiliation and network structure and stock return volatility. Using data from a listed company 
related party information database, listed company related party transaction database, listed 
company financial indicator database and stock price data, we construct a sample of 1971 
listed companies over the period 1997-2011.  
Adopting a fixed effects panel estimator and using several robustness checks, we find 
that firms in business networks via related parties are more volatile than isolated firms. It is 
necessary for the manager to be aware that business networks can generate adverse 
effects for affiliates, including a higher degree of stock return volatility. Additionally, it is 
suggested that as network size and network diversity increases, firm return volatility 
increases, peaks, and decreases. Furthermore, a central network position is positively 
related to firm return volatility while an intermediate network position is negatively related to 
firm return volatility. The network dominator also imposes significant influence over firm 
return volatility. It is suggested that, in China, firms in SOE dominated networks are more 
volatile than those others. Finally, our study also suggests that foreign-owned firms in China 
are more volatile in the market than domestic firms. 
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Tables for chapter 5 
 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics of key variables in Chapter 5 
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
vol1 
Annualised Standarded Deviation of Daily Returns for 
Each Year 16567 0.0279  0.0074 
vol2 Annual Average of the Logarithm of Squared Returns 16565 -8.3640 0.5566  
Network Variable 
net 
Dummy Variable Takes Value 1 if Firms is Affiliated to 
Networks 16567 0.313  0.464  
net_size The Number of Firms in a Network 16567 1.766  3.652  
net_diversity 
Ratio of Number of Industries to Number of Network 
Members in the Networks 16567 0.222  0.357  
net_degree The Number of Contacts a Firm has in its Network 16567 0.512  0.876  
net_constraint Total Constraint the Network has to the Firm 16567 0.284  0.429  
centre_soe 
Dummy Variable Takes Value 1 if Firms Affiliated to a 
Network Dominated by SOE 16567 0.174  0.379  
centre_financial 
Dummy Variable Takes Value 1 if Firms Affiliated to a 
Network Dominated by a financial institution 16567 0.008  0.088  
Control Variable 
marketvol1 
Annualised Standarded Deviation of Market 
Composite Index 16567 238.338  254.172  
marketvol2 
Annual Average of the Logarithm of Squared Market 
Composite Index 16567 14.160  1.332  
trturnover 
The annual average number of shares traded in a day 
divided by the number of shares outstanding during 
the year. 16567 2.319  2.109  
lev Ratio of Total Liability to Total Assets 16567 0.467  0.194  
size Logarithm of Sales 16567 19.905  2.306  
growth Growth Rate of Sales 16567 0.166  0.343  
foreign 
Dummy Variable Takes Value 1 if Firms is Foreign-
owned 16567 0.008  0.091  
SOE Dummy Variable Takes Value 1 if Firms is a SOE 16567 0.670  0.470  
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Table 5.2: Univariate analysis of Chapter 5 
VARIABLE
S 
Isolate Network 
Difference Pr(T < t) Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
VOL1 0.02771  0.00008  0.02879  0.00012  -0.00108  0.00000  
VOL2 -8.38870  0.00579  -8.32538  0.00865  -0.06332  0.00000  
Note: Vol1 is the annualized standarded deviation of daily returns for each year. Vol2 is Annual Average of the 
Logarithm of Squared Returns. 
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Tabel 5.3: Correlation coefficients amongst variables 
 
  vol1 vol2 net 
net_siz
e 
net_di~
y 
net_de~
e 
net_co~
t 
centre~
e 
centre
~l 
marke~
1 
marke~
2 trtur~r lev size 
growt
h 
foreig
n 
vol1 1                
vol2 0.8711 1               
net 0.0699 0.0527 1              
net_size 0.0473 0.0224 0.7163 1             
net_divers~
y 0.062 0.0484 0.9223 0.5013 1            
net_degree 0.0629 0.0423 0.8659 0.7614 0.7333 1           
net_constr~
t 0.0735 0.0578 0.9801 0.6427 0.9253 0.7757 1          
centre_soe 0.0521 0.0316 0.6786 0.7514 0.5032 0.7378 0.6149 1         
centre_fin~l 0.0402 0.0325 0.1317 0.1863 0.1355 0.1111 0.1271 0.0044 1        
marketvol1 0.5949 0.534 0.0861 0.0757 0.0709 0.0806 0.0868 0.0757 0.0476 1       
marketvol2 0.1849 0.1219 0.0959 0.1498 0.0583 0.1087 0.0871 0.1125 0.0133 0.6353 1      
trturnover 0.4471 0.5055 
-
0.0276 -0.0211 -0.0221 -0.0229 -0.0239 -0.0424 
-
0.0139 0.2519 0.1659 1     
lev 0.0838 0.1654 0.093 0.0828 0.0815 0.0987 0.0829 0.0848 
-
0.0062 0.076 0.0416 
-
0.0103 1    
size -0.059 
-
0.1078 0.0916 0.0831 0.0605 0.1059 0.0835 0.0995 
-
0.0204 0.0259 0.0478 
-
0.0808 
0.044
3 1   
growth 
-
0.0608 
-
0.0658 0.0091 0.0035 0.002 0.012 0.0057 0.0049 
-
0.0026 -0.0231 0.0161 0.0698 
0.006
6 
0.127
7 1  
foreign 0.0082 0.0028 
-
0.0375 -0.0327 -0.0335 -0.0392 -0.0349 -0.035 
-
0.0006 -0.0177 -0.0132 
-
0.0103 -0.014 -0.007 
-
0.014 1 
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Table 5.4: Business networks and firm return volatility using VOL1 
Note: This table reports estimation of vol1 using firm fixed effects as in equation 1 in this 
chapter. Definitions of variables can be found in table 5.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 
         
marketvol1 2.05e-06*** 2.05e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.07e-06*** 2.05e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.04e-06*** 
 (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) (2.88e-07) 
size 6.10e-05*** 5.86e-05*** 5.89e-05*** 5.86e-05*** 5.85e-05*** 5.88e-05*** 5.99e-05*** 6.13e-05*** 
 (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.55e-05) 
lev 0.00104*** 0.00101*** 0.000992*** 0.00100*** 0.000997*** 0.00102*** 0.00102*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) (0.000242) 
trturnover 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 
 (2.45e-05) (2.45e-05) (2.46e-05) (2.45e-05) (2.46e-05) (2.45e-05) (2.46e-05) (2.45e-05) 
growth -
0.000466*** 
-
0.000464*** 
-
0.000460*** 
-
0.000464*** 
-
0.000463*** 
-
0.000464*** 
-
0.000464*** 
-
0.000466*** 
 (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) (8.93e-05) 
foreign 0.00129*** 0.00127*** 0.00127*** 0.00127*** 0.00128*** 0.00127*** 0.00127*** 0.00129*** 
 (0.000419) (0.000418) (0.000418) (0.000418) (0.000418) (0.000418) (0.000419) (0.000419) 
soe 0.000364*** 0.000346*** 0.000330*** 0.000341*** 0.000337*** 0.000351*** 0.000326*** 0.000363*** 
 (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000119) (0.000118) 
net  0.000355***       
  (8.76e-05)       
net_sizesquare   -4.47e-06*      
   (2.49e-06)      
net_size   0.000105***      
   (3.47e-05)      
net_diversitysquare    -0.00138***     
    (0.000446)     
net_diversity    0.00162***     
    (0.000433)     
net_degree     0.000199***    
     (4.92e-05)    
net_constraint      0.000350***   
      (9.10e-05)   
centre_soe       0.000287***  
       (0.000103)  
centre_financial        0.000424 
        (0.000348) 
Constant 0.0248*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.000805) (0.000806) (0.000805) (0.000806) (0.000805) (0.000806) (0.000806) (0.000805) 
         
Observations 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 
R-squared 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.761 
Number of id 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.5: Business networks and firm return volatility using VOL2 
Note: This table gives the estimation of vol2 using firm fixed effects. Definitions of variables 
can be found in table 5.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 
         
marketvol2 0.0147 0.0148 0.0148 0.0147 0.0147 0.0149 0.0146 0.0146 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
size -
0.00457*** 
-
0.00465*** 
-
0.00467*** 
-
0.00467*** 
-
0.00465*** 
-
0.00465*** 
-
0.00464*** 
-
0.00455*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
lev 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
trturnover 0.0764*** 0.0765*** 0.0767*** 0.0766*** 0.0766*** 0.0765*** 0.0766*** 0.0765*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) 
growth -0.0472*** -0.0471*** -0.0470*** -0.0472*** -0.0471*** -0.0471*** -0.0471*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.00612) (0.00612) (0.00612) (0.00611) (0.00612) (0.00612) (0.00612) (0.00612) 
foreign 0.0389 0.0381 0.0380 0.0376 0.0386 0.0381 0.0377 0.0387 
 (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) 
soe 0.0146* 0.0140* 0.0131 0.0133 0.0137* 0.0142* 0.0123 0.0146* 
 (0.00809) (0.00809) (0.00810) (0.00810) (0.00810) (0.00809) (0.00814) (0.00809) 
net  0.0122**       
  (0.00600)       
net_sizesquare   -0.000210      
   (0.000170)      
net_size   0.00476**      
   (0.00238)      
net_diversitysquare    -0.0985***     
    (0.0305)     
net_diversity    0.0990***     
    (0.0296)     
net_degree     0.00650*    
     (0.00337)    
net_constraint      0.0117*   
      (0.00623)   
centre_soe       0.0171**  
       (0.00703)  
centre_financial        0.0290 
        (0.0238) 
Constant -8.584*** -8.581*** -8.580*** -8.577*** -8.580*** -8.582*** -8.577*** -8.582*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) 
         
Observations 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 
R-squared 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 
Number of id 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.6: Regression results where the dependent variable is VOL3 
Note: This table gives the estimation of vol3 using firm fixed effects. Definitions of variables 
can be found in table 5.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol3 vol3 vol3 vol3 vol3 vol3 vol3 vol3 
         
marketvol3 0.0159 0.0180 0.0151 0.0169 0.0161 0.0183 0.0157 0.0151 
 (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
size 0.0152*** 0.0148*** 0.0149*** 0.0148*** 0.0147*** 0.0148*** 0.0151*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00154) 
lev -0.238*** -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.246*** -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
trturnover -0.0140*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0132*** -0.0136*** -0.0136*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) (0.00243) 
growth 0.0524*** 0.0528*** 0.0530*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0529*** 0.0527*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.00886) (0.00884) (0.00885) (0.00884) (0.00884) (0.00884) (0.00886) (0.00886) 
foreign 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0415) (0.0415) 
soe 0.0502*** 0.0467*** 0.0466*** 0.0471*** 0.0451*** 0.0477*** 0.0446*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
net  0.0697***       
  (0.00867)       
net_sizesquare   -
0.00142*** 
     
   (0.000246)      
net_size   0.0234***      
   (0.00344)      
net_diversitysquare    -0.146***     
    (0.0441)     
net_diversity    0.213***     
    (0.0428)     
net_degree     0.0392***    
     (0.00487)    
net_constraint      0.0696***   
      (0.00900)   
centre_soe       0.0429***  
       (0.0102)  
centre_financial        0.0696** 
        (0.0345) 
Constant -2.420*** -2.403*** -2.395*** -2.398*** -2.401*** -2.407*** -2.406*** -2.417*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
         
Observations 16,547 16,547 16,547 16,547 16,547 16,547 16,547 16,547 
R-squared 0.627 0.629 0.628 0.629 0.629 0.628 0.627 0.627 
Number of id 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.7: Business networks and firm return volatility controlling for non-stationary 
variables 
Note: This table gives the estimation of vol1 using firm fixed effects. Definitions of 
variables can be found in table 5.1. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 
         
marketvol1 1.07e-06*** 1.08e-06*** 1.08e-06*** 1.08e-06*** 1.10e-06*** 1.08e-06*** 1.09e-06*** 1.07e-06*** 
 (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) (3.05e-07) 
diff_size -7.87e-06 -8.67e-06 -8.24e-06 -8.45e-06 -8.32e-06 -8.81e-06 -8.34e-06 -7.68e-06 
 (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.21e-05) 
leverage 0.00118*** 0.00114*** 0.00113*** 0.00114*** 0.00113*** 0.00115*** 0.00116*** 0.00119*** 
 (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) (0.000260) 
trturnover 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00108*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 
 (2.73e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.74e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.74e-05) (2.73e-05) 
diff_growth -
0.000189*** 
-
0.000185*** 
-
0.000183*** 
-
0.000185*** 
-
0.000186*** 
-
0.000185*** 
-
0.000187*** 
-
0.000189*** 
 (6.69e-05) (6.69e-05) (6.68e-05) (6.69e-05) (6.69e-05) (6.69e-05) (6.69e-05) (6.69e-05) 
foreign 0.00145*** 0.00143*** 0.00144*** 0.00142*** 0.00144*** 0.00143*** 0.00143*** 0.00144*** 
 (0.000446) (0.000445) (0.000445) (0.000445) (0.000445) (0.000445) (0.000446) (0.000446) 
soe 0.000488*** 0.000462*** 0.000447*** 0.000460*** 0.000456*** 0.000468*** 0.000444*** 0.000487*** 
 (0.000127) (0.000127) (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000127) (0.000128) (0.000127) 
net  0.000424***       
  (9.33e-05)       
net_sizesquare   -4.93e-06*      
   (2.59e-06)      
net_size   0.000117***      
   (3.65e-05)      
net_diversitysquare    -0.00142***     
    (0.000468)     
net_diversity    0.00173***     
    (0.000456)     
net_degree     0.000222***    
     (5.19e-05)    
net_constraint      0.000413***   
      (9.68e-05)   
centre_soe       0.000316***  
       (0.000108)  
centre_financial        0.000369 
        (0.000357) 
Constant 0.0205*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.000769) (0.000769) (0.000768) (0.000769) (0.000768) (0.000769) (0.000769) (0.000769) 
         
Observations 14,172 14,172 14,172 14,172 14,172 14,172 14,172 14,172 
R-squared 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767 
Number of id 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.8: Dynamic GMM estimation results in Chapter 5 
Note: This table gives the estimation of vlo1 and vol2 using dynamic gmm. Instruments 
are differences and lags of variables. Definitions of variables can be found in table 5.1. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES vol1 vol2 
   
marketvol1 1.66e-05***  
 (4.76e-06)  
marketvol2  0.402** 
  (0.190) 
firmsize -0.00195*** -0.000853 
 (0.000498) (0.0250) 
leverage1 0.00244 0.0145 
 (0.00991) (0.424) 
trturnover 0.00360*** 0.118*** 
 (0.000874) (0.0433) 
growth_sale 0.000373 -0.0228 
 (0.00243) (0.0963) 
foreign 1.869*** 73.88* 
 (0.496) (43.84) 
soe 0.0533*** 8.096*** 
 (0.00994) (3.018) 
net 0.00786*** 6.904*** 
 (0.00280) (2.603) 
 
Hansen’s J 0.82 4.53 
Observations 14,172 14,168 
Number of id 1,629 1,629 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.9: Correction for cross-sectional dependence 
Note: These table are estimated using Driscoll-Kraay estimator to control for cross-sectional dependence. 
The definition of variables can be found in table 5.1. 
Panel A: Vol1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 vol1 
         
marketvol1 2.05e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.07e-06*** 2.05e-06*** 2.06e-06*** 2.04e-06*** 
 (2.93e-07) (2.91e-07) (2.94e-07) (2.92e-07) (2.92e-07) (2.91e-07) (2.93e-07) (2.93e-07) 
size 5.87e-05*** 5.62e-05*** 5.64e-05*** 5.61e-05*** 5.61e-05*** 5.64e-05*** 5.75e-05*** 5.90e-05*** 
 (1.85e-05) (1.85e-05) (1.86e-05) (1.84e-05) (1.82e-05) (1.85e-05) (1.86e-05) (1.87e-05) 
lev 0.00101 0.000975 0.000959 0.000968 0.000964 0.000985 0.000985 0.00101 
 (0.000675) (0.000684) (0.000681) (0.000688) (0.000679) (0.000682) (0.000683) (0.000675) 
trturnover 0.00102*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00103*** 0.00102*** 
 (0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000105) (0.000105) (0.000105) (0.000104) (0.000105) (0.000104) 
growth -0.000454** -0.000451** -0.000447** -0.000451** -0.000451** -0.000451** -0.000451** -0.000454** 
 (0.000176) (0.000176) (0.000175) (0.000176) (0.000177) (0.000176) (0.000177) (0.000176) 
foreign 0.00131*** 0.00129*** 0.00129*** 0.00128*** 0.00130*** 0.00128*** 0.00129*** 0.00131*** 
 (0.000394) (0.000393) (0.000390) (0.000392) (0.000389) (0.000394) (0.000394) (0.000393) 
soe 0.000361** 0.000342** 0.000327* 0.000338* 0.000334* 0.000347** 0.000321* 0.000361** 
 (0.000161) (0.000158) (0.000163) (0.000159) (0.000159) (0.000158) (0.000163) (0.000161) 
net_sizesquare   -4.96e-06***      
   (1.42e-06)      
net_size   0.000111***      
   (1.94e-05)      
net  0.000365***       
  (7.40e-05)       
net_diversitysquare    -0.00135**     
    (0.000539)     
net_diversity    0.00160***     
    (0.000491)     
net_degree     0.000200***    
     (4.96e-05)    
net_constraint      0.000361***   
      (7.62e-05)   
centre_soe       0.000297***  
       (8.36e-05)  
centre_financial        0.000417 
        (0.000280) 
Constant 0.0269*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0270*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.000418) (0.000425) (0.000427) (0.000431) (0.000420) (0.000422) (0.000428) (0.000418) 
         
Observations 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 16,567 
Number of groups 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Vol2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 vol2 
         
marketvol2 0.0136 0.0137 0.0137 0.0136 0.0136 0.0138 0.0135 0.0134 
 (0.00985) (0.00994) (0.00996) (0.00998) (0.00999) (0.00991) (0.0101) (0.00979) 
size -0.00464* -0.00473* -0.00475* -0.00475* -0.00473* -0.00472* -0.00472* -0.00462* 
 (0.00248) (0.00246) (0.00247) (0.00248) (0.00248) (0.00246) (0.00248) (0.00248) 
lev 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.260*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0586) (0.0589) (0.0591) (0.0584) (0.0584) (0.0589) (0.0578) 
trturnover 0.0764*** 0.0765*** 0.0766*** 0.0766*** 0.0765*** 0.0765*** 0.0766*** 0.0764*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0100) 
growth -0.0468*** -0.0467*** -0.0465*** -0.0467*** -0.0467*** -0.0467*** -0.0467*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.00829) (0.00829) (0.00821) (0.00828) (0.00828) (0.00830) (0.00829) (0.00829) 
foreign 0.0398 0.0390 0.0389 0.0384 0.0395 0.0389 0.0386 0.0396 
 (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0269) 
soe 0.0149 0.0142 0.0134 0.0135 0.0140 0.0144 0.0125 0.0149 
 (0.00914) (0.00887) (0.00916) (0.00878) (0.00906) (0.00888) (0.00878) (0.00916) 
net_sizesquare   -0.000226*      
   (0.000115)      
net_size   0.00503***      
   (0.00142)      
net  0.0130**       
  (0.00482)       
net_diversitysquare    -0.102***     
    (0.0341)     
net_diversity    0.103***     
    (0.0329)     
net_degree     0.00701***    
     (0.00195)    
net_constraint      0.0126**   
      (0.00508)   
centre_soe       0.0180***  
       (0.00470)  
centre_financial        0.0279 
        (0.0194) 
Constant -8.523*** -8.523*** -8.522*** -8.519*** -8.520*** -8.524*** -8.518*** -8.522*** 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.129) 
         
Observations 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 16,565 
Number of groups 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 1,971 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.1: Firm return volatilities during 1997-2011 
 
 
 
 
Note: Vol1 is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns for each year. Vol2 is Annual Average of the 
Logarithm of Squared Returns. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
This study was initially motivated by the pervasiveness and popularity of various 
business networks and their importance for business operations and firm performance. 
Business networks are widely seen and extensively used by firms in the emerging 
economies due to the prevalence of market failure and information problems. Business 
networks are particularly popular in China.  By adopting and managing appropriate network 
strategies, firms can achieve and sustain competitive advantages. The literature has 
documented the importance of business networks on sale growth, market expansion, firm 
efficiency, and operating performance. Adopting a network perspective is helpful in reaching 
an understanding of this economic phenomenon. It is suggested that network connections 
are crucial and can even determine the survival of firms.  
The importance and popularity of business networks in the emerging economies has 
sparked interest from researchers.  However, the findings thus far have been relatively 
ambiguous, with studies concentrating on either the advantages or the disadvantages of 
business networks. Further, the literature is relatively blank in relation to some aspects of 
the topic. For example, there has been limited academic focus on how business networks 
affect firms’ stock return volatility. The nature and extent of the impacts of business networks 
remains an open question that deserves additional investigation. 
To investigate the role of business networks, we construct business networks 
employing data from CSMAR database and Datastream.  These databases give us access 
to listed company related party information data, listed company related party transaction 
data, listed company financial indicator data, listed company corporate governance data, 
and listed company stock price data. We are, as a result, able to construct business 
networks that capture a wide range of important network relationships and are, we believe, 
superior to the definitions used previously in the literature.  Using these networks we are 
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able to further investigate the consequences on firms of affiliating into business networks. 
We believe our findings are more reliable due to the completeness of relations captured.  
The thesis is composed of 6 chapters that approach a thorough understanding of 
business networks in China. First of all, an introduction chapter presents an overview of the 
motivations, research questions, data and methodology, and key findings. In the next 
chapter, we discuss an overview of business networks in China in which we outline the 
dynamics and features of business networks. These two chapters are descriptive in nature 
to provide an overall picture and some background to business networks. The 
understandings gleaned from the business networks we construct in chapter 2 underpin the 
three empirical studies that follow, which investigate the role of business networks on firm 
finance, corporate performance and market response.  
In chapter 3, we examine the financing advantages accessible by firms in business 
networks in order to provide a potential answer to the question of why business networks 
are so prevalent.  We do this by testing the effects of business networks on firms’ debt 
financing, access to trade credit, working capital management and cash sufficiency.  
After exploiting the effects of business networks on firms’ access to financial resources, 
we examine in chapter 4 the relationship between business networks and firm performance, 
and test how firm strategy can affect the relationship. This chapter provides a new insight 
into performance implications using management costs calculations, and contributes to the 
literature on the net effects of business networks. In chapter 5, we investigate the effects of 
business networks on firms’ market response using firms’ stock return volatility. This gives 
us a more complete understanding of the consequences of business networks. Finally, we 
conclude the thesis and outline contributions and limitations. 
This study has generated interesting findings. Through a systematic descriptive 
analysis of business networks in China, we disclose the dynamics of business networks, 
business network composition, and some individual features of business networks in China. 
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Moreover, by adopting network perspectives we also provide new insights into state 
capitalism in China. We find that the number of firms in business networks has expanded 
considerably during the period studied. We see how the development of business networks 
in China is shaped by the development of its economy, with business network development 
being uneven across sectors, and SOEs remaining actively involved in the process. 
Moreover, we provide new insights into the debate of “the state advances and private 
retreats”. From a network perspective, we can see that SOEs are indeed expanding their 
influence through network size and network centrality at a time when private firms are 
relatively stalled or even shrinking. By comparing the features of ownership networks and 
general networks, we generate insights that different networks impose different effects. 
Using the business networks we constructed in chapter 2, we further investigate their 
consequences. Firstly, this study investigates the role of business networks on firms’ debt 
financing, access to trade credit, working capital management, and cash sufficiency, to offer 
a view on the financing advantage of business networks. We find that firms in business 
networks have superior access to long-term debts, short-term debts, trade credit and have 
more efficient working capital management and sufficient cash for investment. Moreover, 
we find that the effects of business networks are mediated by institutional factors and the 
nature of business networks. Evidence shows that SOEs in business networks have better 
access to debts and trade credit while non-SOEs in networks have more efficient working 
capital management and sufficient cash. Among ownership networks, collaboration 
networks, and individual networks, individual networks have the largest marginal effects 
while collaboration networks are less significant in influencing firms’ access to financial 
resources. Network centrality and structural holes are significant factors that shape network 
effects.  
This study also investigates the impacts of business network affiliation on firms’ 
management cost and firm performance, and the impacts of concentrated ownership on 
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such relationships. We find that business networks affiliation is negatively related to firm 
performance in terms of profitability. Evidence shows that firms in business networks incur 
higher management costs. Among the three types of business networks, ownership 
networks and collaboration networks are found to have significant influence over firm 
performance and management cost. Interestingly, concentrated ownership is an important 
mediator for these relationships.  
Finally, since firms in business networks are exposed to other network members, this 
study examines the relationship between business networks and stock return volatility to 
model the effects of business networks on firms’ market response. We find that firms in 
business networks are more volatile than independent firms. Additionally, the results show 
that network size and network diversity exhibit an inverted U shape relationship with stock 
return volatility. Holding a central position in a network is positively related to stock return 
volatility while structural hole networks are negatively related to stock return volatility. 
Moreover, we also find that firms in SOE dominated networks are more volatile than those 
not. 
 
6.2 Contributions  
Through this study, we have made several contributions. First of all, as previous studies 
use business network definitions that either include weak connections or exclude important 
connections, we propose a new approach to defining business networks. Using relations 
classified as related parties, we construct business networks that capture many important 
relations. We believe the definition is superior to those used in previous studies (e.g. Carney 
et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2010; Ren et al., 2009) since it ensures that all network members 
have control or significant influence over each other. While previous studies were heavily 
focused on related party transactions, we adopt a network perspective to assess the extent 
of the relations among listed companies. Using this definition of business networks, we are 
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also able to configure how different types of relationships work based on the rich information 
available on relations between listed companies. Previous studies have used a single sole 
relationship to define their business networks (Ren et al., 2009; He et al., 2013; Gulati, 1998); 
this study identifies ownership networks, collaboration networks, and individual networks 
and investigates the role of each. Knowledge has been added to the literature of business 
networks by this understanding of how the nature of business networks affects the network’s 
effects. 
Additionally, we contribute to network studies in China by providing a systematic 
understanding of the features and dynamics of business networks and examining how 
network structures shape network effects. This research has provided an overall picture of 
business networks, something that has been relatively absent from the literature since 
studies on China have heavily focused on how guanxi matters (Ren et al., 2009; Li et al., 
2014). We find that business networks have expanded significantly over the period we 
studied, and that the development of business networks is shaped by the economic features 
of the national economy. Using panel data, we have been able to comment on the dynamics 
of business networks; this is something that is not often seen in the literature due to data 
constraints. This study also contributes to network studies by examining the role of network 
structure. Network structure is an important factor that shapes network effects. Unlike 
previous studies that suggested a positive relationship between central position and firms’ 
access to financial resources and firm performance, we have found that there is a positive 
relationship between central position and firms’ access to financial resources, but a negative 
relationship between central position and firm performance. 
Moreover, by adopting a network perspective, we have been able to model the channels 
for how business networks affect firms in terms of firm financing, operating performance, 
and market response. We have provided evidence that firms in business networks have 
superior access to finance, impaired firm performance due to higher management cost, and 
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more volatile stock return in the market. We have provided a complete view of business 
networks incorporating both their bright sides and dark sides. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature of corporate finance in several ways. 
Firstly, we investigate the role of business network affiliation on firms’ access to financial 
resources in order to partially answer the question of why and how business networks are 
still prominent given the significant improvement in the institutional environment (Byun et al., 
2013). By inspecting the relationships between business network affiliation and firms’ 
access to debts, trade credit, working capital management, and cash sufficiency and how 
the nature of business networks and institutional factors affect these relationships, we 
contribute to the literature by establishing that firms in business networks are less financially 
constrained. 
Second, while previous studies were relatively focused on the influences of firm/product 
characteristics on trade credit (Liu et al., 2016), this study examines how informal contracts 
affect firms’ access to trade credit. Previous studies looked at the impact of business 
networks on firms’ access to formal finance (Claessens et a., 2008; Liu et al., 2013; 
Haselmann et al., 2013), while this study examines the relationship between business 
networks and firms’ access to informal finance, which is severely affected by information 
asymmetry and moral hazard.  Third, by investigating the role of business networks on firms’ 
working capital management, we contribute to a relatively neglected area of study (Singh & 
Kumar, 2014). Studies on working capital management are limited in number and scope, 
with focus being concentrated on the relationship between working capital management and 
firm performance (e.g. Wang, 2002; Deloof, 2003). This study expects to add to the 
knowledge by shedding light on the determinants of working capital management. 
Fourth, we investigate the role of business network affiliation on management cost and 
subsequent financial performance to provide another channel of understanding for how 
business network affiliation affects firm performance. This chapter contributes to the debate 
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on the net benefits of business networks (Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016) by adding empirical 
evidence to the effect that business networks cause higher management costs for firms. We 
also examine the contingency value of concentrated ownership on the relationship between 
business network affiliation and management cost as well as firm performance to provide 
evidence for how corporate governance can shape the role of business network effects. We 
add empirical evidence of how firm strategy can affect the relationship between network 
affiliation and financial performance (Carney et al., 2011). 
Fifth, adopting stock price data, we construct measures of stock return volatility and 
investigate the relationship between business network affiliation and network structure and 
stock return volatility. We identify the impacts of the informal contracts and institutions that 
are typical of business networks on firm return volatility rather than relying on the traditional 
fundamental or trading volume-based factors (Zhang, 2010). We have identified that 
business networks are important factors that cause higher stock return volatility. Network 
structures also carry significant weight in shaping the role of the effects of business networks. 
We contribute to the research on emerging economies. Studies have stressed the role 
that the political economy has on firms, particularly regarding the lack of formal institutions 
(Cull et al., 2015; Zhou, 2013; Chen et al., 2011). This study further investigates the role of 
business connections among firms and provides evidence that business networks are vitally 
important for firms in emerging markets.  
Finally, by investigating the role of SOEs in business networks, this research further 
contributes to the literature on state capitalism. Adopting a network perspective, we provide 
new insights into the debate of “state makes advances and private retreats”, which is a 
theory that has until now gained little empirical support (Ji, 2010; Hu, 2012). This study 
further contributes to the literature on state capitalism by investigating the role of ownership 
in the relationship between network affiliation and firms’ access to financial resources. The 
results suggest that the role of business networks in firms’ financing is mediated by the 
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ownership of the focal firm. 
Through studying business networks in China, we have knowledge of their 
characteristics and their impacts on firms’ access to financial resources, firm performance, 
and market response in terms of stock return volatility. The findings of this study have 
significant managerial implications. We have outlined both the positive and negative aspects 
of business networks in this study, which enables managers to consciously select a network 
strategy that best fits the needs of the firm. Understanding the relationship between 
business networks and firms’ finance helps firms to choose a financing strategy that is 
appropriate for them; this is crucial for firms’ survival and growth. Greater knowledge of the 
effects of business networks on firm performance and the role of ownership concentration 
helps firms to properly choose their network strategy and guides firms in networks to better 
manage their network costs; they can therefore reap the full benefits of affiliation. Managers 
should search for ways to maximize the benefits of business networks while minimizing the 
costs.  
The findings concerning the relationship between business networks and firm stock 
return volatility equip firms with the tools to attract investors properly. Network effects are 
shaped by many factors including network nature, institutional factors, corporate 
governance, and network structure; this knowledge can encourage firms to use business 
networks strategically.  
Understanding the impacts of business networks also has strong policy implications for 
Chinese policymakers, who can use this knowledge to assist their management of the 
market and achieve their goals for economic reform in China.  This study provides some 
evidence of the advance of SOEs and their more prominent roles in networks. It is important 
for policy makers to come up with ways of managing the market to promote a fairer 
competitive environment. The knowledge of determinants of stock return volatility provides 
important tools for policy makers to control for volatility. More broadly, this study also has 
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important implications for foreign investors in China. It is necessary for foreign competitors 
to realize that in China they may not be competing with individual f irms but rather with a 
network of firms, and that their solution could be to get involved themselves in business 
networks in China. 
 
6.3 Limitations and future studies 
Like many other studies, this study suffers from several limitations. First of all, because 
we do not have data for non-listed companies in China, this study only looks at the networks 
in which listed companies are involved. The listed company network is clearly a sub-network 
of the whole network, and this narrowing of focus prevents us from gaining a more direct 
and accurate picture of business networks in China. Even though we have been able to 
perform some network measures for the whole network, we have not investigated its 
consequences and features. According to our definition related parties have either control 
or significant influence over each other, meaning that our definition only captures major 
relations while omitting many existing connections. Investigating a network that involves all 
firms would undoubtedly be more helpful in understanding the national economy. Moreover, 
as we exclude non-listed companies, there is the potential for sample selection. Future 
studies could consider using our definition to construct business networks involving both 
listed and non-listed companies to gain a more complete and reliable understanding of 
business networks. 
Additionally, even though this study sheds some light on business networks dynamics 
and evolution in chapter 2, we do not identify the factors that affect the formation of business 
networks. As business networks are crucial for firms’ survival and growth, greater 
understanding of the factors that prompt their formation would be useful in assisting firms’ 
networking decisions. Many network studies investigate the consequences of business 
networks but there has been limited academic focus on identifying the factors that influence 
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firms’ decisions to network. Knowledge of the determinants of business networks would 
enable firms to refine their tactics for managing business networks. Future studies could 
consider what factors drive the formation and evolution of business networks, and provide 
a more thorough understanding of business networks. Potential research questions could 
be “What factors drive the entry and exit of business networks?”  and “How does firm 
strategy affect firms network decisions?”  
As has been evidenced in this research, firms in business networks have financing 
advantages over independent firms. However, firms’ performance in terms of their 
profitability deteriorates rather than improves. Studies have suggested that the benefits of 
business networks are often not realized due to various offsetting costs (Claessens et al., 
2006; Lee et al., 2008; Carney et al., 2011) but studies that outline how the costs of business 
networks affect firm performance are limited. In this study, we use management cost of firms 
to explain the negative relationship between business networks and firm performance and 
thereby partly answer the question of how business networks tarnish firm performance. A 
thorough understanding of the internal working systems of business networks needs to be 
generated to capture how the cost of business networks outweigh their benefits. 
Understanding the internal working of business networks could also explain in detail how 
the benefits and costs of business networks conflict with each other. For example, future 
studies could investigate resource allocation among firms in networks to have an idea of 
how business networks work and why networked firms relatively underperform in 
comparison to free-standing firms. 
Furthermore, although this study investigates the effects of network affiliation status it 
does not provide evidence on how the extent of firms’ involvement in business networks 
affects firms’ network effects. In this study, we use different types of relations to identify 
different networks and outline the strength of networks. We also have some network 
structure measures to examine how firms are positioned differently in business networks. 
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We have therefore partially captured the intensity of business networks. However, as we 
mainly use a dummy variable to indicate firms’ network affiliation status, we have been 
unable to capture the effects of all the different extents to which firms may be involved in 
business networks. We are aware that some firms actively participate in network activities 
while other firms do not. Some firms in networks are activity organizers, while the others are 
merely participants. We expect that different degrees of involvement in business networks 
would make a difference to firm performance. Future studies can consider proxying the level 
of participation in network activities to provide evidence of how the extent of involvement 
mediates network effects.  
Fifth, there are many findings that need further exploration and we believe that mixed 
methodologies can be used to generate a more complete understanding of business 
networks. We can interview firms in networks to capture their internal working mechanism 
and thereby explain more thoroughly the benefits and costs of business networks affiliation. 
Using primary data, we can incorporate unlisted companies to generate a more 
representative sample to investigate business networks. By using mixed methods, we can 
potentially investigate the reasons underlying the empirical evidence. This study has 
presented a swathe of empirical evidence to support our hypotheses but the explanations 
of many of our results are based on previous studies in the literature. These studies were 
based on different definitions and research contexts and thus may not sufficient in explaining 
the current findings. With mixed methods, we can further examine the underlying principles 
of our findings and provide extra comfort for our results. 
Last but not least, the study suffers from cross-sectional dependence problems as 
suggested by the CD-test. This is a common issue in every panel data study and may affect 
parameter estimation and inference since the presentation of the panel statistics has 
assumed that individuals are cross-sectional independent (Sarafidis & Wansbeek, 2012; 
Kok & Munir, 2015). It is evidenced that conventional panel estimators, such as fixed or 
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random effects, are subject to misleading inference and even inconsistent estimators (Kok 
& Munir, 2015). In our case, firms have bonded together and formed networks to take 
coordinated actions. Fisher (1935) claims that “patches in close proximity are commonly 
more alike.” We acknowledge the possibility that our network dependent variable can be 
jointly determined. In this case, our estimations may produce misleading results. We have 
dealt with it using the Driscoll and Kraay estimator which is cross-sectional dependence 
robust.  
However, we also aware that this approach is unlikely to resolve the remaining 
endogeneity issue. This approach only works to correct standard errors if the unobserved 
factor that create the joint dependence are not correlated with the included independent 
variables. However, the estimators we used are some form of firm fixed effects model which 
a control for individual level of time invariable unobserved component. To some extent, 
which control for individual level time invariable unobservable components that may cause 
potential endogeneity. To some extent, we hope that this would address some potential 
endogeneity, although it may not be adequate in the cases when there are omitted variables 
that are not time-invariant firm specific, such as management skills. Moreover, in this study 
we adopted endogenous treatment effects which controls endogeneity issue for all models 
in Chapter 3. In order to solve this problem better, future studies could adopt models that 
control cross-sectional dependence to deliver more efficient results. For example, future 
studies can use spatial models to deal with this issue. Another alternative approach is the 
factor structure approach, which also effectively corrects for the dependence. Future 
research can also consider using GMM estimator to eliminate the possibility of endogeneity.  
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Appendix 1a: Listed companies in networks across different industries 
Industry 
199
7 
199
8 
199
9 
200
0 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
Manufacturing 9 33 55 68 122 164 205 238 240 280 326 373 416 512 523 
Real Estate 5 8 10 16 31 26 31 48 44 47 43 43 53 54 57 
Wholesale and retailing 2 7 11 11 28 35 37 41 41 45 46 53 51 61 66 
Mining industry 2 2 5 5 7 15 13 13 11 21 22 25 28 29 33 
Accommodation and Catering Services 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 5 7 6 5 6 
Leasing and Business Services 1 1 1 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 7 11 11 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 3 5 2 3 2 4 5 
Agriculture, forestry , animal husbandry and fishery 0 1 1 0 2 4 5 4 5 5 7 7 7 11 8 
Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry 0 2 5 5 9 15 17 24 28 30 31 37 39 47 46 
Building industry 0 1 2 1 2 5 7 6 7 10 15 20 20 21 21 
Transportation, storage and postal services 0 3 7 6 11 16 17 19 19 20 25 32 35 38 36 
Information transmission, software and IT services 0 1 1 3 8 10 11 8 6 8 10 10 16 28 26 
Financial Industry 0 1 4 5 7 9 12 12 10 12 16 18 24 29 31 
Scientific and technical services 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Facilities 
Management 
0 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 6 6 5 6 6 
Education industry 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Health and social work 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Complex 0 0 1 1 3 2 4 6 4 8 4 6 7 6 7 
Total 22 64 106 126 237 312 372 433 425 501 563 646 717 863 884 
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Appendix 1b: Listed companies in ownership networks across different industries 
Industry 
199
7 
199
8 
199
9 
200
0 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
Manufacturing 7 25 39 48 81 124 148 221 217 251 302 341 365 430 452 
Wholesale and retailing 1 5 9 8 18 26 23 38 39 43 43 49 48 51 59 
Real Estate 4 7 7 12 23 15 21 40 35 39 34 39 44 42 48 
Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry 0 2 4 3 6 12 13 22 26 27 29 35 37 40 35 
Mining industry 1 2 3 4 4 12 9 13 9 20 20 24 28 28 31 
Financial Industry 0 1 2 1 6 7 8 12 10 12 16 16 22 27 29 
Transportation, storage and postal services 0 3 7 6 6 12 9 19 17 19 23 28 32 29 24 
Information transmission, software and IT services 0 1 0 2 5 7 9 7 6 8 9 10 16 22 22 
Building industry 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 4 7 10 14 20 19 20 20 
Leasing and Business Services 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 3 3 5 4 6 9 10 
Complex 0 0 0 1 3 2 3 5 4 6 4 5 7 6 7 
Agriculture, forestry , animal husbandry and fishery 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 4 4 7 7 6 9 6 
Accommodation and Catering Services 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 5 6 5 4 5 
Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Facilities 
Management 
0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 4 4 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 2 3 2 3 4 
Education industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Health and social work 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Scientific and technical services 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 15 50 76 90 158 226 256 396 384 452 519 594 642 725 758 
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Appendix 2: Within industry ratio of firms in networks across industries 
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Financial Industry 0.00  
14.2
9  
32.0
5  
14.2
9  
30.7
7  
50.0
0  
57.1
4  
66.6
7  
46.6
7  
58.8
2  
51.8
5  
55.5
6  
70.0
0  
75.0
0  
72.5
0  
Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry 0.00  0.00  
11.6
6  
11.9
0  
20.0
0  
24.4
9  
27.4
5  
36.3
6  
43.1
0  
47.4
6  
40.0
0  
48.3
3  
53.1
3  
66.6
7  
64.3
8  
Accommodation and Catering Services 
20.0
0  
20.0
0  
0.00  0.00  0.00  
33.3
3  
28.5
7  
33.3
3  
14.2
9  
50.0
0  
55.5
6  
77.7
8  
60.0
0  
45.4
5  
54.5
5  
Mining industry 0.00  0.00  7.40  
14.2
9  
11.7
6  
30.0
0  
31.8
2  
25.0
0  
21.7
4  
27.5
9  
41.6
7  
44.4
4  
47.6
2  
45.2
8  
48.2
8  
Transportation, storage and postal services 0.00  7.41  
12.3
3  
9.52  
23.4
0  
23.2
1  
25.4
5  
33.3
3  
25.8
6  
27.4
2  
36.9
2  
43.2
8  
43.0
6  
50.6
8  
44.0
0  
Wholesale and retailing 5.00  2.63  6.87  7.69  
15.3
1  
22.5
5  
19.8
0  
27.2
7  
28.5
7  
35.3
5  
31.3
1  
33.6
6  
34.0
0  
39.2
9  
43.2
0  
Leasing and Business Services 0.00  
12.5
0  
9.62  8.33  
23.0
8  
14.2
9  
21.4
3  
20.0
0  
20.0
0  
18.7
5  
29.4
1  
33.3
3  
42.1
1  
33.3
3  
40.7
4  
Real Estate 
12.5
0  
12.0
0  
13.7
4  
10.3
4  
28.3
3  
21.3
1  
25.4
0  
35.4
8  
31.7
5  
30.3
0  
32.0
0  
23.8
1  
37.5
0  
39.0
2  
39.8
4  
Complex 2.13  4.48  8.01  
10.6
7  
18.9
2  
23.6
1  
28.7
7  
29.8
5  
26.8
7  
32.3
5  
30.8
8  
36.5
1  
37.5
0  
44.4
4  
37.0
4  
Manufacturing 3.14  8.48  
10.8
0  
12.8
7  
20.8
3  
24.0
3  
29.3
7  
32.6
5  
32.3
7  
34.9
9  
36.6
4  
41.3
3  
40.9
1  
39.5
8  
35.8
7  
Building industry 0.00  
15.3
8  
6.01  
17.6
5  
22.2
2  
22.7
3  
34.6
2  
18.5
2  
25.9
3  
31.2
5  
38.8
9  
45.9
5  
45.2
4  
42.8
6  
34.6
9  
Health and social work 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
33.3
3  
Water Conservancy, Environment and Public Facilities 
Management 
0.00  
20.0
0  
12.0
2  
10.0
0  
10.0
0  
18.1
8  
18.1
8  
45.4
5  
54.5
5  
54.5
5  
50.0
0  
42.8
6  
40.0
0  
37.5
0  
30.0
0  
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 0.00  
33.3
3  
24.0
4  
25.0
0  
50.0
0  
50.0
0  
25.0
0  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
11.1
1  
25.0
0  
27.7
8  
Resident services, repairs and other services 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
20.0
0  
40.0
0  
40.0
0  
40.0
0  
20.0
0  
14.2
9  
37.5
0  
12.5
0  
11.1
1  
25.0
0  
Information transmission, software and IT services 4.35  
12.9
0  
8.24  
10.8
1  
19.5
1  
25.5
3  
21.1
5  
23.5
3  
23.4
0  
24.0
7  
24.1
4  
24.1
9  
26.8
3  
28.7
0  
23.6
2  
Agriculture, forestry , animal husbandry and fishery 0.00  0.00  
10.1
2  
0.00  3.85  
17.2
4  
23.3
3  
11.4
3  
12.1
2  
13.8
9  
17.1
4  
22.2
2  
29.4
1  
25.0
0  
20.9
3  
Scientific and technical services 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
33.3
3  
28.5
7  
20.0
0  
10.0
0  
Education industry 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Appendix 3a: Centrality of listed companies across industries 
Industry 
Degree Between 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial Industry 
1.2308  1.5481  0 10 0.1377  0.2949  0 1 
Mining industry 
0.9111  1.8728  0 18 0.0735  0.2279  0 1 
Electricity, heat, gas 
and water 
production and 
supply industry 
0.7849  1.4122  0 13 0.0549  0.1786  0 1 
Building industry 
0.5885  1.0246  0 7 0.0515  0.1884  0 1 
Transportation, 
storage and postal 
services 
0.5587  1.1318  0 12 0.0432  0.1734  0 1 
Manufacturing 0.5565  1.1219  0 14 0.0352  0.1586  0 1 
Accommodation and 
Catering Services 
0.5447  0.8708  0 4 0.0208  0.1184  0 1 
Water Conservancy, 
Environment and 
Public Facilities 
Management 
0.5183  1.0594  0 6 0.0546  0.2057  0 1 
Wholesale and 
retailing 
0.4817  1.0800  0 11 0.0337  0.1606  0 1 
Real Estate 0.4504  1.0396  0 16 0.0331  0.1532  0 1 
Information 
transmission, 
software and IT 
services 
0.4312  1.0813  0 10 0.0199  0.1170  0 1 
Leasing and 
Business Services 
0.3984  0.7953  0 4 0.0472  0.1934  0 1 
Complex 0.3736  0.8510  0 10 0.0245  0.1329  0 1 
Scientific and 
technical services 
0.3478  0.8998  0 4 0.0377  0.1809  0 1 
Agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry 
and fishery 
0.2448  0.6270  0 3 0.0185  0.1216  0 1 
Resident services, 
repairs and other 
services 
0.2209  0.4703  0 2 0.0194  0.1289  0 1 
Culture, Sports and 
Entertainment 
0.1961  0.4231  0 2 0.0001  0.0013  0 0.0128 
Health and social 
work 
0.1818  0.4045  0 1 0.0000  0.0000  0 0 
Education industry 0.0000  . 0 0 0.0000  . 0 0 
Notes:Degree refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness 
centrality means the number of paths through the firm to all paths in the network. 
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Appendix 3b: Centrality of listed companies in ownership networks across industries 
Industry 
Degree Betweenness 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial Industry 0.7665  1.1124  0 6 0.00000190  0.00000922  0 0.000118 
Electricity, heat, gas 
and water production 
and supply industry 0.5314  1.0262  0 8 0.00000479  0.00003310  0 0.000514 
Mining industry 0.5241  1.1863  0 12 0.00000183  0.00001260  0 0.000201 
Leasing and Business 
Services 0.4061  0.7610  0 4 0.00000041  0.00000267  0 2.77E-05 
Manufacturing 0.3915  0.8243  0 10 0.00000109  0.00001500  0 0.000773 
Wholesale and retailing 0.3870  0.8567  0 14 0.00000095  0.00001210  0 0.000366 
Accommodation and 
Catering Services 0.3759  0.6922  0 4 0.00000002  0.00000019  0 2.00E-06 
Transportation, storage 
and postal services 0.3744  0.7092  0 6 0.00000102  0.00001310  0 0.000346 
Building industry 0.3510  0.6605  0 4 0.00000072  0.00000572  0 7.93E-05 
Education industry 0.3333  0.6172  0 2 0.00000021  0.00000080  0 3.11E-06 
Real Estate 0.3210  0.7684  0 10 0.00000067  0.00000901  0 0.00027 
Information 
transmission, software 
and IT services 0.3044  0.7852  0 7 0.00000101  0.00001070  0 0.00017 
Water Conservancy, 
Environment and Public 
Facilities Management 0.2750  0.7081  0 5 0.00000205  0.00002810  0 0.000433 
Agriculture, forestry , 
animal husbandry and 
fishery 0.1994  0.4740  0 2 0.00000021  0.00000212  0 3.02E-05 
Complex 0.1890  0.5140  0 3 0.00000019  0.00000328  0 0.000064 
Culture, Sports and 
Entertainment 0.1490  0.4417  0 3 0.00000030  0.00000285  0 3.02E-05 
Health and social work 0.1250  0.3416  0 1 0  0  0 0 
Scientific and technical 
services 0.0244  0.1562  0 1 0  0  0 0 
Notes:Degree refers to the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness 
centrality means the number of paths through the firm to all paths in the network. 
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Appendix 4a: Structural hole of listed companies across industries 
Industry 
Constraint 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Agriculture, forestry , animal 
husbandry and fishery 
0.9862  0.0772  0.3994  1.1285  
Mining industry 0.9251  0.1942  0.1331  1.6441  
Manufacturing 0.9720  0.1237  0.1210  1.9445  
Electricity, heat, gas and water 
production and supply industry 
0.9264  0.1804  0.1939  1.2986  
Building industry 0.9612  0.1323  0.3284  1.6389  
Wholesale and retailing 0.9720  0.1156  0.2806  1.8631  
Transportation, storage and postal 
services 
0.9531  0.1562  0.1267  1.6667  
Accommodation and Catering 
Services 
0.9850  0.0901  0.3973  1.1250  
Information transmission, software 
and IT services 
0.9818  0.0986  0.2544  1.6200  
Financial Industry 0.8809  0.2246  0.2282  1.3263  
Real Estate 0.9727  0.1223  0.2000  1.7516  
Leasing and Business Services 0.9705  0.1218  0.3968  1.5636  
Scientific and technical services 0.9775  0.1117  0.3243  1.0000  
Water Conservancy, Environment 
and Public Facilities Management 
0.9578  0.1445  0.2655  1.0000  
Resident services, repairs and other 
services 
0.9893  0.0700  0.5000  1.0000  
Education industry 1.0000  . 1.0000  1.0000  
Health and social work 1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 0.9953  0.0475  0.5200  1.0000  
Complex 0.9849  0.1077  0.2800  1.9150  
Notes: Constraint measures the structural holes a firm has in its network. It captures total 
constraint the network has to the firm.  
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Appendix 4b: Structural hole of listed companies in ownership networks across industries 
Industry 
Constraint 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Financial Industry 0.9083  0.2184  0.2000  1.0000  
Electricity, heat, gas and water 
production and supply industry 0.9359  0.1798  0.2000  1.1250  
Mining industry 0.9448  0.1733  0.1000  1.1250  
Education industry 0.9667  0.1291  0.5000  1.0000  
Wholesale and retailing 0.9686  0.1289  0.1391  1.1250  
Transportation, storage and postal 
services 0.9693  0.1291  0.2439  1.1250  
Manufacturing 0.9707  0.1254  0.1429  1.1250  
Leasing and Business Services 0.9724  0.1259  0.3333  1.1250  
Water Conservancy, Environment 
and Public Facilities Management 0.9745  0.1051  0.4397  1.0000  
Building industry 0.9747  0.1160  0.2500  1.1250  
Real Estate 0.9750  0.1178  0.1250  1.1250  
Information transmission, software 
and IT services 0.9786  0.0987  0.3333  1.0069  
Agriculture, forestry , animal 
husbandry and fishery 0.9881  0.0745  0.5000  1.0000  
Complex 0.9893  0.0720  0.5000  1.1250  
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 0.9921  0.0671  0.3333  1.0069  
Accommodation and Catering 
Services 0.9940  0.0835  0.3767  1.1250  
Scientific and technical services 1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
Health and social work 1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
Financial Industry 0.9083  0.2184  0.2000  1.0000  
Notes: Constraint measures the structural holes a firm has in its network. It captures total 
constraint the network has to the firm.  
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Appendix 5: network centrality for SOE and POB in each year 
Year 
Degree-SOE Between-SOE Degree-POB Between-POB 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1997 0.0499  0.2618  0 2 0.0035  0.0482  0 0.6667 0.0279  0.1652  0 1 0.0000  0.0000  0 0 
1998 0.0960  0.3541  0 4 0.0051  0.0684  0 1 0.0755  0.3139  0 2 0.0047  0.0687  0 1 
1999 0.1547  0.4573  0 4 0.0143  0.1116  0 1 0.0460  0.2106  0 1 0.0000  0.0000  0 0 
2000 0.1680  0.5082  0 4 0.0131  0.1043  0 1 0.0769  0.2678  0 1 0.0000  0.0000  0 0 
2001 0.2915  0.6458  0 7 0.0310  0.1556  0 1 0.2302  0.5391  0 3 0.0172  0.1112  0 0.8333 
2002 0.3857  0.8323  0 11 0.0288  0.1493  0 1 0.3024  0.6688  0 5 0.0282  0.1581  0 1 
2003 0.4432  0.8785  0 12 0.0456  0.1813  0 1 0.3380  0.6537  0 3 0.0198  0.1075  0 0.8333 
2004 0.5347  1.0352  0 18 0.0445  0.1828  0 1 0.3932  0.7851  0 4 0.0303  0.1569  0 1 
2005 0.5694  1.0120  0 13 0.0465  0.1859  0 1 0.3369  0.7602  0 5 0.0267  0.1478  0 1 
2006 0.7033  1.1710  0 14 0.0642  0.2105  0 1 0.3260  0.7047  0 6 0.0254  0.1491  0 1 
2007 0.7484  1.1462  0 9 0.0623  0.2078  0 1 0.3321  0.7105  0 5 0.0209  0.1356  0 1 
2008 0.9898  1.3812  0 9 0.0747  0.2186  0 1 0.3567  0.7806  0 6 0.0209  0.1358  0 1 
2009 1.1417  1.6380  0 14 0.0685  0.1931  0 1 0.3408  0.7600  0 5 0.0185  0.1150  0 1 
2010 1.3934  1.8725  0 12 0.0608  0.1946  0 1 0.4657  1.0100  0 9 0.0254  0.1342  0 1 
2011 1.4790  1.9761  0 16 0.0621  0.1926  0 1 0.2842  0.7288  0 11 0.0158  0.1130  0 1 
Note: Degree centrality is the number of contacts a firm has in its network. Betweenness centrality is the possibility that a focal firm falls into the paths of other network 
members. 
 
 
 
